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To Laos and its landscapes
Preface
This book originates from a university teaching initiative for landscape architecture
courses on ecological planning in Southeast Asia. Over the past 7 years, it evolved
into a platform for knowledge exchange, planning consultancy and environmental
advocacy. An outcome of this multi-year and multi-targeted initiative, this book
synthesizes landscape architecture with critical awareness of the global development
disciplines, connections not entirely new but which have radically diverged in recent
decades. This awareness, together with landscape architecture’s spatial and ecolog-
ical acumen, is strategically used to explore the often-opaque planning, design and
implementation processes of large-scale infrastructure and to complicate simplistic
notions of development and urbanization frequently reproduced in the Laos-China
frontier region.
The 414-kilometer China-Laos Railway, one of the first infrastructure projects
implemented under China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), is nearing completion at
the end of 2021. Coupled with hydroelectric dams, industrialization of new mineral
belts, and super-highways, landscapes along this and similar development corridors
in BRI countries are undergoing rapid and unprecedented transformation. Exploring
diverse conceptions and issues of development, including cultural and scientific
knowledge exchanges between Laos and China, nature tourism, resource networks
and new town planning, this book provides chapters on the historical and interdis-
ciplinary framing and pedagogy propelling its site-specific strategies that promote a
wider “landscape approach” to development.
Most often the agents and accomplices of neoliberal development, the plan-
ning and design professions, including landscape architecture, have little dialogue
with either the mainstream natural sciences or critical social sciences that form the
discourse of development projects in Laos and similar contexts. Seldom do the plan-
ning and design professions engage post-development theory, and hence, they lack
critical and tractable scholarly reflection on their socio-environmental impact and
lack adequate methodologies in the academy and professional practice for miti-
gating that impact. Addressing this scholarly lacuna, this book advocates for ecolog-
ical planning as a more momentary and political practice of sustainable development
supported by post-development theory and emancipatory aspirations. Illustrated in a
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selection of nine planning strategies developed by students, who followed this peda-
gogy since the ground-breaking of the China-Laos Railway in 2016, this book uses
landscape architecture’s interdisciplinary focus on planning and landscape ecology
to synthesize critical development studies with the design disciplines’ capacity, if
not naive predilection, to intervene on the ground.
Hong Kong Ashley Scott Kelly
Xiaoxuan Lu
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Landscape architecture participates in development. Whether that participation is
self-reflective or uncritical, complicit or compromised, this discipline has had signif-
icant impacts on development practice and academia that are often unacknowledged
outside what is otherwise a relatively narrow professional field. In the ways land-
scapes are planned and studied, for instance, both geographic information systems
and modern landscape ecology, which are today established parts of diverse social
and natural sciences, owe their origins distinctly to landscape architecture.
In 1967, landscape architect Ian McHarg, often referred to as the father of
Geographic Information Systems (GIS), wrote that “[w]here the landscape archi-
tect commands ecology he is the only bridge between the natural sciences and the
planning and design professions, the proprietor of the most perceptive view of the
natural world which science or art has provided” (p. 105). With global urbaniza-
tion increasing, both as physical land use change and as expanding discourse and
rhetoric, not at any time since the beginning of the twentieth century’s environmental
movement in the early 1970s has this burden of “bridging” been more imperative.
New allegiances between development agencies and planning institutions, such as
in China’s recent ecological “red line” policies (Bai et al., 2018), are extending
these institutions’ (and their planners and landscape architects’) remit into sensi-
tive non-urban landscapes and socio-ecological systems. While often the agents and
accomplices of neoliberal development in countries such as Lao PDR, the planning
and design disciplines generate scarce critical scholarly reflection on development
and offer few models of practice for critically engaging or mitigating large projects.
A significant portion of this book presents planning proposals for rural develop-
ment situated in northern Laos. “Development” here includes such projects, prac-
tices, and processes as land conversion, linear infrastructure building, ecological
resilience, impact mitigation, and resource access and redistribution. These planning
proposals are intended to be presented and debatedwith regional and national govern-
ments, multilateral banks, international environmental and human rights NGOs, civil
© The Author(s) 2021
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2 1 Introduction
society, and environmental movements. These actors are not the urban real estate
developers, town planning boards, and city governments most landscape architects,
architects, and planners are trained or accustomed to interact with. The most well-
informed expertise in critical development studies rarely enters these professions
or their projects, and there is a lack of publications in the planning and design
fields that engage the implementation of large-scale infrastructure development. This
book addresses this scholarly lacuna and uses landscape architecture’s interdisci-
plinary focus on planning and landscape ecology to synthesize or “bridge” critical
development studies with the planning and design disciplines’ capacity, if not naive
predilection, to intervene on the ground.
This bridging is admittedly uncomfortable, and intellectuals and professionals
will disagree with this book. Green academics and geographers may, at least in the
first half of this book, read little new here but a rediscovery of decades of their liter-
ature. Conservation biologists may see and rebuke a deconstruction of nature and
scientific authority. Development practitioners, from both the international devel-
opment community and built-environment camps, will argue that they are already
practicing in interdisciplinaryways. Landscape academicswill admonish us for shed-
ding decades of landscape architecture discourse. When teaching our students as
well as writing this book, we bear this potential crossfire in mind and deploy them
as productive motivators in our search for alternative models of landscape architec-
ture education and practice that more effectively bridge development, geography and
natural sciences.
2 Critical Interventions
While this book details a pedagogy of planning, its primary reflections are on how
planning for environmentally sensitive, rapidly developing contexts such as northern
Laos should be approached by planners. There are at times unresolved tensions in
our presentation of “critical” landscape planning as a pedagogy versus as a prac-
tice. This tension results from whether such a practice is relegated to the academy,
the profession, consultancy, advocacy or a combination of these. There are strong
institutional fields that make such a practice near impossible regardless of the host
or medium. We must admit that this pedagogy is situated in two ways: Firstly, it is
reactionary to ongoing rapid development in Lao PDR, primarily spurred by China’s
Belt and Road Initiative launched in 2013 and the assemblage of agro-industrial and
infrastructural projects that predate or accompany it; and secondly, this pedagogy is
taught as a required design studio course in landscape architecture at the University
of Hong Kong, which enables or enhances varying degrees of access to Southeast
Asia and relieves some burdens of the institutional fields present when operating
from North American and European contexts.
Doyle and Doyle (2000) assert that environmental studies’ “strategic problem-
solving, … eclectic methodology of interdisciplinary approaches, [and] … critical
and at times radical thought and propositions” are useful “to bridge the gap between
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theory and practice” (p. xxx). However, doing planning, as opposed to studying it or
the sciences that may (or may not) underpin it, is arguably different than being a critic
of planning. It is important to consider how critical development specialists (e.g., a
critical geographer or critical anthropologist) are trained and their frequent hesitation
to generate tractable proposals from what are otherwise very robust, critical, and
generative disciplinary spaces. For anthropologist Tania Murray Li in The Will to
Improve, a book based on her fieldwork and consultancy in Indonesia’s Sulawesi
highlands, this hesitation is reflected in her inability to suggest effective development
programs:
I find an ethnographic appreciation of the complexities of rural relations to be antithetical to
the position of expert. This might seem counterintuitive. Surely a person like me, after more
than a decade of research, has ideas about how to translate that knowledge into effective
programs to help people? Indeed, I am sometimes asked by anthropologically trained devel-
opment administrators in Indonesia to provide suggestions about what they should do. More
specifically, they ask me to provide them with a bridge between my research describing the
dynamics of rural life, which some of them have read, and the world of projects, which they
inhabit. Such a bridge eludes me. Why is it, I ask myself, that so many experts can examine
Indonesia and devise programs to improve it, whereas I cannot? (Li, 2007, p. 3)
Li further describes how development projects result from acts she calls the “ren-
dering technical” from a field of preexisting, predetermined capacities or solutions,
the construction of “an arena amenable to management and calculation” (p. 28).
This act is similar to what political ecologists Forsyth and Walker (2008) articu-
late as “problem closure” in their work in northern Thailand (p. 12). Li articulates
her critical position here primarily as “diagnostic” (p. 3); for her, the role of critic
and expert (e.g., the planner) are distinct because of the expert’s necessity to define
problems in terms of the solutions that can be offered. Geography’s various inter-
disciplinary constructions for studying nature-society relationships, such as political
ecology and land change science (Turner & Robbins, 2008) or, more recently, a call
for a critical physical geography (Lave et al., 2014), hold, to various degrees, cultural-
technological positions that challenge Li’s distinction between critic and expert. A
large portion of Chapter Two: A Pedagogy of critical landscape planning is dedi-
cated to developing a cultural-technological position for landscape architects doing
development planning, i.e., landscape planning, and exploring Li’s circumscription
of what constitutes a “project.”
3 Landscape Planning as Sustainable Development
Although this book is written from the perspective of the design disciplines and is
intended to effect change in and for various silos of landscape architecture educa-
tion, in programs both design-oriented and science-oriented, we offer considerable
bridging into development, geography, and natural sciences. Indeed, in the book as in
teaching, we hold an outward valence and deploymostly foreign discursive sounding
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boards to make and justify both pedagogical choices and suggestions for how to do
planning.
This book also offers a significant break with the ecological planning and land-
scape ecology literature from landscape architecture. Landscape ecology is defined
as “the science and art of studying and improving the relationship between spatial
pattern and ecological processes on a multitude of scales and organizational levels”
(Wu, 2008, p. 2103). Richard T. T. Forman, professor emeritus in Harvard’s Depart-
ment of Landscape Architecture, is considered the father of modern landscape
ecology, as well as the subfield of road ecology. Since its inception in the mid-
1980s, modern landscape ecology has become a vibrant field over the last three
decades in various biological, geographical, and social sciences (Cushman et al.,
2010). Furthermore, early geographic information systems (GIS) research and devel-
opment addressed questions of “development suitability” among human landscape
use (such as agricultural or industrial), environmental limits (such as slope, soils,
and water supply), and their consequences or services (such as erosion and pollu-
tion control) (Chrisman, 2006). Indeed, throughout the 1990s, land-use planning in
Laos was rationalized through “scientific” expertise stemming from such land suit-
ability analysis and geospatial software environments (Lestrelin et al., 2012, p. 583).
Although, in the course of their learning, our students have engaged with landscape
ecologists, none of those landscape ecologists had trained in landscape architec-
ture, and, indeed, they recognize little if any disciplinary lineage with landscape
architecture. The same is true for natural and social scientists deploying GIS.
Significant ideological barriers are also present. With few exceptions, most land-
scape architects and planners are disciplinarily short-handed to engage sustainable
development outside of what is termed urban sustainability. This inadequacy requires
a shift (notmerely expansion) in design discourse and related built-environment fields
from urban sustainability to conservation and sustainable development. Sustain-
ability is most commonly defined as “…a dynamic balance among three mutually
interdependent elements: Protection and enhancement of natural ecosystems and
resources; economic productivity; and provision of social infrastructure such as jobs,
housing, education, medical care and cultural opportunities” (Dominski et al., 1992,
as quoted in Bell & Morse, 1999). Alternatively, the International Union for the
Conservation of Nature (IUCN) has, since the 1980s, defined “sustainable develop-
ment” as “…development that meets the needs of the present without compromising
the ability of future generations to meet their needs” (WCED, 1987). Key to this
latter definition is the framing of sustainable outcomes in terms of “ability,” which
foretells the focus of post-development theory on, rather than material outcomes, the
means of development, the process of development, and ensuring that people have
the capacity to improve their own lives (Sen, 1999). Arguably, most of the planning
and design disciplines (i.e., landscape architecture, architecture, urban planning)
take the former definition, which presumes a necessity to quantify resources, to be
economically productive, and that social infrastructure, including health and well-
being, is something to be provided. For landscape architecture to effectively engage in
landscape planning and development, landscape architects must wield a discourse of
sustainable development and shift away (not merely expand) from design’s dominant
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forms of economic or urban sustainability. This shift is explored through situated,
Laos-specific discourse from geography in Chapter Four: Locating discourses and
narratives for intervention.
4 A Definition of Critical Landscape Planning
Landscape architects are not traditionally trained to be critical; they are also not
trained as natural scientists, and landscape architects’ expertise in development
should be treated with suspicion. Landscape architects are mostly designers (e.g.,
artists) who tend toward ecologically conceptualizing their practices with varying
degrees of social and (natural) scientific sophistication. Although landscape archi-
tecture claims distinct lineages in human geography and town planning, it is often
the more mainstream town planning traditions that drive the field both academically
and professionally. However, Gerald Young, in his 1974 survey of applied human
ecology fields, remarked that:
[S]everal of the soundest and most successful ecologically based environmental consultant
firms are essentially converted landscape architecture firms, e.g. Wallace, McHarg, Roberts
andTodd in Pennsylvania or Steinitz andRogers inMassachusetts. This latter trend presents a
difficulty in trying to distinguish an ecologicalmethod specifically for landscape architecture;
most of its more prominent practitioners, at least those in print, tend not to separate it from
the field of planning and generally make little attempt to distinguish method (Young, 1974,
p. 53).
Althoughwe by nomeans have naive faith in the capacity of “design” (as a holistic
approach from the design disciplines) to offer ways to improve improvement, we do
argue that landscape architecture’s role in the institution of planning remains, in its
capacity (and responsibility) as McHarg had argued in 1974, to “bridge” planning
with natural science. We further this argument in this book to suggest landscape
architecture’s contemporary role to bridge planning with critical development, as
well as conceptions of nature that hold it, in its own right, distinct from humanistic
social deconstruction (e.g., conservation biology; see Soulé, 1995).
There are numerous, almost assuredly insurmountable, barriers to what could
be considered “critical” planning. Planning is largely mainstream, dominant and an
active participant in the neoliberalization of science. Planning suffers from a lack of
effective interdisciplinary knowledge and praxis with both critical social science and
applied ecology. We do not address these issues, nor do we provide a comprehensive
survey of critical social theory or critical approaches as they pertain to development.
Instead, we demonstrate the use of critical reflection as conceptual generators in
the making (and drawing and designing) of plans. We bridge tenets from design,
such as process-based and iterative approaches, to similar process-based axioms and
methods in post-development theory.
Our working definition of critical landscape planning is as follows:
A practice of critical landscape planning, routed in landscape architecture, uses
multiple forms of sustainability to plan for landscapes engaging in (or encountering)
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development. The critical landscape planner holds a cultural-technological posi-
tion and simultaneously applies science to specific site conditions, is critical of that
science, and in the process and practice of applying it, refines and deepens the relevant
scope of work.
Whether done by a consultancy firm or a large international NGO (with no
designers or planners), planning is almost always a compromised effort. We are
attempting to push planning towards a more momentary and political practice of
sustainability (not economic or urban sustainability) that is supported by post-
development theory and emancipatory aspirations. The conceptual approaches in
students’ projects presented in Part Two of this book are driven by a critical devel-
opment focus, which can be distilled even from the project titles, such as: Nego-
tiating with ethno-ecology: Landscape management strategies for northern Laos’s
ecotourism boom; Empowering a labor transition during enclosure and securiti-
zation of Luang Prabang’s natural heritage; or Water risk and responsibility: A
political-chemical land genealogy for the Muang Sing Valley, Laos.
5 Organization of This Book
This book is divided into two distinct parts. The three chapters in Part One have a
wide remit, covering issues from pedagogy to practice, reframing the development
history of northern Laos as an assemblage of projects, and surveying the discourses
necessary, hopefully, to make development planning better—or as anthropologist Li
(2007) would say—“for how improvement can be improved” (p. 2).Part Two surveys
nine strategic planning proposals developed from that pedagogy and discourse.
In Chapter Two: A Pedagogy of critical landscape planning, we suggest a form of
critical research andpractice in landscape architecture that actively engages the global
development community. We frame critical landscape planning as produced through
three primary struggles: holding cultural-technological positions; ensuring transdis-
ciplinary approaches through culturing and immersion; and maintaining momentum
via process-oriented approaches to development. We cover critical landscape plan-
ning’s definition as an applied critical research practice, address its primary chal-
lenges institutionally, academically, and practically, and describe the aspects of the
landscape architecture design discipline that enable it. This is conveyed through
reflection on our approaches to project case study selection and design exercises,
stakeholder relationships, approaches to fieldwork, capacity for intervention, and
association with parallel research efforts. Much of the contents, although supported
academically, are structured as suggestions that are equally important as methods for
design research and professional practice. These suggestions include replacing “site
analysis” with a process of site-specific interdisciplinary socialization and replacing
design and planning “concepts” with generative (even if often incommensurable)
cultural-technological positions.
Chapter Three: From land-locked to land-linked? constructs a history of
infrastructure-building in Laos understood through economic connectivity. This
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chapter challenges the dominant narrative of a dehistoricized, often linear progres-
sion from land-locked to land-linked or from isolation to integration by contextual-
izing the contemporary imaginations and developments of Laos within the broader
social, economic and political transitions across the Mekong region. We ground
the distinct histories of three loosely defined historical periods between the mid-
nineteenth century and present day in discourses specific to their times and places,
each with their own geographic conception of the Mekong region and particular
combination of socio-economic and geopolitical imperatives driving investment in
large-scale infrastructure projects. This chapter presents development projects in
Laos as relational and cumulative and supports an understanding of development as
a process instead of product.
Chapter Four: Locating discourses and narratives for intervention explains why
particular literature (i.e., secondary sources) were included as supporting knowl-
edge for our approach to landscape planning. This chapter argues that planners and
designers engaging in a “critical” landscape planning need a proactive, rigorous and
reflective approach to assembling the discourses, both global and local, in their
projects. Discourse is assembled from post-development theory, cultural anthro-
pology, sociology, political science, political geography, and political ecology.
Drawing from a selection of articles on the recent (i.e., since establishment the
Lao People’s Democratic Republic in 1975) political economy and ecology of Laos
by Lestrelin et al. (2012), Goldman (2001), Barney (2009) and Dwyer (2020),
we foreground four critical concepts that function as conceptual drivers of the
strategic planning proposals featured in Part Two of the book. These critical concepts
are: the politics of land-use planning; sustainable development paradigm; frontier
resourcification; and the promise of infrastructure.
The strategic planning proposals in Part Two are loosely grouped into four
thematic areas: (1) Infrastructural connectivity and difference; (2) Western alter-
native development and Chinese development; (3) Chinese mass nature tourism and
ecotourism; and (4) Northern scientific knowledge and indigenous knowledge. These
planning proposals engage the development of large-scale agro-industry, infrastruc-
ture and extractive projects, and the milieu of green developmentalist projects that
contest and enable them, such as protected areas, community forestry programs,
and corporate social responsibility projects. Political economist Simpson (2014)
following Hirsch (1998) argues that most environmental movements in the Global
South have “crystallised most clearly around large-scale resource projects” and that
they are “movements that ‘oppose something’” (p. 50). Although not overtly activist
in nature, most of the included planning proposals in Part Two do have, as evidenced
in their thematic groupings by chapter, normative or emancipatory objectives aligned
with the deconstruction of development and nature.
Indeed, for every special economic zone, development enclave, satellite city, or
resettlement site in rural Laos, there might just be an unassuming planner, architect
or landscape architect doing a landscape impact assessment, drafting a new plan
or making a rendering to motivate investment. The planning and design disciplines
are often complicit in development violence through mainstream professional prac-
tice. Deeper awareness of the development process, starting from an immersion and
8 1 Introduction
culturing of landscape designers in the critical and technical disciplines that actually
debate and practice sustainability in Laos and related contexts, however flawed, is
necessary to improve development outcomes.
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A Pedagogy of Critical Landscape
Planning
1 Introduction
Outside the design disciplines, the conservation of “landscapes” is now a domi-
nant agenda, narrative and rhetoric that binds together the scientific study, planning,
finance, and development of the project of conservation globally. Today, “landscape”
displaces and “consumes” both the older strict national park paradigm and newer
community-based conservation approaches of the last three decades (Goldman, 2009,
p. 336).
Very different disciplines dominate development in these landscapes. In urban
Vientiane, the capital of Lao PDR, familiarity with urban design and planning and
real estate institutions, even for the urban periphery, necessitates an urban awareness.
However, in rural Laos, both the impacts and academic insights come from either the
global development machinery (e.g., the environmental impact assessment process)
or critical reactions to it.
Landscape architecture, as is much of planning and architecture, is highly imbri-
cated in development. Landscape architects and planners create masterplans for
building resettlement camps, development enclaves, and special economic zones;
they offer (and sell) their expertise and impose their authority. Plainly put, these disci-
plines, both in praxis and academia, are largely complicit in neocolonialist practices
and the destruction of the natural world. The role of “landscape” in the planning and
design disciplines (i.e., landscape architecture, architecture, urban planning) is at its
best and most critical when deploying the complexity of human-oriented ecology
to champion normative sustainable agendas. Such deployment is rare in landscape
architecture’s academia and professional practice, which are dominated by client-
consultant relationships, due to the compromised nature of those relationships, poor
familiarization with conventional scientific material in ecology, and scant engage-
ment with contemporary critical environmental literature. “Landscape,” in this case,
gives no effective resistance to the broader neoliberalization of environmental science
and its practice. Critical geographer Lave (2012) suggests three characteristics of the
neoliberalization since the 1990s of the science of environmental management in
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policy, in practice, and in part, the academy, including: privatized knowledge claims,
applied research that targets market or agency demands, and new metrics enabling
market-based environmental management. These are all present to various degrees
in the academic science and professional practice of the landscape disciplines.
A pedagogy and practice of critical landscape planning is important for both the
design disciplines’ and conservation fields’ framings of “landscape,” especially given
the increasing territorial expansion of the planning and design professions from their
historical urban centers into nature, the countryside, or the rural.
Rural development is an outlier for most urban planners and designers, as well as a
place and discourse most academics and practitioners of landscape architecture may
never encounter. These different development contexts and foci necessitate a varied
range of teaching approaches, which in turn require instructors to have significant
interdisciplinary backgrounds outside the design disciplines and a significant expense
of academic institutional capital in transdisciplinary teaching and research (Perz
et al., 2010). The development contexts we claim and the discourses of sustainability
we conjure are used in service of teaching rather than teaching a better way for a
discipline (not necessarily landscape architecture) to engage development.
Weller (2014), chair of Landscape Architecture at the University of Pennsyl-
vania, affirms “there is a significant disconnection between landscape architecture
and the global conservation effort and community, who are otherwise extremely
active and well organized” (p. 94). He continues by relaying a conversation with
Braulio Ferreira de Souza Dias, executive secretary of the Convention on Biological
Diversity, in which de Souza “indicated that he was unfamiliar with the capabilities
of landscape architects and had never heard of Ian McHarg. This is our problem,
not his” (emphasis in original) (p. 94). While Ian McHarg is a central figure in both
landscape architecture and, for his theoretical and methodological contributions to
suitability planning, a foundational figure in Geographic Information Systems (GIS)
(Chrisman, 2006), this is unsurprising. Landscape architecture turned away from
large-scale planning towards the end of the twentieth century, just as the global devel-
opment machinery, headed by the World Bank, was beginning to reshape the global
physical, political and epistemological natures of the developing world and their
most attendant disciplines (Goldman, 2005). The design and planning disciplines’
involvement, including landscape architecture, is either nascent or, when it exists
in regional or master planning, disciplinarily siloed. Accordingly, addressing these
issues both in the academy and in the field requires greater disciplinary awareness
and innovative approaches to learning and practice.
Contemporary landscape (or ecological) planning, a waning subfield of land-
scape architecture, comes from the generally positivist approaches promoted by
landscape architect Ian McHarg in his 1969 canon “Design with Nature” (Young,
1974).However, neither planning nor landscape architecture existswithin a constella-
tion of disciplines able to offer critical interdisciplinary research (e.g., anthropology
and geography’s political ecology, land change science, sustainability science). A
potential “critical” repositioning of landscape planning is as follows: To combat the
design disciplines’ reproduction of disciplinary and organizational inequalities and
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injustices in problem framing and approach requires (or is always requiring) sensi-
tivity to postcolonial, post-development, and gendered approaches to science and
planning. Such a sensitivity may only be possible if landscape architecture can turn
beyond the design disciplines and hold an outward valence to both natural science,
as McHarg had argued, and critical development theory.
This chapter introduces, primarily using insights from critical and applied anthro-
pology and geography, a pedagogy of critical landscape planning run for six years
at the University of Hong Kong that rapidly builds landscape designers’ abilities to
wield global development and sustainability discourses in landscapes undergoing
transformation in the biodiverse frontiers of mainland Southeast Asia. In design
education, design “studio” courses are the dominant taught pedagogy for disciplinary
training, at least in terms of time and effort. These courses are often taken for granted
as the most effective means of learning how to design and plan (They are often a
pedagogical leap of faith). They are problem-based, with the scope usually set by
a defined “program,” i.e., the required components of a building, landscape, urban
design, or urban plan. In our studio courses on strategic landscape planning, which
were focused on northern Laos each year from 2018–2020, instead of program,
we provide students with a loose assemblage of non-design case-based literature,
working theses, and constellation of ongoing development projects disbursed along
the 400 km China-Laos Railway corridor.
In this chapter,wefirst define the “critical” in critical landscape planning, followed
by three key struggles that both define and sustain a pedagogy and practice of crit-
ical landscape planning. We describe the ways that landscape architecture, when
holding cultural-technological positions, is similar to and distinct from various crit-
ical approaches to the environment in geography and other social sciences. There-
after, drawing from these same disciplines, we propose a method of interdisciplinary
socialization bywhich a landscape architect simultaneously assembles the discourses
of a site of engagement and enhances their awareness of various actors’ capaci-
ties and positions. We explore the utility and limitations of critical approaches for
“making plans” and describe howcritical geography and anthropology have informed
students’ planning proposals’ scopes and narratives, particularly in the ways these
fields converge on cultural-technological and sustainability themes.
The sequence for our design studio courses on landscape planning includes multi-
sited and multi-scale research, cross-disciplinary case studies, direct and diverse
cross-sector stakeholder engagement, and student-led scoping of strategic landscape
planning proposals. The organization of the components (i.e., how the pedagogy is
“run”) of this design studio course on landscape planning are relatively straightfor-
ward (Fig. 1) and are described in the following paragraphs. However, that structure
largely obscures why pedagogical decisions were made, as well as limits its transla-
tion into and implication for a critical practice. For these reasons, we structure this
chapter and frame critical landscape planning as engaged in three primary struggles:
• holding cultural-technological positions;
• ensuring transdisciplinary approaches; and
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Fig. 1 Four-phase organizational schedule of 15-week landscape planning course showing indi-
vidual learning paths for 22 students as they assemble knowledge across diverse research areas,
drivers of landscape change, and cross-disciplinary case studies in development
• maintaining momentum, especially via process-oriented approaches to develop-
ment.
Students spend the first half of the term, approximately eight hours in class each
week for six weeks, actively coupling a process of landscape transformation with
critical texts on Laos and other regions in Southeast Asia. Such processes of land-
scape transformation are highly physical and technical, including: agricultural cycles,
conversions, and transitions; highway planning, material sourcing, construction, and
operation; and mining prospecting, extraction, and remediation. The selected crit-
ical texts, which form the basis for Chapter Four: Locating discourses and narra-
tives for intervention, are situated case-based literature that challenge the main-
stream narratives of scientific land-use planning, alternative development models,
the decentralization of environmental governance, and technical scopes of various
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infrastructure and development programs. Students use their landscape architecture
design backgrounds in visual arts, supported by generalist technical knowledge in
ecology, site engineering, and participatory planning, to re-represent these critical
texts. This reflective and translational process often involves drawing and modelling
the geographical and anthropological field sites described in that literature while
foregrounding the role of each student’s assigned process of landscape transfor-
mation. Students struggle with questions of information and data (e.g., stakeholder
transparency; abstraction and contingency; partiality or scope; integration or incom-
patibility) and environmental determinism (and the very real struggle to resist deter-
ministic representations). This process is an exercise in imagining, constructing,
manipulating and holding, however momentary and brittle, a cultural-technological
position. It is also an intensive immersion or socialization in critical studies.
Following the preceding exercise, the group of approximately 20 students and two
instructors travelled to northern Laos for ten days. Figure 2 shows the travel route,
projects, China-Laos Railway corridor, and other important context. This fieldwork
component to these courses, while not structured around social sciences methods,
also does not follow planning methods that stress on-the-ground documentation of
landscape or physical systems; it is not a “site visit.” Instead, focus is on stakeholder
interaction with a purposefully wide spectrum of agents, from domestic civil society
groups to international NGOs, and visiting upwards of 20 development programs or
projects selected purposely for their contrasting ideological approaches to conserva-
tion and development. No partner organization manages or oversees the entire field
visit, and the class typically only stays with a single stakeholder from a few hours to
two days. The diversity of sites and diversity of stakeholders are crucially important
for students to recognize the nuances of stakeholder positions, specifically both in
how these agents present themselves and their projects and in how they react to the
students’ own presentation of “desktop research” done prior to the field visit. These
experiential learning activities have engaged students directly with no less than 12
major international NGOs and more than 16 domestic civil society organizations
focused on development and environmental conservation. Most of these organiza-
tions had never before spoken to a landscape architect or anyone from the design
disciplines. Although substantial work is required to create and sustain these expan-
sive non-academic, non-design-related, andoften conflictingnetworks and associated
campaigns, they are invaluable for research and pedagogy. Indeed, when navigating
complex stakeholder relationships, Perz et al. (2010) recommend choosing partner-
ships “assuming pre-existing conflicts … which reduces time spent on downstream
courtships” (p. 428). Daily debriefing sessions are held for one to two hours each
evening for the students and instructors to discuss the complexity of interactions
and observations from the day and how these compare with previous days. Together
with students’ immersion in development literature, the aforementioned stakeholder
meetings provide students with invaluable awareness of the professional and disci-
plinary positions of a wide spectrum of stakeholders. Maintaining access to these
stakeholder networks requires dealing with dominant “institutional fields” (p. 425).
For the secondhalf of the term, for another approximately sixweeks for eight hours
in class eachweek, students each developed strategic planning proposals for engaging
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Fig. 2 Twenty-two development projects, all located in landscapes impacted by development of
the China-Laos Railway, and the route along which they were visited by University of Hong Kong
landscape planning students in 2018 and 2019; these projects are categorized by sector, subsector,
or broad development approach
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in or mitigating a wide range of development sites and contexts. A selection of these
proposals is presented in Part Two of this book, and they are grouped by the primary
ideological friction used to generate each strategy: (1) Infrastructural connectivity
and difference; (2) Western alternative development and Chinese development; (3)
Chinese mass nature tourism and ecotourism; and (4) Northern scientific knowledge
and indigenous knowledge. To start the brainstorming process, the approximately
20 development programs or projects visited were paired in different combinations
generally following these contrasting approaches to development (Fig. 3). Students
reflected on their field visits by drawing andmodelling those sites, using similar skills
and approaches as the first half of the course where they were re-presenting or eluci-
dating on the critical texts and processes of landscape transformation. Student spec-
ulations have included such diverse topics as: Resilience strategies for China-Laos
Railway temporary access roads; Remediation strategies for agricultural concessions
based on a highly heterogenous land genealogy; Negotiation between ecosystem
science research and community forest initiatives; and Landscape-oriented knowl-
edge toolkits to help communities argue for international compensation standards.
Fig. 3 Tobegin brainstorming potential landscape interventions, students studied contrasting devel-
opment approaches between two projects or programs they visited; these contrasts included frictions
in development ideology, scale, speed and scope
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At the end of the term, students present their strategies to a cross-disciplinary panel
juried largely by non-designers: academics including political ecologists, landscape
ecologists, sociologists, and environmental managers; agencies and international
NGOs engaged in development, including NGO directors of conservation, philan-
thropy, and green economy; and domestic NGOs and civil society organizations’
field biologists.
Frameworks, especially more aspirational ones, are often academically tenuous.
Admittedly, we are careful in howwe define the “struggles” necessary, as bothmeans
and ends, to achieve a pedagogy and practice of critical landscape planning. Although
certainly not a panacea for addressing the deficiencies in the training of planners
and the institution of land planning in development, as an isolated component of
a landscape architecture curriculum, this framework is manageable and facilitates
a basic disciplinary awareness necessary for more critical, reflective engagement
with development. Ideally, such training could indeed be multidisciplinary, but after
decades of calls for planning curricula to diversify—to have staff compositions that
reflect their interdisciplinary mandates—few (if any) universities have achieved that
diversity. The academic capital necessary to start is significant (Rasmussen & Arler,
2010).
2 Critical Approaches to Landscape Planning
As with most “critical” disciplinary turns, being critical of landscape planning
requires more reflexivity about the impacts of our practices. Periodic critical turns
across academia have occurred since the linguistic and deconstructivist turn of the
1980s. More recent turns in nature-society studies, which focus predominantly on
the forms of development studied in this book, include critical political ecology and
critical physical geography (Forsyth, 2003; Lave et al., 2018).
Landscape architecture holds separate origins in geography and town planning
and has historical synergies with human ecology (Young, 1974). However, as a
practiced profession, its mainstream town planning and environmental management
legacies are distinctly dominant in academia and praxis. Environmental theorists
from political ecology and science and technology studies, along with other various
subfields of geography and anthropology, have been ardent in their critiques of exper-
tise, authority, and scientific practice institutionally, in the lab, in the field, and in
consultancy (Forsyth, 2015). Introduced earlier in this chapter, Weller’s discontent
with opportunities for landscape architecture in the “conservation community” are
well-founded, if not overly aspirational. A critical practice and pedagogy of land-
scape planning in the design disciplines requires recognizing at times uncomfortable
but instructive bridges between design and approaches in critical and physical geog-
raphy. Although calls for synergy between physical and critical geography occur
periodically, a recent debate over political ecology and land change science is useful
to summarize, particularly given these fields’ approaches to problem framing.
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Although political ecology and land change science diverge respectively into
constructivist and post-positivist perspectives, both trace their origins to the emer-
gence of environmental studies in the 1960s when human ecology was reinvented
as an interdisciplinary “subversive science” with strong problem-oriented and ethi-
cally driven approaches (Rasmussen &Arler, 2010, p. 39). Both of these subfields of
geography are case-based and share topics covering “land degradation, desertifica-
tion, deforestation, conservation, institutions and governance, ecological impacts of
economic development, and equity and environmental trade-offs,” as well as shared
spatial themes, such as “the efficacy of park or reserve boundaries, the role of spatial
connectedness to understand human–environment relationships (e.g., access, isola-
tion, and distance), and the use of spatial knowledge and information” (Turner &
Robbins, 2008, p. 299).
While political ecology and land change science share interests and similar
conclusions, they differ in base research questions, explanatory frameworks, problem
framing, analytical approaches, and institutional positioning. Land change science
employs and refines methods of geospatial and statistical science to relate environ-
mental change to human decision making and engages policy through formalized
institutional arrangements (Turner & Robbins, 2008). In contrast, political ecology
stresses the divergent needs of stakeholders anddeploys awider set of skills, including
“archival analysis, ethnography, discourse analysis, historical narrative construction,
interviews, as well as tools and theories from environmental sciences” (Kull, 2013,
p. 79). While greatly inspirational for a landscape architect considering a practice
of regional landscape planning, a planner (or planning team of any size, for similar
and additional reasons) would not accomplish such groundwork, especially in the
course of professional practice. Before we address what is useful here, it is impor-
tant to describe the expertise of an individual holding both physical and critical
geographical positions.
Although early political ecologists, circa 1980s, conducted their own natural
science research, political ecology todayhas largelymoved away fromnatural science
as an object of analysis (Lave et al., 2018;Walker, 2005). Political ecology “expresses
concern about simplifications of concepts borrowed from ecological science for
policy and development applications” (Turner & Robbins, 2008, p. 304). Early polit-
ical ecology focused on disproving dominant explanatory frameworks; this disproval
methodologically often replaced one form of data with another and often via mixed
methods (Lane et al., 2018, p. 37). This approach led to very particular types of
projects that often did not require (although they should have) an acute fluency with
those sciences’ methods.
Lave et al.’s (2018) recent framework for a “critical physical geography” proposes
training geographers in both critical theory (e.g., political ecology, science and tech-
nology studies) and a specific natural science niche, either biophysical or technolog-
ical, such as field biology. They argue that because such geographers can “speak a
forest ecologist’s language,” these geographers’ “arguments (hopefully) gain more
traction in those fields” (parentheses in original) (Law, 2018, p. 100). This training
is effectively a horizontal knowledge base in critical studies with a vertical natural
science knowledge base. Such a construction in many ways mirrors actual silos of
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training in these fields and, if strategic and mentored, might be achievable with only
minor transgression of academic institutional structures. Lave et al.’s framework can
be extended to suggest a model whereby landscape planners can be “critical” nego-
tiators of complex development programs and projects, but only by becoming more
proficient (i.e., vertical) at the science and more horizontal in critical development
knowledge.
Although an attractive model, there are distinct if not insurmountable differences
in most landscape architects’ training (not to mention again the heavy orientation
towards professional practice) and their weak exposure to science and engineering
curricula. Landscape architects are educated with a diffuse combination of civil
engineering, physical geography, human geography, ecology, and design histories,
theories, and applications. They are taught predominantly by landscape architects
in a field far more homogenous and with far fewer academic centers than geog-
raphy. Design often speaks in a collective “we” (and we are culpable of that in this
book). A landscape architect’s expertise is largely interactional, meaning it exists on
a continuum somewhere between minimal or no expertise to the ability to contribute
to a field of knowledge (Collins et al., 2007). Interactional expertise primarily enables
one to see connections, to understand and to communicate across fields but rarely
deepens an individual field’s disciplinary knowledge.
For the aforementioned reasons, our pedagogy for critical landscape planning
requires practitioners to draw primarily from secondary studies and data. However,
suchmethods do require advanced expertise in data integration and aworking knowl-
edge of these fields. Importantly, this is not an approach to academic research; it
is an approach to a critical practice of landscape planning that draws heavily on
the axioms and problem frameworks of various critical academic fields and draws
heavily on secondary sources, both academic and gray literature. We have no inten-
tion to debate academic research against applied research or forms of practice. There
are many volumes on this divide, and indeed, such debate can often be productive
for interdisciplinary practices (See, for example, Perz, 2019). For our purposes, the
central epistemological questions of research, i.e., what should be studied and how,
are less important unless they are reframed as—in order to intervene—what should
be studied and how.
Arguably, a critical landscape planner sharesmore affinities with political ecology
than Lave et al.’s critical physical geography. Over its approximately four decades,
political ecology has rarely collected its own physical and social data (Walker, 2005).
Political ecology emphasizes the environment’s “immediate resource implications,”
does not document the “full array of ecosystem provisional services,” and includes
the “flow of values of that ecosystem beyond its immediate ecological context”
(Turner & Robbins, 2008, p. 300). Political ecology primarily focuses on how nature
is represented and not on its materiality. This is a highly relational and partial
perspective of the environment. However, landscape planners must be very careful
in their use of political ecology as a “conceptual driver” for design or research for
design, particularly given that political ecology does not offer a substantive theoret-
ical base for practice and application. However, geography’s theorization of its select
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subfields’ cultural-technological dissonance provides a useful, directed rearticulation
of landscape architecture’s art-science debate, which we cover in the next section.
3 Holding Cultural-Technological Positions in Landscape
Planning
Design has a disciplinary mandate to intervene (i.e., to practice), and although
ethically and epistemologically perilous in most disciplines, “applied,” “action,”
“advocacy” or “activist” positions can yield intense understanding of the primary
issues and tensions of a site, landscape or region (Hale, 2006). This understanding
results from the knowledge built from moving, with necessary hesitation and self-
reflection, towards a solution but resulting in scenarios or futures construction in
order to change the present situation. Critical theory, because it is normative, helps
one understand how to apply knowledge. In practice, this amounts to synthesizing, or
better put holding in contradiction, lessons from environmental studies and environ-
mental management. Although not necessarily activist in nature, Hale’s definition
of a politically engaged anthropology, i.e., “activist research,” summarizes this posi-
tion well. For Hale (2006), activist research is to align with political struggle, “to
occupy a space of profoundly generative scholarly understanding” that provides “an
often-unacknowledged basis for analytical understanding and theoretical innovation”
(p. 98). Hale aptly calls this space the “cognitive dissonance” between political and
academic commitments in critical applied research (p. 113). Salisbury et al. (2013)
extend this dissonance to describe applied research holding cultural-technological
positions.
Numerous critical nature-society scholars have deployed Tsing’s (2005) concept
of “friction” since she used it to describe her ethnographicwork in Indonesia’s forests:
Friction is “the awkward, unequal, unstable, and creative qualities of interconnection
across difference” (p. 3). This concept can be conceived of as both the friction arising
from epistemological pluralism when (truly) multidisciplinary teams are brought
together (Perz et al., 2010), as well as the generative dissonance created when critical
theory and applied sciences are brought together. This dissonance and pluralism, in
essence the questions of sustainability that preoccupy and define critical nature-
society disciplines, as it does for critical theory, is also generative conceptually for
landscape planning. The example strategic planning proposals constituting the entire
Part Two of this book each hold such dissonance: (1) Infrastructural connectivity
and difference; (2) Western alternative development and Chinese development; (3)
Chinese mass nature tourism and ecotourism; and (4) Northern scientific knowledge
and indigenous knowledge.
However, many question the coherence, at least academically, of cultural-
technological positions in the development disciplines (Hale, 2006). Critiques of
ethics and objectivity of researchers holding cultural-technological positions simi-
larly come from both mainstream and critical discourses and from questioning
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alliances to large institutions, NGOs and civil society (Baird, 2014; Goldman, 2005;
Simpson, 2014). Periodic calls within geography for a synthesis of cultural and tech-
nological subdisciplines are met with a mix of aspiration and pessimism (Turner &
Robbins, 2008). Indeed, objective science (e.g., wildlife and landscape connectivity
modelling) is often in empirical conflict with following an overt advocacy agenda;
conversely, post-structural political ecologists do not easily align with the “prag-
matic short-term decision-making” of local groups or cannot risk deconstructing
them (Salisbury et al., 2013, p. 131). Yet, as Wainwright et al. (2013) assert, “we
crave technical research with a political edge” (p. 185), which is a reflection on
the failure of technical research to create positive impact for development. Hale
(2006) reflected that critical applied researchmust recognize “that political mobiliza-
tion must always be re-created anew and according to articulations of the moment”
(p. 112). Accordingly, averting essentialist positions of art versus science (cultural-
technological) of any transdisciplinary construction requires an acute awareness of
expertise, as well as a “tall order” of knowledge in the relevant fields. To understand
the unique ways landscape architects currently hold cultural-technological positions,
we consider here landscape-specific articulations of space, scale and the integration
of social and natural sciences.
Landscape architects’ cache of technical knowledge includes basic terrestrial
ecology (generally focused on urban forestry, arboriculture, and horticulture), civil
engineering (concentrated primarily at the scale of site engineering), and geographic
information science.This technical knowledge is usually complementedbya substan-
tial focus on representation, both theoretically as “to represent” and technically
as graphic communication and visual arts. Together with design-oriented architec-
ture and planning fields, landscape architecture frequently claims “space,” in theory
(spatial theories) and praxis (spatial approaches), as one of its expertise or distin-
guishing characteristics in problem framing and methods. Note that this focus on
ecology and space does not translate into the academic field of spatial ecology,
which has extended landscape ecology since the 1990s into modelling landscape
patterns and processeswith species’ population dynamics (Cushman et al., 2010). For
comparison, anthropologists have taken a “spatial turn” within the last two decades,
leading to sub-fields of spatially integrated social science, such as geo-ethnography
and geo-narrative.
Distinct from spatial practices in architecture or planning, the spatial focus in
landscape architecture often translates to a predisposition toward complex landscape
forms, patterns and processes. The planning and architectural fields may work with
such phenomena, but they do not impose such spatial description, often rooted in
ecology, as fundamental to the scope and concepts of design projects. From geog-
raphy’s land change science subfield, Roy Chowdhury (2013) notes the “privilege”
precisemodels of land change give to “detail, nuance, and finely scaled differences in
characterization or quantification, rather than characterizing components, patterns,
or process in the aggregate” (p. 226). Landscape architecture as planning frequently
makes this agenda and privileging explicit, almost obdurately, whether the problem
being defined necessitates it or not. In general, the design disciplines are characterized
by a focus on precision and realism and are weak at generalization or transferability.
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Lestrelin et al. (2013), through considering an integration of land change science
and political ecology, argue formore nuanced and “aware” definitions of land use and
economy that recognize a “genealogy of land cover classification,” such as anthro-
pocentric definitions of “degraded” forest types, in service of revealing knowledge
and power constructions (p. 61). While Swaffield and Deming (2011) may consider
such reclassification as a landscape architect’s practice of “interpretation” (p. 39), as
well as having roots in critical regionalism or place-based drivers of sustainability,
the critical reflection on power and knowledge in development discourse is essential,
as is the critical reflection on technical data and its use. This practice can be paralleled
to the detailed site- or ethno-specific land use classifications used in counter-mapping
strategies (see, for example, Harris & Hazen, 2006).
With this predisposition to the local, however, one must not fall into geography’s
“local trap,” where one may “assume that organization, policies, and action at the
local scale are inherentlymore likely to have desired social and ecological effects than
activities at other scales” (Brown & Purcell, 2005, p. 607). In other words, consid-
ering the political as “wider” and conflating the “local” with culture and ecologymay
lead to structural adjustment at the local scale (p. 613). Furthermore, environmental
research requires multiple scales and different spatial and temporal units, thereby
making “standardization of sampling andmeasurement crucial but difficult” for inter-
disciplinary work (Perz et al., 2010, p. 423). Such multipurpose “standardization”
relies heavily on moving across scales and upscaling and downscaling information.
Rosa et al. (2014), while acknowledging the benefits of multi-scale studies, assert
that data availability and computational power often drive the scale of study and
not “research choice.” This assertion is typical of more positivist approaches to
environmental research. Pedagogically, exercises in our landscape planning studio
courses are constructed to resist the “scalar trap,” “territorial trap,” or “local trap”
(p. 607), especially since Brenner’s (2001) “singular connotations” of scale (p. 599)
are prevalent across most of the planning and design disciplines. Space can be an
expertise of the landscape architect, addressing “plural connotations” (p. 604)without
using scale as an organizing driver. The emergence of multi-sited ethnography in the
1990s has enabled anthropology to “follow webs of power” and, through cultural
critique, produce emancipatory knowledge (Hale, 2006, p. 102). In our landscape
planning design studio courses, detail, in the form of physical data and case studies,
is often proxied from comparative sites with more information.
In order to hold cultural-technological positions, Lave et al. (2018) argue that their
critical physical geographers must work iteratively between their “biophysical and
social findings” and ensure that their research questions require both physical and
social analyses (p. 9). This ensuring or requiring is important and, inmost cases, must
be forced and constantly fought for, less one risks “slipping” into a “multi-disciplinary
framework in which results from different parts of a study are simply juxtaposed at
the end or in which ties between the different parts disintegrate altogether rather
than informing each other in any way” (p. 9). Iterative research and design are a
core tenet of design methodologies, and critical landscape planning focuses on the
iterative, reflexive and critical creation of detailed sites, often in contexts lacking
otherwise rudimentary spatial data. In the process of iteratively scoping, deepening,
and refining their strategic planning proposals, students are required to create and
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manipulate geospatial data (i.e., not the mere borrowing of datasets), generate land-
scape patterns using basic computer programming, and fabricate highly complex 3D
landscape surface models that combine otherwise irreconcilable environmental and
social parameters.
Perz et al. (2019) argue that amajor barrier to interdisciplinarywork is the division
between those who collect and manipulate data and understand a region locally (i.e.,
data specialists) and modelers who focus on data integration. The former focuses
on retaining variations in data, whereas the latter concentrates on processes and
generalization. Even if only operating at the level of critic, the designer’s translations
of natural science and social science research begins to break down, or at minimum
foreground, such divisions.
Holding cultural-technological positions is primarily about engaging science (i.e.,
the technology) from within, about having effective ways to reflexively channel that
dissonance. Critical landscape planners, to be effective, must be acutely aware of
the neoliberalization of science, particularly the privatization of knowledge claims
in professional practice; the standards, metrics and indices enabling market-based
environmental management; and shifts towards “applied” research that meets market
and government demands (Lave, 2012, p. 376). Although critical studies provide
explanatory frameworks for deconstructing seemingly neutral science, a critical
landscape planner holding (i.e., maintaining, sustaining) cultural-technological posi-
tions requires both science’s deconstruction and its subsequent empowering or
championing—its dismantling and reconstitution—into a principled authority.
4 Ensuring Transdisciplinarity Through Culturing
and Socialization
At the beginningof this chapter,we asserted that compromisedprofessional positions,
poor familiarization with conventional scientific material in ecology, and seldom (or
at least noncommittal) engagement with contemporary critical environmental studies
were root deficiencies in landscape architects’ training for landscape planning. This is
also true whether landscape architecture follows the design traditions of its architec-
tural lineages or the applied scientific traditions of its landscape ecology and human
ecology lineages. In this section, we propose a method of immersion in interdisci-
plinary critical and scientific literature that can both inform the making of plans and
introduce or enhance a landscape planner’s awareness of local discourses to inform
their strategic positioning, planning and collaborations.
Interdisciplinarity requires that individuals train in epistemology and method-
ology “beyond what is typically considered relevant to the discipline in which they
are socialized” (Rasmussen & Arler, 2010, p. 44). For the development arena, the
critical landscape planner must be able to embrace and appropriate (not repro-
duce) geography’s interdisciplinary constructions focused on nature-society rela-
tionships, particularly those engaged in land-related debates. Note that this embrace
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and appropriation requires planners to actively recognize that they are not intellec-
tually “trespassing” (Portes, 1995) in or borrowing from other disciplines. Each of
these interdisciplinary subfields sit more-or-less uncomfortably at the art-science
nexus.
Anthropologists Harvey and Knox (2015) in their work on road-building in the
Peruvian Amazon argue that civil engineers do not practice in modernist stereotypes
but are instead “recombinant scientists” who are reflexively aware of their expertise
and post-positivist positions (p. 198). Such professional expertise “lies in their ability
to produce resilient structures out of the dynamic relational properties of the material
and social worlds in which they find themselves” (p. 197). Landscape architects may
argue, for instance, that site engineering or constructing buildings engender a similar
process; however, the critical landscape planner, as is necessary in transdisciplinary
geography, must be “immersed” (Lave, 2014) in a wider range of development litera-
ture, both critical and scientific. From the design disciplines, South African architect
Kurgan’s (2013) concept of “para-empiricism” calls for similar kinds of immer-
sion, albeit in geospatial technology, to reveal the politics of cartography and remote
sensing.
Instead of case studies, which are a dominant mode of knowledge accrual and
transmission in the planning and design disciplines (i.e., landscape architecture,
architecture, urban planning), we promote a practice of transdisciplinary immer-
sion. Students are immersed (i.e., socialized, cultured) in both highly technical and
positivist literature (e.g., conservation biology) and critical literature (e.g., political
ecology, science and technology studies) specific to these geographies. Students are
tasked, using their landscape design and training in the representation of biophys-
ical systems and other creative visual communications, to narrate, problematize, and
appropriate scientific research on conservation in service of more situated, contin-
gent, and site-specific sustainable development objectives. This process has enabled
these students’ rapid introduction into and awareness of both place-specific narratives
and the dominant non-design disciplines operating there. Because of the compromise
in selecting location-specific over canonical development studies literature, a second
exercise in this design studio course requires students to focus on a set of interna-
tional case studies, which have included rich anthropological writings on highway
development in Peru (Harvey & Knox, 2015), mining in Papua New Guinea (Kirsch,
2006), and logging in Indonesia (Nevins & Peluso, 2008).
Importantly, this culturing is not for reproduction or to conduct basic research but
instead: (1) to gain rapid introduction to very foreign geographies; (2) to become
keenly aware of those disciplines’ projects, axioms, ethics, problem framing, knowl-
edge sources, and vocabularies; and (3) to deploy those disciplines’ own critical
reflections in strategic planning proposals (e.g., mitigating the industrialization of
indigenous botanical knowledge). This pedagogy of critical landscape planning,
largely because most design pedagogy (and practice) is Socratic, assumes that
students (and practitioners) have a weak liberal arts foundation. Indeed, transdis-
ciplinarity requires creating something that transcends the disciplines involved and
is often a very conscious struggle constructed by individuals.
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Many academics and practitioners within the planning and design disciplines
(i.e., architecture, planning, landscape architecture) would consider the education
and practice of their fields as unarguably interdisciplinary. Their claim often refers
to some practice of interdisciplinarity, which is usually articulated through teams
of architects, planners, and landscape architects collaborating on projects; engineers
and ecologists are often part of subcontracted expertise. Biermann et al. (2018),
in a pun on business as usual, call this “interdisciplinarity as usual” (p. 563). It
is useful here then, in contradistinction to interdisciplinary, multidisciplinary, and
cross-disciplinary, to introduce the concept of transdisciplinarity.
We challenge the imperative for interdisciplinary “integration,” which is often
dominant in problem-led science and in the gray literature and professional projects
of the planning disciplines. The integration of theory, methods, and data is itself
the question of integration, not a matter of cross-disciplinary problem-solving. For
Lave et al.’s critical physical geography, integrated research “is not an intellectual
advance if it simply brings a wider range of tools to answer the same old questions,
or if it fails to question the concepts and theories that limit current understanding,
not to mention the political commitments that undergird them” (Biermann et al.,
2018, p. 562). Trandisciplinarity is a struggle that is “a gesture out of the ordinary,
which is subject to questioning due to suspicion” (Perz, 2019, p. 2). To achieve
this in multidisciplinary teams, members must undergo a process of “collaborative
deconstruction,” whereby team members actively deconstruct one another’s disci-
plinary perspective (Yarime et al., 2012; Smithwick et al., 2019, p. 155). Similar
to the concept of friction or dissonance involved in holding cultural-technological
positions, Laborde et al. (2019) consider actively embracing epistemological fric-
tion as necessary for effective interdisciplinary collaboration, in which their team’s
“[p]rogress was certainly not smooth or linear, and at times the team experienced
inertia, blockages, and frustration” (p. 107).
Much that is required of a transdisciplinary practice is necessary in a correl-
ative pedagogy, including requiring academics, instructors, and team leaders to
have significant interdisciplinary backgrounds, significant academic capital to pursue
transdisciplinary teaching and research, and conducting such work outside norma-
tive institutional frameworks (Perz et al., 2010). Perz et al. argue that academic
reward systems are “not readily compatible with problem-driven science;” thus,
“disciplinary boundary-crossing becomes a political act” (p. 423). Most of these
challenges will not change in the near term, including the extra costs of grappling
with multiple disciplines, traditional academic reward systems (Rasmussen & Arler,
2010), the academy’s reluctance to validate results (Salisbury et al., 2013), and
incompatible temporal frameworks among the academy, NGO donor cycles, and
development timelines (e.g., the wet-dry season cycles of infrastructure-building).
These are dominant institutional fields which must be negotiated. We now argue that
such a strategic position requires process-oriented approaches to development and
its planning.
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5 Process-Oriented Development and Planning “Projects”
InTheWill to Improve, anthropologist Li (2007) reflects on her inability to offer devel-
opment and planning agencies suggestions on what to do or how to intervene in the
“world of projects, which they inhabit” (p. 3). Landscape architecture and planning
are almost unescapably within this “world of projects,” especially as professionally
oriented disciplines in close alignment with real estate development interests and the
development apparatus. Li describes development projects and programs as “pulled
together from an existing repertoire, a matter of habit, accretion, and bricolage”
(p. 6). After Foucault, she further describes “failed” plans as “not ‘abortive schemas
for the creation of a reality. They are fragments of reality’…. [P]rograms, and the
messy consequences of programs, are equally real” (p. 28).
If such plans are indeed “real” and have impact regardless of whether they are
implemented, plans are also frequently erased during the process of development.
Controversial and risky development often progresses slowly, outlasting political
transitions, investors and design scopes. For these and other reasons, anthropologists
Harvey and Knox (2015) suggest that one should focus on the “when” rather than
“what” of infrastructural formation (p. 5). Feasibility studies, environmental and
social impact assessments, plans and designs are often shelved in reaction both to
political instability and to breaks in team composition and expertise, as plans are
handed-off between consultants at various stages. Harvey and Knox consider this
process a form of systematic “amnesia” in the development process, especially in
areas of weak environmental governance (p. 87). To be critical in landscape planning,
one must treat it as relational—as an assemblage. Li (2007) describes a process
by which experts (e.g., planners) effectively “render technical” their development
programs and projects (p. 11). She wants to understand “the conditions under which
expert discourse is punctured by a challenge it cannot contain; moments when the
targets of expert schemes reveal, in word or deed, their own critical analysis of the
problems that confront them” (p. 11). Landscape architects have a unique capacity, in
their understanding of land-use planning, civil engineering, and ecology and strong
capacities for data integration introduced in the previous section on holding cultural-
technological positions, to synthesize development plans and retrace and narrate their
impacts.
Understanding development as an assemblage requires redefinition of what a
development “project” or program is in critical landscape planning, and, as we argue
in this section, such understanding is closely related to critically recognizing and
approaching development as process-oriented. Although there is a long and diffuse
lineage of understanding design as a “process,” the focus here is on process-oriented
development and its implications for pedagogy, research, design, and practice, i.e.,
for studying and intervening.
From the environmental scenario literature, Biggs et al. (2007) argues that the
actual storylines and narratives are often less important than the process of knowledge
sharing and empowerment from developing scenarios. Similarly, in his writing on
the Thai and Myanmar border regions, political scientist Simpson (2014) argues that
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environmental governance should be understood not by outcomes but by a process of
“trust-building activities” and that the success of any environmental campaign should
be measured “in terms of the development of emancipatory processes” emphasizing
“democracy, social justice, ecological sustainability, and nonviolence” (p. 24).
Academically, outcomes and outputs are actively debated in applied research in
development, particularly surrounding the institutional, ethical and practical consid-
erations presented in this chapter. For instance, for Perz et al. (2010) in their counter-
mapping efforts along the borders of Peru, Bolivia and Brazil, production of material
for stakeholders (largely civil society) is prioritized before scholarly output in order
to keep stakeholders invested and informed and minimize political damage. Even
withinmainstream institutions, impact assessment consultancy is unfortunately often
a form of subjective “rapid appraisal” (Goldman, 2005, p. 164) or “rapid ethnogra-
phy” (Fisher, 2008, p. 235). These are arenas that require iterative and negotiated
approaches and are where the critical landscape planner may excel. Further, these
complex networks and the politics of applied research, as opposed to cultural critique,
often lead to “forced analytical closure” and research that is “simplistic, unproblema-
tized, and undertheorized” in the near-term, straining its claims to scholarship (Hale,
2006, p. 101). Critical applied research in anthropology often tends toward oversim-
plified “‘how to’ manuals,” i.e., scholarship on praxis that is undercut by both the
politics of the research and the traditions of the academy (p. 108).
Although the design disciplines, including landscape architecture and urban and
regional planning, often champion their methods as “problem-based” approaches,
they are typically more solution-based rather than how critical theory might describe
(and celebrate) problem-based approaches. In Turner and Robbers (2008) compar-
ison of geography’s subfields of political ecology and land change science, they
surmise that political ecology investigates “case-based outcomes or socioenviron-
mental events as informed by theory that stresses the role of distal or exogenous
processes that usually operate to disadvantage local land managers and are often
captured in social conflict and land or resource degradation” (p. 303).
To sustain access to networks and field sites, instructors led parallel research with
global environmental NGOs and institutions that allow for “in-action” reflection
directly in the classroom on the potential for landscape architects’ participation in
the global development community. Such research has included objective science
(e.g., ecosystem services and predictive wildlife modelling), technical studies (e.g.,
species-specific highway mitigation guidelines), and activist research (e.g., auto-
mated 3D-printed stakeholder engagementmodels, political-economic investigations
into the impact assessment process) (Helsingen et al., 2019; Kelly et al., 2016, 2018).
As a practice, this work often requires “mid-course corrections” (Perz et al., 2010,
p. 427) and managing vested interests, which are complex and cross-sectoral, espe-
cially surrounding large development programs and projects. Importantly, because
of developments’ strong “institutional fields” (Perz et al., 2010, p. 425), substan-
tial amounts of the teaching and parallel research are realized outside normative
institutional frameworks, including lacking formal research agreements and signifi-
cantly reduced advantages or impossibility of university-to-university collaboration.
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Further, in development consultancy, academic work is often manipulated or influ-
enced to legitimate economic and political agendas (Goldman, 2005). Baird (2014)
encourages “principled” academic engagement, lamenting that “restrictive contracts
have become the norm, whether coming from private companies, the World Bank,
United Nations agencies, bilateral donors and even NGOs such asWWF and Conser-
vation International” (p. 502). Unsurprisingly, developers and multilateral banks
often prefer to deal with NGOs (to meet their international obligations) and local
communities separately (Harvey & Knox, 2015). Perz et al. (2010), from their work
on the transboundary region of Peru, Bolivia and Brazil, assert that governments
and large international NGOs maintain “dominant institutional fields [that] obstruct
collaborative advantages” (p. 425).
In the aforementioned context, a “project” may be better articulated as a more
nimble, process-oriented assemblage or “campaign.” In complex development
circumstances, such a campaign requires sustained momentum and rapid course
correction. For the design disciplines, including landscape architecture, the concep-
tualization of projects as assemblages may also aid the chronic scholarly weakness
whereby the “project” rather than the scholarship or praxis is dominant. Although the
examples given are from a distinctly North American context, landscape architects
Thering and Chanse (2011) propose a science of “transdisciplinary action research”
that “investigates the similarities, differences, and outcomes of discrete [case-by-
case, project-by-project] research initiatives with the intention of developing inno-
vative ways to address the complexities and multiplicity of scales of sustainability”
(p. 9; see also, Stokols, 2011). Since the late 1980s, landscape architecture academics
have theorized pedagogical approaches to engagement, such as “action research,”
which is usually realized directly through or in close synergy with design studio
courses (Deming & Swaffield, 2011, p. 193). For instance, Deming and Swaffield
reference Forsyth, Lu andMcGirr’s 1999 “Service Learning Studio inUrbanDesign”
run at the University of Massachusetts, which recognizes multiple publics, cham-
pions disadvantaged communities, and challenges mainstream definitions of poverty
and illiteracy (p. 198). However, even when such efforts have more emancipatory
aims, they are aligned with very Northern struggles and situated in discourse entirely
foreign to the global development and conservation community. Given the profes-
sional orientation of most landscape architecture teaching programs, extreme care
must be taken to ensure critical engagement.Otherwise, these effortsmay tend toward
educational discourse surrounding service learning and global citizenship, which are
often naively neocolonial (Martin & Pirbhai-Illich, 2015).
Although engaged research is at times a difficult form of scholarship, it is
necessary as an emancipatory knowledge-building process. For these design studio
courses, outputs targeted to stakeholdersmust be distinct from high-level educational
outcomes for students. The long-term impact from the students’ strategic proposals
is not about creating solutions to be implemented in the field. Instead, they are used
to create conversations about how development should move forward. For land-
scape architecture’s “ecological urbanism” movement, postcolonial theorist Bhabha
(2010) suggests that “[t]he crucial task of the ecological agent then is to maintain a
‘momentary equilibrium’ between these various practices of sustainability and their
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diverse definitions of what constitutes the ‘future’” (p. 80). As with any successful
sustainability practice, design for the development community offers momentary
solutions.
6 Conclusion
Although critical human geography often academically defines itself in opposition to
realist ontologies and research approaches, a critical practice of landscape planning
must not be defined in opposition to practice. For those encountering the plans of
experts, as anthropologist Li (2007) writes, “the will to improve can be taken at its
word” (p. 9). Such a practice must also recognize its compromised position, both
academically and professionally.
This chapter summarized a pedagogy of critical landscape planning and identified
three defining struggles within that pedagogy that have implication for howwe study
and plan development, including holding cultural-technological positions, interdisci-
plinary socialization, and engaging in process-oriented development. We offer ways
for landscape architects engaging in development to recognize both the compro-
mise and the potential of holding cultural-technological positions. In a design studio
engaged in landscape planning, this cultural-technological pluralism or dissonance
can act as conceptual generators for planning and design. Indeed, as anthropologist
Bateson (1972) argued in his 1941 essay “Experiments in Thinking about Observed
Ethnological Material,” “advances in scientific thought come from a combination of
loose and strict thinking, and this combination is the most precious tool of science”
(p. 73).
Moreover, this chapter offers a series of constructive bridges between applied crit-
ical geography and anthropology and a practice of landscape planning. One might
term these as “trespassing” or “borrowing” fromgeography; however, true transdisci-
plinary work overcomes “incommensurate perspectives,” does not imply the erasure
of disciplinary boundaries, and requires a willingness to “delineate the limitation of
[one’s] home discipline as a motivation to learn more from others” (Perz et al., 2008,
pp. 420–421).
Hirsch (2014), founder of the Mekong Research Group (formerly the 1997
Australian Mekong Resource Centre, AMRC) at the University of Sydney’s
Geosciences program, reflects on the “potentials of an applied critical social science
of environment” (p. 516). Hirsch affirms that “the response is clear—if we were to
conceive of ourselves as an activist entity rather than a research—and teaching-based
one, we would immediately diminish our value to those NGOs with whom we work
closely” (p. 522). He further declares that after nearly two decades of operation, the
continued engagement of governments, agencies andNGOswith AMRC in research,
dialogues and initiatives is a “testament to the niche for critical engaged analysis,
and its substantive emphasis lies squarely within the realm of an engaged political
ecology” (p. 522).
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If we hold that the practice of design is our expertise, then we must actively
seek the knowledge of disciplines “where” we practice. For a practice of design in
the development arena, we propose that both critical and technical culturing and
immersion in geography is necessary. If landscape architecture and planning wish
to participate in principled ways in the global development community, in what is
often termed “the rural,” then we must overcome the wide chasm between urban
sustainability and sustainable development. This is true both “in the field” and in
cities where these landscape architects are educated. Our use of “urban” and “rural”
in this book refer, rather than to regions, respectively to the disciplinary familiar and
disciplinarily foreign institutions and actors in development.
To work in these geographies requires sustained momentum and diverse forms of
practice and expertise, from construction knowledge for sustainable road engineering
to geographic information science for wildlife habitat modelling. Landscape archi-
tecture here provides fertile ground for bridging, not only between the professional
built environment disciplines of planning and natural science, as Ian McHarg had
suggested in 1960s, but also between planning and critical development approaches
in geography and anthropology. This bridge is admittedly tenuous and disciplinary
diffuse. For the built environment disciplines, landscape architecture has in many
respects been a sort of free-wheeling form of semi-critical physical geography.
Although such work is at times a difficult form of pedagogy and scholarship, it
is necessary as an emancipatory knowledge-building process that offers sustained
momentum through momentary solutions.
The next chapter builds a biography of Laos through its many large-scale infras-
tructural projects and plans, real and unrealized. Redefining how planning and land-
scape architecture conceptualize “projects” is an important first step in training indi-
viduals to be critical of development and to be effective in creating more principled
plans. For our most biologically and culturally sensitive landscapes, landscape archi-
tecture here may be rearticulated as a highly impactful “subversive science” for the
twenty-first century.
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Chapter 3
From Land-Locked to Land-Linked?
Laos Within a Continuum of Connectivity in the
Mekong Region
1 Introduction
On November 5, 2017, just after the rainy season and as the dry season was coming, the
construction site of the Mekong River Bridge in Luang Prabang, a key project of the China-
Laos Railway, was a hive of activity as the builders of China Railway No. 8 Engineering
Group Co., Ltd. were taking advantage of the rare golden opportunity and making full use
of the time to construct.
Laos is the only landlocked country in Southeast Asia. Its transportation infrastructure is
extremely backward. December 25, 2016 saw the beginning of a new era with the inau-
guration of the construction of China-Laos Railway, which will be completed and open to
traffic by the end of 2021. Connecting the railways of not only China but also Thailand,
Malaysia, and Singapore in the future, this railway bears Laos’ dream of becoming a land-
linked country from a land-locked country and will greatly promote its economic and social
development.
people.com.cn (2017, November 14).
A map of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) shows a country
situated in the northeast-central mainland of Southeast Asia and bordering five other
countries: Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, China, and Myanmar. The Lao PDR’s
borders generally follow two prominent natural geographical features that define the
country’s elongated shape, which stretches over 1,700 km from north to south. The
northern border with Myanmar and much of the western border with Thailand run
along the Mekong River, while the eastern border with Vietnam largely follows the
ridgeline of theAnnamiteMountain range.This cartography confirms themainstream
depiction of Laos as an isolated “land-locked country,” which is deployed by most
accounts justifying ongoing regional integration projects that aim to redefine Lao
PDR as a “land-linked country,” as exemplified by the above People’s Daily (2017)
coverage on the China-Laos Railway project.
This chapter challenges the dominant narrative of a de-historicized, often linear
progression from land-locked to land-linked or from isolation to integration by
contextualizing the contemporary imaginations and developments of Laos within the
broader social, economic, and political transitions across the Mekong River region
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since nineteenth century European colonialism. In addition to defining boundaries,
colonial powers inaugurated an era of (modern) infrastructure planning and construc-
tion to consolidate their authority. Rather than connecting the region, however,
this colonial infrastructure redefined preexisting patterns of connectivity. Gupta and
Ferguson (1992) argue for an approach tounderstanding connections that foregrounds
such preexisting patterns (p. 8). Understanding “cultural and social change becomes
not a matter of cultural contact and articulation but one of rethinking difference
through connection” (emphasis in original). For a demonstration of the instrumen-
tality of this conception of connectivity, see landscape planning proposals inChapter
Five: Infrastructural connectivity and difference.
“Laos,” as portrayed on modern maps, was hardly an historical inevitability and is
in fact a recent arrival on theworld stage. Present-dayLao territorywaspart the former
Lao Kingdom of Lan Xang (1345–1707), the “Land of a Million Elephants,” which
included territory on both sides of the Mekong River south of Yunnan. Lancang,
the Mekong River’s name in Chinese, echoes ancient Lan Xang. The three king-
doms of Lan Xang (Luang Prabang, Vientiane, and Champasak) were under Siamese
suzerainty (1707–1779) by the time France secured control over the lower reaches of
theMekong River. “Laos,” formed on the east bank of theMekong through a series of
Franco-Siamese treaties in the last decade of the nineteenth century, arrived during
the demise of pre-modern states yet without the defined boundaries that dominated
Southeast Asian colonial geopolitics (Stuart-Fox, 1995).
Flowing for 4,300 km from the Tibetan plateau, the Mekong River defines the
region’s connectivity. As part of the historic Southern Silk Road, various caravan and
river-based routes linked southern Yunnan’s Sip Song Pan Na (now Xishuangbanna)
with Lan Na in northern Siam. These riverside lowland areas were celebrated as
regional rice bowls (Nameans “rice paddies,” thus Sip Song Pan Nameans “the land
of twelve thousand rice fields” and Lan Nameans “the land of a million rice fields”)
(Beyrer, 1998, p. 75). Prior to the establishment of the French protectorate of Laos
in 1893, the Siamese town of Lan Na and the Lao town of Luang Prabang were
key centers controlling the regulation of trade in the upper-Mekong borderlands.
One of the main trade routes linked Mengla in Sip Song Pan Na, Luang Namtha,
Viang Phoukha and Houay Xay in Lan Na. From Houay Xay on the east bank of the
Mekong, trading caravans could cross the river to ChiangKhong to tradewith Chiang
Rai and Chiang Mai in Greater Siam or follow the river directly to Luang Prabang,
also known as Mang Luang or “principal city,” the capital of the Lao Kingdom and
present-day cultural and tourist hub of Lao PDR (p. 75).
While the French colonial government of the protectorate of Laos (1893–1953)
denied the existence of the Southern Silk Road, the route continued to operate after
theMekongRiver wasmade to form the colonial boundary at the turn of the twentieth
century. Existing land- and river-routes connecting the territory east of theMekong to
the Kingdom of Siam across the river were actively delegitimized because they were
outside direct colonial control and contradicted the aspiration to incorporate Laos into
French Indochina. Nearly a century later, these old trading routes have been romanti-
cized since the 1990s to bolster various economic initiatives advocating the integra-
tion of the region surrounding theMekong, including the Greater Mekong Subregion
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(GMS) initiative by the primarily US and Japanese controlled Asian Development
Bank and the more recent Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) by China. The lack of
“modern infrastructure,” such as roads and railways, once described as an obstacle
to colonial rule, is today purported as an obstacle to economic development and
integration of the Mekong region.
Natural resource-rich Laos, the only land-locked GMS country, finds itself central
in these recent regional integration enterprises. Restrictive regulation and closed
borders characterized the decade following the 1975 establishment of the Lao PDR
in the aftermath of the Second Indochina War (also known as the Vietnam War).
In comparison, the post-Cold War efforts to integrate Laos into the regional market
since the late 1980s appear substantial. Seen from a wider historical perspective,
however, a remarkable continuity persists in how historical narratives and practices
are reproduced to enable and constrain development. In the following historical
analysis,we examine themalleable identities of “Laos,” “border” and “infrastructure”
in the strategic importance of the Mekong River region and the struggles to control
and reshape its interconnectivity, especially during the period between colonial-
era obscuration and more recent revitalization of the Southern Silk Road. Rather
than strictly chronological and comprehensive, this chapter focuses on three loosely
defined historical periods: the colonial period from the mid-nineteenth century to the
mid-twentieth century, the Cold War period from the mid-twentieth century to the
late 1980s, and the post-Cold War period from the late 1980s up to the present day.
We ground the distinct histories of these periods in discourses specific to their times
and places, each with their own geographic conception of the Mekong River region
and particular combination of socio-economic and geopolitical imperatives driving
investment in large-scale infrastructure projects.
The Colonial period was characterized by efforts to de-link Laos from Greater
Siam and incorporate it into French Indochina. Influenced by nineteenth-century
Anglo-French geostrategic rivalries in Southeast Asia, the French secured navigation
of the Mekong River and drew it as their colonial boundary. The Mekong River,
together with the newly established French protectorate of Laos on its east bank, was
a strategic opportunity to establish new trade routes linking French Indochina with
the fabled wealth and markets of imperial China. However, the narrative of Laos as a
“formidable frontier” and “colonial backwater” (Ivarsson, 2008) resurged with each
unsuccessful attempt to transplant the rationale and expertise of road and railway
development from rural France to mountainous and flood-prone Laos.
The ColdWar period was characterized by efforts to de-link Laos and other lower
Mekong countries from communist China and North Vietnam and to bring them
under greater US influence. Surveys and feasibility studies for the Pa Mong Dam
and Mekong Basin Development Plan were carried out from the mid-1950s through
the early 1970s as part of a broader US geopolitical and developmental strategy to
coerce newly independent states by providing water resource development among
more general technical assistance. Although these visions never materialized due
to economic, socio-ecological, and political obstacles, the characterization of the
Mekong region as natural-resource rich “waiting to be developed” (Sneddon, 2015)
has persisted to the present day.
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The post-ColdWar period has been characterized bymarket-led and state-directed
efforts to integrate Laos into the global market. The French aspiration of establishing
trade corridors via road- and railway-building and the American plan to facilitate
international cooperation through (mainly) water resource development were rein-
carnated under neoliberal globalization and its poverty alleviation and sustainable
development objectives. The imagined geographies of a “formidable frontier” and
“natural resources” have hybridized into a “resource frontier” (Barney, 2009). The
Lao authorities and their international development partners deployed concurrent
processes of infrastructure-building and land assessment to expedite connectivity
and accessibility of the Laos resource frontier. These processes have reshaped the
socio-economic and geopolitical landscape of Laos and theMekong region, resulting
in uneven patterns of development.
2 The Colonial Period: Integrating Laos into the Colonial
Space of Indochina
The antique kingdom of Lan Sang [Xang] that became Laos under the French protectorate
was until 1926 more or less isolated from the rest of Indochina. Separated from the ports in
Tonkin and Annam by the Annamese Cordillera [mountain range] and only linked to the rest
of the world by the Mekong, the destiny of this country seemed to be the economic satellite
of Siam as the politics seemed to link by railroad the various locations of the Mekong with
Bangkok instead of with the French ports, especially Saigon.
Marty (1938).
The formation of colonial boundaries along the Mekong River was heavily influ-
enced by nineteenth-century Anglo-French geostrategic rivalries in Southeast Asia.
After Louis Napoleon came to power in 1852, France perceived a pressing need to
counter British influence in East Asia. French priorities were the consolidation and
expansion of French colonial possessions, the containment of Britain’s coloniza-
tion of Upper Burma and the suppression of British economic interference in the
Southeast Asian subcontinent (Keay, 2005). French consolidation of Cochinchina
(the southern region of modern-day Vietnam) in the early 1860s raised the question
of dominance over the Mekong River. French ambitions were to turn Saigon (now
Ho Chi Minh City), the capital of Cochinchina lying immediately to the east of the
Mekong Delta, into a successful commercial center. Just as the British controlled
Shanghai at the mouth of the Yangtze, the Mekong offered the French a path to the
largest potential market in the world, imperial China.
When six French explorers left Saigon in the summer of 1866 in search of a
navigable route to south-west China, the Mekong River was largely unknown to
modern cartography. The best available maps of the Indochinese region showed few
sections of the Mekong with any degree of accuracy, leaving large stretches of the
river to the imagination of early cartographers (Osborne, 1975, p. 14). The Mekong
Expedition of 1866–1868 unveiled, for the first time, a complete map of the Mekong
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river from Saigon in Cochinchina to Dali in Yunnan. However, French hopes that the
Mekong would immediately open a great new trade route to China were thwarted by
the discovery of impassable rapids and waterfalls and treacherous shoals and sand-
banks. Ambitions persisted regardless, and officials repeatedly questioned whether
the rapids were really an absolute barrier or the islands of Khone truly impassable
(de Carné, 1872, p. 36). Further surveys, military missions and expeditions were
carried out throughout the late-nineteenth century, notably in four missions led by
colonial civil servant Auguste Pavie (Mission Pavie Indo-Chine 1879–1895). These
missions resulted in the production of the first definitive atlas of the Mekong and at
least six volumes of observations, noting in particular the political affiliations and
strong Siamese influence over Lao principalities on both banks of the Mekong River
(Wong, 2010).
Throughout the last two decades of the nineteenth century, the strategic annexation
of French protectorates to the east of the Mekong and the adoption of the river as a
colonial boundary was informed by these cartographic advances and the persistent
hope in the Mekong as a potential trade route linking Saigon and southern China.
Following the successful French colonial acquisition of Tonkin and Annam (parts
of modern-day Vietnam) in 1884 and the establishment of the Indochinese Union in
1887, Laos andCambodia became protectorates of French Indochina after the French
victory in the Franco-SiameseWar of 1893. Under the 1893 Treaty of Bangkok, Siam
was obliged to give up its claim to the Shan region of north-eastern Burma to the
British and cede the Lao principalities on the east bank of the Mekong to France.
The French argued the Mekong was the obvious boundary between the colonial
possessions (Walker, 1999, p. 45). The demarcation line was generally established
along the deepest sections of the main river channel, and islands in the river were
allocated to French Laos such that the French could maintain control over Mekong
navigation (p. 8).
At the turn of the twentieth century, after securing the Mekong River, which
formed the western colonial boundary, the French prioritized road and rail infras-
tructure projects in Indochina up until WorldWar II, especially in Laos. The colonial
government’s objective was to de-link Laos from the cultural and economic influ-
ence of Greater Siam on the other side of the Mekong River and link it with the
rest of French Indochina beyond the Annamite Mountains (Ivarsson, 2008). This
rationale was a continuation of the rapid internal integration of France itself since
the late nineteenth century, where the consensus was that “there could be no national
unity before there were national circulations” (Weber, 1976, p. 218 as quoted in
Ivarsson, 2008, p. 95). Infrastructure was an “agent of change” in the moderniza-
tion and nationalization of rural France and the cementing of the modern French
nation-state (Weber, 1976, p. 256). Infrastructural development was considered an
effective tool for “spatial and moral rapprochement” (Marty, 1938, p. 72 as quoted in
Ivarsson, 2008, p. 100) which not only “makes space manageable but can be linked
with movements in time and mind as well” (Ivarsson, 2008, p. 95). Integrating Laos
in an Indochina-wide infrastructural network was seen by the French as the only
possible means to counter the geographical proximity between the Mekong’s east
bank and Greater Siam on its west.
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Laos was strategically important for connecting southern China and Indochina in
its entirety, safeguarding not only the Mekong River route but also a French-favored
land route linking the eastern Himalayan foothills extending across Siam, Burma,
China and Laos to the Indochinese coast. The French colonial government was well
aware of the existence and significance of the Southern Silk Road that linked southern
Chinawith SoutheastAsia (Walker, 1999, p. 32). Nineteenth-century FrenchMekong
expedition members had noted that Yunnanese muleteers carried Chinese products
such as silk, salt, tea, opium, furs andmetal goods on their southward journeys, selling
them in villages along the route, in the northern-Siamese markets and even as far as
the coastal Burma. On their return trip to Yunnan, the muleteers carried local produce
as well as British manufactured goods (de Carné, 1872; Garnier, 1885; Pavie, 1906).
These observations were useful when demarcating the border between French Laos
and China in the late 1890s, as exemplified by the French insistence on incorporating
BotenwithinLao territory.Known for its numerous saltwells,Botenwas an important
salt producer and was a well-established caravan stop along a major trade route. The
importance of the colonial acquisition of Boten was not territorial; rather, it provided
the French access to commercially important areas in southern China (Walker, 1999,
p. 57). Preoccupied with Japanese aggression in the first Sino-Japanese war (1894–
1895), China signed an agreement with the French in 1895 handing over control of
Boten and granting preferential terms for French goods entering Yunnan (Prescott,
1975, 450). Boten remains of strategic importance today; for an exploration of its
continued cultural, ecological and economic significance, see landscape planning
proposal “Negotiating with ethno-ecology: Landscape management strategies for
northern Laos’s ecotourism boom” in Chapter Seven: Chinese mass nature tourism
and ecotourism.
Once control over the connections between northern Laos and southern China had
been secured, the next urgent priority was to link Laos with the rest of Indochina to
divert trade with adjacent territories away fromBangkok, the capital of Siam, thereby
replacing the China-Laos-Siam-Burma trade route with a China-Laos-Indochina
trade route. During the first two decades of the twentieth century, railway develop-
ment proceeded apace as the French colonial government considered it an effective
way to build Indochina’s basic infrastructural network. In 1898, a railway network
was proposed across Indochina with several east–west lines crossing the Annamite
Mountains to link French Laos, the “interior of the colony,” with the rest of French
Indochina (Demay, 2015, p. 7). These lines were to intersect with a north–south
line running along the coast between Saigon and Hanoi. Due to Laos’s mountainous
terrain, this grand schemenevermaterialized andonly the coastal linewas constructed
(Ivarsson, 2008, p. 96). After WorldWar I, colonial priorities shifted to the construc-
tion of durable roads, in particular construction of the east–west arterial roads linking
Laos with the Indochinese coastal areas. Of the numerous roads originally planned
across the Annamite Mountains, by the end of the 1920s, only the 280 km Route
Coloniale No 8 (1924) and the 330 kmRoute Coloniale No 9 (1926)were constructed
(p. 97). While R.C. 9 was passable all year around, R.C. 8 was prone to monsoon
flooding and only passable for trucks in the dry season (p. 97). Consequently, the
newly established arterial roads did not lead to a diversion of trade with Bangkok.
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Siam’s infrastructure developed more rapidly over the same period, and, given
easier terrain, territories on the west bank of the Mekong were soon better connected
by road and rail to Bangkok (Kakizaki, 2005). By the early 1900s, durable infras-
tructure already connected Bangkok and the Siamese town of Nong Khai, which
overlooked the Mekong, to the Laos colonial capital of Vientiane. A railway linked
Bangkok and Khorat, and this was connected to Nong Khai on the west bank of
the Mekong by a network of roads and tracks (Ivarsson, 2008, p. 97). Siamese
internal connections were further improved when an air service and road were
opened between Khorat and Nong Khai in the early 1920s (p. 97). In addition,
the long-standing link between Bangkok and the Siamese town of Chiang Khong,
overlooking the Mekong at Houay Xay in French Laos, had also been consider-
ably improved by the early 1920s. A railway linked Bangkok and Chiang Mai,
which was connected to Chiang Rai and Chiang Khong by road (p. 96). By the early
1930s, Laos’s development was oriented more towards Siam than the rest of French
Indochina in terms of infrastructure, much to the chagrin of French authorities. Not
only did the China-Laos-Siam-Burma trade route still dominate the region, even
French citizens returning to France from Vientiane in Laos preferred the 25-days
travel via Bangkok over the 50-days via Saigon (p. 97).
French efforts to counter Siam-Laos connections, including Air France making
Vientiane a destination in 1935, persisted throughout the 1930s until the outbreak of
WorldWar II and, in terms of infrastructure investment, focused on constructing two
inter-regional roads. Firstly, the 640 km east–west Route Coloniale No 7 connecting
coastal Vinh to Xieng Khuang and Luang Prabang in Laos, and secondly, the 1,650
km north–south Route Coloniale No 13 following the Mekong valley connecting
Pakse, Savannakhet, Thakhek, Paksane, Vientiane and Luang Prabang in Laos to
Saigon (Ivarsson, 2008, p. 98). R.C. 7 and 13 were hailed for “bringing Laos firmly
into the Indochinese family” and “implying a definite break away fromSiam” (p. 98).
However, there was great disparity between the cartographic representations of these
roads and the realities on the ground. Much of R.C. 7 and 13 were impassable for up
to half the year due to monsoon flooding. Ultimately, only the Saigon-Thakhek and
Paksan-Vientiane sections of R.C. 13 were constructed, and by the end of the 1930s,
French Laos remained an economic satellite of Siam rather than an integral part of
the colonial economy (p. 98).
Even four decades after the demarcation of the colonial boundary along the
Mekong River in the late 1890s, Laos remained a contested space caught between
Siam and French Indochina. The geographical reputation of Laos as a “colonial back-
water” formed through many attempts at road and rail development, which together
embody the complex persistence of the idea, ambition, and discourse versus material
reality of infrastructure planning and construction in colonial Laos. French invest-
ment and resources consequently failed to reach this mountainous and flood-prone
colony (Stuart-Fox, 1995). France began exploiting Indochina’s natural resources
in order to diversify the colonial government’s revenue base in the 1930s, which
included transforming Cambodia into a center for rice and pepper production and
Cochinchina, Annam and Tonkin (together encompassingmodern-dayVietnam) into
a source of tea, rice, coffee, pepper, coal, zinc and tin (Miller, 1947). Although having
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some small-scale timber exploitation, colonial Laos was considered economically
unviable, and its socioeconomic development lagged far behind the rest of Indochina.
The reimagining and transformation of Laos and the Mekong region entered a
new phase during the Cold War, when European colonial rivalries across Southeast
Asia were supplanted by the ideological struggle between capitalism and commu-
nism. French Indochina ceased to exist once the Kingdoms of Laos and Cambodia
proclaimed independence in 1953, and the French evacuated Vietnam following the
Geneva Accord of 1954. The colonial plan to integrate the French protectorate of
Laos into Indochina was replaced by a capitalist engineering blueprint to re-link Laos
with other lower-Mekong countries for the explicit geostrategic purpose of usurping
communist power in the region.
3 Cold War Period: Integrating Laos into the US Sphere
of Influence
The task is nothing less than to enrich the hopes and existence of more than a hundred
million people. And there is much to be done. The vast Mekong River can provide food and
water and power on a scale to dwarf even our own TVA [Tennessee Valley Authority]. The
wonders of modern medicine can be spread through villages where thousands die for lack of
care. Schools can be established to train people in the skills needed to manage the process
of development. And these objectives, and more, are within the reach of a cooperative and
determined effort.
Johnson (1966).
The 1954 Geneva Conference witnessed France relinquish all claims to territory
on the Indochinese peninsula and the start of concerted US involvement in Southeast
Asia (Osborne, 2000). The Mekong River was once again center stage on the geopo-
litical arena, now post-colonial Southeast Asia. In the mid-1950s, 90 years after
the French-led Mekong Expedition of 1866–1868, extensive surveys of the Mekong
basin resumed, this time including, most notably, a reconnaissance survey carried out
by the United States Bureau of Reclamation in early 1956 and an investigation by the
United Nation’s Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) in 1957.
The earlier French expeditions were carried out within nineteenth-century Anglo-
French geostrategic rivalries and facilitated the demarcation of colonial boundaries
along the Mekong River. By contrast, the US and UN reconnaissance surveys were
carried out within the Cold War-era rivalry between capitalism and communism and
were intended to facilitate development of the Mekong basin in order to steer the
Mekong region’s newly independent governments towards “international coopera-
tion” with each other and more importantly the US (Black, 1969; Sneddon, 2015).
The French ambition of turning the Mekong into a navigable river was reenacted as
a basin-wide development program that included irrigation, power production, flood
control, and improved navigation.
After the 1954 Geneva Conference, the US urgently sought to fill the political
vacuum, left after conclusion of nearly a century of French influence, to avoid a
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Communist takeover of South Vietnam (1955–1975), the Kingdom of Laos (1946–
1975), andCambodia (1953–present). Numerous Southeast Asian specialists advised
the US of the importance of steady economic growth and political and social stability
in the non-Communist countries in the region (Sneddon, 2015, p. 108). Water
resource development became an effective geopolitical tool to modernize South-
east Asia with an orientation toward the US rather than the USSR, thereby hobbling
any perceived Communist expansion. As early as 1954, the US government had
urged Thai officials to consider regional economic cooperation under the banner of a
“Mekong River Authority” and emphasized the huge power and irrigation potential
of the Mekong benefitting four Southeast Asia countries (p. 108). The completion
of the US 1956 and UN 1957 survey missions, along with other behind-the-scenes
lobbying, led to the 1957 creation of the Committee for the Co-ordination of Inves-
tigations of the Lower Mekong Basin (simply known as the Mekong Committee)
(Palumbarit, 2017). Although the Mekong Basin covers parts of six countries, only
Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam were member nations of the Mekong
Committee and participated this international planning initiative. China was not a
member of the United Nations in the early 1950s and Burma was not interested in
participating (Mekong Secretariat, 1989).
The United States Bureau of Reclamation (USBR) spearheaded the ambitious
US- and UN-led development venture in the lower Mekong basin. Initially a modest
initiative set up in 1902, the USBR was originally charged with constructing infras-
tructure to irrigate the arid Western US (Pisani, 2002, p. 3). In the 1930s the bureau
transformed into a dynamic political player, closely involved in Federal efforts to
stimulate domestic economic development through construction of multi-purpose
projects in President Roosevelt’s New Deal (p. 151). During this period the USBR
shifted its attention to comprehensive river basin development programs, including
the construction of large-scale hydroelectric dams, and conducted technical analysis
and design of many dams under the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) (Billington
& Jackson, 2006, p. 12). The USBR’s political significance expanded into the global
arena when it officially started “foreign activities” in 1950 (Sneddon & Fox, 2011,
p. 451). Technical assistance dominated bywater resource developmentwas deployed
as development aid by the US government to persuade newly independent states to
ally with the West during the Cold War. As part of this process, the TVA became a
symbol of US overseas development and the USBR was celebrated as the world’s
preeminent water development agency. The USBR played a central role in hundreds
of water resource development programs throughout Africa, the Middle East, Latin
America and Asia, promising the creation of “modern” river basins as a means of
becoming a “modern” state (p. 451).
As part of a broader US geopolitical and developmental vision to globalize river
basin planning strategies,Mekong basin development constituted themost ambitious
overseas project in the history of the USBR (Biggs, 2006). Because two-thirds of the
lower Mekong River and one-third of the total basin area falls within Lao territory,
Laos figured prominently in the US blueprints for the region and was dubbed “the
TVA of Southeast Asia” (Johnson, 1966). In 1961, the Pa Mong Dam was proposed
across the Mekong’s main channel at the Thai-Lao border, approximately 20 km
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upstreamof theLao capitalVientiane. The projectwas the linchpin ofComprehensive
Mekong River Basin Development Plan (CMRBDP), comprising of eight massive
hydroelectric dams on the main channel and numerous ancillary projects on the
Mekong’s tributaries (MekongCommittee, 1961).1 The PaMongDamwas envisaged
as an “impact type” project intended to showcase the US team’s experts “in full
command of the science of putting water and land to use for economic development”
for Mekong countries and for the Thai and Lao governments in particular (Sneddon,
2015, p. 109). A 1960s USBR brochure promoted the Pa Mong Dam as a multi-
purpose project, with benefits including improved upstream navigation, additional
water provision during drought, “modern irrigation development” for more than
one million hectares of farmland in Laos and Thailand, and 4,800–5,400 MW of
hydroelectricity annually to power regional industrialization (United States Bureau
of Reclamation, 1970).
In 1963, the US State Department granted the USBR the necessary funding to
implement a two-phased feasibility study for the Pa Mong scheme on the basis
that the studies “will have the value of tagging the Pa Mong site as an American
project” (Sneddon, 2015, p. 111). Phase One (1963–1966), aimed to establish the
dam’s technical feasibility from biophysical and economic standpoints. Although
confirmation of the project’s feasibility might have seemed a foregone conclusion
given its geopolitical significance, an extraordinary amount of information, including
stream gaging, rainfall, soil, hydrographic, topographic and land classification, was
surveyed and collated (See United States Bureau of Reclamation, 1965). Basic data
collectionwas paramount, as earlier surveys carried out by theUS andUN in themid-
1950s had noted that basic data for “orderly development of the basin”was practically
non-existent (United States Bureau of Reclamation, 1956). Data collected during
Phase One “successfully” demonstrated the feasibility of the Pa Mong Dam, and
US President Johnson exclaimed that the “vast Mekong River can provide food and
water and power on a scale to dwarf even our own TVA” (Johnson, 1966, p. 397).
The optimism conjured in Phase One soon evaporated during Phase Two, as new
feasibility studies encountered significant economic, socio-ecological, and political
obstacles.
Phase Two, started in late 1966 with an expected duration of five to seven years,
was to estimate the costs and benefits of all aspects of the Pa Mong project including
irrigation, power production, flood control, improvement of navigation and reduction
of estuarine saltwater intrusion (United States Bureau of Reclamation, 1966, p. 4).
Estimated at US $600 million, Pa Mong Dam would cost more than 12 times that of
the Hoover Dam in the US. Full estimates for the entire project, including transmis-
sion lines and irrigation projects, ballooned to $1.1 billion (Sneddon, 2015, p. 120).
The project’s viability was further questioned given that while construction of the
dam and power plants was estimated to take five to ten years, other components, such
as transmission lines and irrigation channels, were unlikely to produce the tangible
benefits envisioned in the project plan for some 25 years (p. 120). Even USBR staff
1 The eight dams planned on the main channel are: High Luang Prabang, Sayabouri, Upper Chiang
Khan, Pa Mong, Upper Thakhek, Ban Koum, Stung Treng, and Sambor.
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began to question the socio-ecological practicability of the project. An estimated
312,000 to 500,000 people would be displaced and 948,000 acres of productive farm-
land inundated due to the dam. Irrigation development targets were also doubted as
experts debated the geological, soil and land classification findings in the Pa Mong
region (United States Bureau of Reclamation, 1970).
Aside from apprehension over the project’s economic viability and socio-
ecological practicability, the region’s political dynamics and the US’s geopolitical
objectives had changed dramatically by the end of the 1960s, leading to the Pa
Mong Dam’s termination in the early 1970s. By 1968, at the height of the Vietnam
War, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia were war zones, rendering large-scale water
development projects in the lower Mekong basin completely “infeasible.” Following
US President Nixon’s election in 1969, the US government re-focused its foreign
policy in Southeast Asia with a view to effectively withdraw military engagement in
Vietnam (McMahon, 2010). Phase Two feasibility studies ended abruptly when the
Pa Mong Project and CMRBDP were officially shelved in 1973. Nevertheless, vast
amounts of data collected in both project phases formed the basis of the 1968 Atlas of
Physical, Economic and Social Resources of The Lower Mekong Basin. This exhaus-
tive tome included 20 plates covering the biophysical and socioeconomic aspects
of the lower Mekong basin including: Geology, Hydrogeology, Population, Educa-
tion, Industries, Tourism, Telecommunications, Geophysics, Water Resource, Rail-
roads, Hypsometry, Health, Engineering Geology, Construction Materials, Mineral
Resources, Rice Lands, Soil Engineering, Land Use, Land Potential, and Electric
Power (Mekong Secretariat, 1968).
Although the Pa Mong Dam and the CMRBDP never materialized, the tech-
nological and geopolitical expertise gained through promoting these projects and
investigating their feasibility set the stage for an imagined geography of the Mekong
basin as a “natural resource” capable of being managed, regulated and “developed.”
The comprehensive data generated throughout the different phases of the investi-
gation from the mid-1950s to the early 1970s, together with the USBR map high-
lighting the most critical engineering projects across the basin, conjured up an imag-
inary geography of a “developed” Mekong region. That vision survived well beyond
the post-Cold War era and was revived under new socio-economic and geopolit-
ical imperatives. The repercussions of US foreign policy changes in Southeast Asia
since the Nixon administration (1969–1974) have persisted over the decades. With
little resistance to Communist influence, the 1970s saw the Mekong’s development
repositioned as an engine of “peacetime reconstruction and development of the Indo-
China countries” (Sneddon, 2015, p. 121). The direct role of US agencies such as
the USBR in the Mekong region was increasingly reduced in favor of various United
Nations agencies such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
and multilateral entities, such as the US-led World Bank (est. 1944) and Japan-led
Asian Development Bank (est. 1966). Following the end of the Vietnam War in
1975, the 1980s boasted a more stable Indochinese Peninsula. The USBR’s vision
of the Kingdom of Laos as the “Tennessee Valley Authority of Southeast Asia” was
transformed by the Mekong states and affiliated development agencies into the Lao
People’s Democratic Republic, the “resource frontier” of Southeast Asia.
48 3 From Land-Locked to Land-Linked?
4 Post-Cold War Period: Integrating Laos into Global
Markets
‘The Economic Quadrangle’ is now the focus of Asia. ... Investors, businessmen and manu-
facturers who are intent to expand their trading, and investment can aim at increasing their
benefits. We are ready for those investors, who are aiming for success, and profits, by coop-
erating with the Lao People’s Democratic Republic. This is a golden opportunity in doing
business, in the area full of natural resources and labour with lower wages. Therefore we
can assure you of stability and achievement in business.
The Economic Quadrangle Joint Development Corporation (1996).
As regional tensions relaxed with the end of the Cold War, the Mekong region
witnessed a burgeoning of overlapping inter-state cooperative ventures supported by
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and multilateral development
banks (MDBs) such as the World Bank. Three main vehicles of development were
established in the first half of the 1990s. The first, the Mekong River Commission
(MRC), was established after Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam signed the
Mekong River Sustainable Development Cooperation Agreement in 1995 (Jacobs,
2002). A reincarnation of the Mekong Committee formed in 1957, the MRC focuses
on water resource development including commercial shipping and energy gener-
ation. The second, the Greater Mekong Subregion economic cooperation program
(GMS Program), was established with the assistance of the Asian Development
Bank (ADB) in 1992 and has actively involved all six Mekong countries. Focusing
on identifying and implementing projects across diverse sectors, the GMS Program
coalesced around a transnational network of “North–South” and “East–West” trade
corridors after the 1997 Asian financial crisis (Chen, 2005, p. 195). The third, the
Golden Economic Quadrangle (GEQ), encompasses the upper-Mekong borderlands,
and membership consists of Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Yunnan. Instigated by
Thailand in 1992, the “Golden Quadrangle” was to supersede the infamous Golden
Triangle of an earlier era (Walker, 2000, p. 123). With the geographical proximity
of four international borders and the existence of old trade routes, GEQ advocates
argued thesewould lead to fruitful economic cooperation in an increasingly integrated
market under the GMS Program.
The unbuilt road and rail trade corridors of French Indochina and the American
blueprints for international cooperation through basin-wide water resource devel-
opment coalesced in the plans and programs of Southeast Asia’s new inter-state
cooperative development mechanisms. These mechanisms no longer operate explic-
itly as colonial domination nor to contain the rising tide of Communism; rather, they
operate in the name of neoliberal sustainable development and poverty alleviation.
The Mekong and its basin as “resource” are central to discourses of regional inte-
gration rooted in visions of economic connectivity (Glassman, 2010; Hirsch, 2001).
In neoliberal discourses, the Mekong region is described as the “last resource fron-
tier” of the Global South, while Laos, land-locked at the region’s geographic center
and surrounded by five GMS-member countries, is further positioned by state agen-
cies, companies, development banks, the MRC, GMS, and the GEQ as an “untapped
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space.” Military conflicts of the 1960s and 1970s and the post-conflict isolationism
imposed by the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party in the 1970s and early 1980s has
kept Laos outside the reach of most international capital. The rhetoric of frontiers
is today “a legitimating ideology” for new forms of capitalist exploitation (Barney,
2009, p. 147).
The idea of Laos as a “resource frontier” formed from the ideal conditions
following the ColdWar together with the Lao PDR’s failed attempt at socialist recon-
struction. After 1975, Laos was one of the world’s 49 Least Developed Countries
(LDCs), measured in terms of its low per capita GDP, weak human-resource base
and high level of economic vulnerability (Rigg, 2005, p. 20). However, Laos was
also situated within one of the world’s most economically dynamic regions, sharing
borders with Thailand and China, two of the rising economic powers of Asia. In
the 1980s, Thailand was shifting its foreign policy towards former Indochina to
turn the region’s “battlefields into market places” (ao sanam lop pen sanam kan
kha). In the early 1990s, China’s ambition to make Yunnan “a grand passageway
to Southeast Asia” was a significant about-turn for a government that had seen its
southern border as a security threat for most of the years since WWII. There was a
growing consensus that opportunities for economic growth and development would
be created if adjoining countries were encouraged to exploit their complementar-
ities, with Myanmar and Laos aided by Thailand and China’s increasing capital,
technology and infrastructure (Walker, 2000, p. 125).
The increasing demand for natural resources from its neighbors coincided with
the Lao government’s need to find other sources of revenue after Soviet aid dried
up in the mid-1980s (Lestrelin et al., 2012). The way to tackle Laos’s “underde-
velopment” and a collapsing domestic economy was through a national strategy of
radical economic reforms encapsulated in the New Economic Mechanism (NEM) or
“New Thinking” (chintanakan mai) introduced in 1986. Abandoning central plan-
ning in favor of opening the economy to trade and investments, the NEM adhered
closely to the principles established by the neoliberal Washington consensus of the
World Bank, the IMF and the US Treasury (Rigg, 2005, p. 22). To an extent, the
economic reform of Laos was indeed a response to pressure from the country’s main
creditors. The World Bank and the ADB promoted the NEM as a way for the Lao
government to effectively gain access to new funding, loans and revenue from inter-
national finance institutions and foreign investors (Stuart-Fox, 2005). Since then,
harnessing the country’s natural resources has been touted a significant driver of
economic growth, and various business-friendly “untapped frontier” narratives have
been devised to help the Lao government recruit investors. In the post-reform era
since 1986, the export-oriented resource sectors, including large-scale hydropower,
mining, forestry and agri-business, are considered by key Lao and international agen-
cies to be the mainstays of the country’s developmental future as the nation seeks to
graduate from its LDC status by 2020 (Government of Lao PDR, 2003).
Twomajor concurrent processes, infrastructure construction and land assessment,
each rationalized through discourses on neoliberal sustainable development and
poverty alleviation, have enhanced the “accessibility” of Laos as a resource frontier
over the last three decades. The first process, infrastructure construction, focuses on
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improving physical accessibility across Laos’s challenging terrain. Echoing earlier
French colonial campaigns, road planning and construction has often usurped tradi-
tional patterns of connectivity, such as those preferred by upland communities, to
make way for the taxation and property regimes enabled by road construction (Scott,
2009, p. 198). Yet, unlike the colonial rationale of competing against Siam’s influ-
ence,modern roads are to battle poverty. Neoliberal development discourse considers
“inaccessibility” by infrastructure a proxy for poverty in rural developing economies.
Moreover, quality of life is believed to depend on the degree populations are linked
to or isolated from markets (van de Walle, 2002; Hentschel & Waters, 2002). In
such narratives, poor infrastructure is a problem requiring development interven-
tion, because it erodes the terms of trade for rural communities by raising the costs
of inputs and lowering the value of outputs, thereby undermining livelihoods. Lao
state agencies and development banks prescribe to infrastructure development as a
panacea that can alleviate poverty, boost incomes and raise living standards. In fact,
the Lao government had tried to improve accessibility during the pre-reform era,
but due to an enduring lack of investment capacity, achieved little beyond the relo-
cation of remote populations to more accessible areas along existing roads (Rigg,
2005, p. 16). Construction and upgrading of infrastructure gathered pace in the 1990s
through trade corridors promoted by the ADB under its GMS Program.
As previously mentioned, the GMS Program prioritized transport projects over
other sectors following the 1997 Asian financial crisis. While facilitating some
improvements to regional airports and air services, the GMS Program has mainly
promoted economic corridor-based connectivity: road-based integration, cross-
border trade, and growth-oriented prosperity (Sturgeon et al., 2013; Su, 2012).
This connectivity is a patchwork of new transportation projects and strategic
upgrades, coupling cross-border sub-regional projects with national development
plans. The East–West Economic Corridor (EWEC) and North–South Economic
Corridor (NSEC) are the two main arteries linking Laos to its neighbors. The EWEC
stretches 1,450 km fromMawlamyine in Myanmar through Thailand and Laos to Da
Nang in Vietnam. The NSEC runs 1,750 km from Bangkok via either Luang Namtha
in Laos or Keng Tung in Myanmar to Kunming in Yunnan. The NSEC, promoted as
a revitalized ancient trading route now linking the region’s largest national markets
(China and Thailand), incorporates roads through Laos and Myanmar connecting
Xishuangbanna and Chiang Rai, both centers of the Golden Economic Quadrangle.
When constructed, these infrastructures improve Laos’s physical accessibility and
transform it from a land-locked to land-linked country. In an advertisement calling
for international investment, the Lao Deputy PrimeMinister andMinister of Foreign
Affairs Thongloun Sisoulith pitched Laos as a “New Frontier of Opportunity” with
supportive, confidence-building investment policies and “an expanding volume of
intra-regional trade made possible through infrastructure upgrades” (Fortune, 2007
as quoted in Barney, 2009, p. 147).
The second process, land assessment, has facilitated the legal “accessibility” of
Laos’s natural resources most central to the livelihoods of much of the population.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Lao authorities, with the support of its devel-
opment partners, carried out country-wide assessments of its natural resources and
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agro-ecological potential, which together constitute the foundation of the nation’s
socioeconomic development. Like the US-led surveys and feasibility studies of the
lowerMekong carried out in the 1950s and 1960s, the Lao government’s land assess-
ments were, through the discourse of neoliberal sustainable development, ultimately
political-economic calculations carried out to render territory measurable and devel-
opable. Unlike the US attempt to legitimize its presence in a region facing perceived
Communist expansion, these assessments of Lao land define “qualities of territory” to
legitimize the exclusion of existing forms of land use considered “unsustainable” and
“unproductive” according to neoliberal market ideology (Goldman, 2005, p. 184).
Shifting agriculture, for example, is the target of a yet ongoing exclusion process,
despite being the dominant mode of agricultural production in the Lao uplands that
constitute some 80% of the country’s land area (Hodgdon, 2010). Lao state planners
and their multilateral development bank backers face serious challenges because
the on-the-ground land use often contradicts their imagined geography of Laos as
an empty landscape ready for commodity extraction and production. Development
agencies identify Laos, ranked among the world’s poorest economies but with great
ecological wealth, as a potential hotspot for a “poverty-environment nexus,” where
poverty and the environment are caught in a mutually reinforcing spiral of degrada-
tion. The discourse of “poverty-environment nexus” further legitimizes the process of
freeing up land and forest resources for capitalization (Dasgupta et al., 2005; World
Bank, 2006). The simplistic chain of degradation narrative, whereby shifting cultiva-
tion is equated with poverty and land degradation, is routinely applied in mainstream
development discourse (Lestrelin & Giordano, 2007).
In post-reform Laos, foreign consultants employed by international development
agencies (IDAs) have helped promote and codify numerous decrees and laws relating
to property rights and natural resource management (Goldman, 2005; Barney, 2009).
They map and legitimize new state-sponsored land use definitions, while traditional
property systems are unmapped and delegitimized. Eco-rationality andmarket forces
have both intensified this phenomenon. The first decade of the post-reform era was
dominated by scientific expertise that rationalized land use to balance development
and conservation objectives. For example, the Tropical Forestry Action Plan (TFAP),
one of the first joint projects initiated by the Lao government and major IDAs, was
launched after the first national forestry conference was held in 1989. The TFAP
recommendations included forest conservation and tree plantationmeasures covering
over 70% of Laos’s land area and the planned resettlement of around 170,000 house-
holds, constituting two thirds of the population engaged in shifting cultivation at
that time (Evrard & Goudineau, 2004). Since the late 1990s, the national strategy of
“Turning Land into Capital” (kan han thi din pen theun) in the name of sustainable
development has promoted the identification of “empty” space suitable for large scale
mining, hydropower, plantation and other agribusiness concessions. For example, the
National Land Titling Programme (NLTP), established in 1997 with help from the
World Bank and AusAID, provided incentives for landholders to invest in productive
and market-oriented land uses (Lestrelin et al., 2012). By allocating swidden land
to companies able to invest in modern and more productive technologies, the NLTP
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was deemed an effective tool to improve the productivity of supposedly unutilized
or underutilized land.
Infrastructure construction and land assessment continuously reshape Laos’s
physical and legal landscapes, transforming an imagined geography into a “resource
frontier” reality for global capital. Improved road networks are turning “land-locked”
Laos into a land-linked “land bridge” providing the most direct overland routes to
its seaboard neighbors. Land classification and other forms of ecological differentia-
tion enable the identification of abundant tracts of supposedly unoccupied degraded
land for ecological improvement or economic development. However, these very
processes carried out in the name of sustainable development and poverty alleviation
are generating new forms of poverty and ecological degradation due to the sudden
disruption of preexisting modes of connectivity and the routine delegitimization of
livelihoods by neoliberal notions of market value and optimal resource allocation.
Inadequate allocation of time and resources to establish viable alternative develop-
ment models during large-scale, fast-tracked human resettlement and dramatic land-
scape change is devastating for an overwhelmingly rural population heavily reliant
on mixed subsistence and semi-subsistence agriculture. Many scholars have pointed
out that the ongoing debasement of subsistence production in favor of the demands of
the regional and global market have compromised the livelihoods of the rural poor,
especially vulnerable upland communities. Increasing Chinese state and business
engagement in Laos and the wider Mekong region since the launch of Belt and Road
Initiative in 2014 has accelerated foreign capital inflows and regional integration.
5 Conclusion
Even during the dry season, the Mekong is a truly immense river, flowing slowly but
inexorably through the surrounding sunbaked brown rice fields. With the advent of
themonsoon rains thewaters of theMekong swell, inundating hundreds of hectares of
scorched land transforming it into a seemingly endless patchwork of ponds and lakes.
This vast natural spectacle has inspired geographical imaginations and infrastructural
ambitions since at least the nineteenth century when mainland Southeast Asia was
increasingly subject to European colonialism.
When the French secured control of Cochinchina in the Mekong delta in the mid-
nineteenth century, the region’s geography of connectivitywas defined by preexisting
trails across and along a largely uncharted Mekong River. Various overland caravan
routes and river-based routes in the upper Mekong combined to form an important
part of the Southern Silk Road, a major trading link between China and Southeast
Asia by which Chinese merchants from Sichuan and even the central plains traded a
wide variety of productswith their Indian,Burmese andSiamese counterparts. French
colonial ambitions and American postwar aspirations gave rise to new geographical
imaginations, reconfiguring regional and geopolitical connectivity. Surveys were
conducted, data collected, and plans created in support of the French effort to de-link
Laos fromGreater Siam and incorporate it into French Indochina, and later American
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ambitions to de-link Laos and other lower Mekong countries from communist China
and North Vietnam in order to bring them under the umbrella of US influence.
Whilemost of the physical infrastructure proposed in both historical periods failed
to materialize, it collectively established a way of perceiving Laos, the Mekong
River, and the Mekong basin that would persist to the present day. Colonial maps
charting long stretches of the Mekong River helped establish a gestalt for the French
protectorate of Laos on the river’s east bank, while unsuccessful attempts to develop
roads and railways generated a narrative describing Laos as a “formidable frontier”
and “colonial backwater.” US and UN maps identified the upper and lower Mekong
basin as two separate socio-economic entities, and data collected through technical
surveys and feasibility studies of the Mekong basin development plan generated
a narrative of Laos and the larger Mekong region as an area of untapped “natural
resources.” The imagined “formidable frontier” and “natural resources” geographies
have hybridized into a perceived “resource frontier” in the post-Cold War period. In
the name of sustainable development and poverty alleviation, the Lao authorities
and their international development partners have deployed the concurrent processes
of infrastructure construction and land assessment to expedite the accessibility and
connectivity of the Laos resource frontier.
The ambitious transportation networks that largely failed to materialize during
the colonial era have been gradually realized over the last three decades. Today the
geopolitical landscape of Southeast Asia has been transformed, even though the terri-
torial and infrastructural configurations shared by these two periods have remained
largely unchanged for over a century. French ambitions of travelling through Laos to
reach the markets of imperial China, then by far the world’s most populous country,
have been replaced by today’s Chinese southward-looking vision of reaching into
Laos and the other lower Mekong countries with their resource-abundant economies
and market over 320 million people strong. Whereas past colonial governments
sought to obscure the Southern Silk Road and establish their own substitutes, multi-
national development banks and Mekong region governments now seek to revitalize
the Southern Silk Road with modern infrastructure. The traditional Southern Silk
Road was never a single fixed route but rather a shifting network of routes used
by caravans of heavily laden oxen and mules. Now reincarnated under the Belt and
Road Initiative (BRI) as a “Modern Silk Road,” it comprises numerous planned
tarmac roads and the 3,000 km Pan-Asian Railway planned to connect Yunnan’s
Kunming with Singapore. Three railway lines are planned to link Kunming with
Bangkok: one through Myanmar, one through Laos, and one through Vietnam and
Cambodia. From Bangkok the railway is planned to run the length of Peninsula
Malaysia to Singapore. The 414 km Laos section of the Pan-Asian Railway, known
as the China-Laos Railway, spearheads this project, with construction commencing
in 2016 and due for completion at the end of 2021.
Understanding how contemporary developments are enabled and constrained by
past perceptions and activities allows us to evaluate them through a wide conceptual
lens and critique them with historical depth. This chapter details the machinations
by various parties to control and reshape the Mekong region’s connectivity and chal-
lenges the dominant narrative of a linear progression from land-locked to land-linked
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and from isolation to integration, by focusing on three loosely defined historic periods
between themid-nineteenth century and the present. Challenging the characterization
of Laos as a land-locked country isolated from modernity, this chapter highlights its
journey along a continuum of contingent transnational flows of ideologies, technolo-
gies and capital since the nineteenth century. The pursuit of more equitable forms of
development requires a more inclusive socio-environmental valuation system than
has yet been imposed, supported by critical, sustained investigation of the spatial,
temporal, and discursive dimensions of development models, whether “sustainable,”
Chinese or yet to be devised.
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Chapter 4
Locating Discourses and Narratives
for Intervention
1 Introduction
Building enough awareness of local discourse tomake effective change is difficult. In
the Introduction, we conveyed anthropologist Li’s (2007) sentiments that when asked
by officials to provide a “bridge,” between her critical, anthropological research and
their “world of projects,” she could not (p. 3). The reason that bridge was “elusive”
is partly explained by the difficulty of holding cultural-technological positions—to
be critical and simultaneously to intervene technically, which were introduced in
Chapter Two.
For planners untrained in ethnographic methods and critical social theory, partic-
ularly that targeting the Global South since the emergence of the sustainable devel-
opment paradigm in the 1980s, research approaches (i.e., for doing planning) must
be cultivated in ways that are proactive, efficient, rigorous and, on some level, a
blunt force pushing those planners up an undeniably steep learning curve. Put in
simpler terms, they must be untrained as planners. This chapter assembles a cache
of recent critical discourse on development in Laos. The selected references are field
studies undertaken by political scientists and critical geographers, anthropologists
and sociologists that: (1) provide for these planners’ socialization in foreign, critical
disciplines; (2) engender an awareness of local discourse; and (3) provide positioning,
narratives and conceptual materials capable of giving inspiration and momentum to
a planning and design process.
Importantly, the assembled discourse in this chapter must be considered a highly
oblique entry into critical development studies, as it circumvents more canonical
literature in development theory in favor of a Laos-centric survey. These field studies
critically theorize and describe development projects and their contexts, including
land-use planning cumresettlement projects, hydropower construction andwatershed
management, corporate social responsibility programs for large gold and copper
mines, and regional economic corridors structured around road-upgrading projects.
Theoretical genealogies are traced where necessary, and this chapter is admittedly
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heavier in its citations, offering both discipline- and actor-specific discourse for
designers and planners.
The literature reviewed here offers a diverse and sometimes conflicting tapestry of
theories and concepts from development studies, including sections: (1) The politics
of land-use planning and its deployment in the state’s territorial strategies; (2) A brief
recounting of origins, since the 1980s, of the paradigm of sustainable development
as it was imposed on regulatory institutions of the Global South; (3) The ways
large-scale resource extraction is reproduced at capitalism’s frontiers via complex
and overlapping patchworks of relations between large-scale infrastructures, state
land concessions, and their administration at various scales; and (4) Discourse on
“infrastructure” as a concept and our capacity to plan and assess it. These sections
are held together by their constructivist and critical theory approaches, focus on the
means and ends of neoliberalism, and undercurrents of authority, expertise and the
politics of intervention found throughout this book.
2 The Politics of Land-Use Planning
A 2012 article on the politics of land-use planning in Laos by geographers Lestrelin
et al. opened with a detailed examination of how land-use planning is defined by the
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization’s (FAO) Guidelines. According
to the FAO (1993), “Land-use planning is the systematic assessment of land and
water potential, alternatives for land use and economic and social conditions in
order to select and adopt the best land-use options… Its purpose is to select and
put into practice those land uses that will best meet the needs of the people while
safeguarding resources for the future.” Lestrelin et al. (2012) argue that land-use
planning, rather than being a straightforward technical exercise undertaken by well-
intentioned experts as framed by FAO, is in fact highly political and involves “the
territorial projection of particular socioenvironmental perspectives and values” (p. 3).
To better understand Lestrelin et al.’s assertion that land-use planning is an impor-
tant instrument of territorialization, as well as to understand its central position in
political debates over society and the environment, our investigation embraces two
interrelated scholarly discussions, firstly the “politics of space” and secondly the
“state’s territorial strategies.”
The disciplinary shift towards the theorization of space across many geographical
and social sciences has progressed through severalmanifestations,mostly responding
to the increasing mathematization, abstraction and formalization of space and time
in everyday life (Peters & Kessl, 2009). Positing space as socially constructed,
historically produced, and politically active, neo-Marxist researchers such as Henri
Lefebvre, David Harvey, Doreen Massey, and Edward Soja have been highly influ-
ential in “spatial” disciplines such as architecture, urban planning, and geography. In
particular, Lefebvre’s seminal work The Production of Space (1991, first published
1974) provides a platform for understanding the modern complexities of form, struc-
ture, organization and experience. His assertion of the “politics of space” challenges
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planners and designers of the built environment to navigate the complexity of “the
production of space.”
In various works on space, the city, and modernity including The Production of
Space, Lefebvre (1971, 1977, 1987, 1995, 2003, 2009) repeatedly asserts that space is
not a scientific object separated from ideology or politics; it has always been political
and strategic. Challenging the objectivity and “purity” of space planning as a science,
Lefebvre argues, “If space has an air of neutrality and indifference with regard to its
contents and thus seems to be ‘purely’ formal, the essence of rational abstraction, it
is precisely because this space has already been occupied and planned, already the
focus of past strategies… Space has been fashioned and molded from historical and
natural elements, but in a political way” (2009, p. 170). Lefebvre defines space as a
social construct and demands a critical analysis of how any given space is produced
and the strategic objectives that dictate its design.
Lefebvre (1991) recognized three dimensions of the production of space, namely
social practices (perceived space), representations of space (conceived space), and
spaces of representation (lived space) (pp. 33, 38–39). Of these, he identified the
representations of space (conceived space) as the most influential, the “space of
scientists, planners, urbanists, technocratic sub-dividers and social engineers… the
dominant space of any society (or mode of production)” (pp. 38–39). According
to Lefebvre, representations of space are deeply entwined with their ideological
history. The professionals’ conception of space, as conceived and represented through
maps, models, drawings, plans, etc., merely reflects how power molds the dominant
discourses, which in turn determine how space is surveyed, controlled, delimited,
delineated and organized to meet particular ends. He states that “any representation
is ideological… Ideology is therefore inseparable from practice” (Lefebvre, 1977,
p. 29), and “it is the role of ideologies to secure the assent of the oppressed and
exploited” (Lefebvre, 1996, p. 76).
Lefebvre argues that in order to grasp how modern environments are created,
change and impact the lived experience of their populations, it is important to under-
stand how space is produced, who produces it, who it is designed for, and what
functions, purposes, and ends it is intended to serve. Space is the subject of conflicts
over ownership, meaning, values, and uses—a crucial battleground where social
justice and equality are routinely contested. Lefebvre points out that current spatial
forms and configurations are not spontaneous; they are products of history. Dominant
spatial forms are imposed, not by competing ideas and values in modernity, but by
those who wield power and seek to control it in their own interests. Their owner-
ship and regulation of space permits some actions and activities while limiting or
prescribing others. “Spatial and temporal practices are never neutral in social affairs.
They always express some kind of class or other social content and are more often
than not the focus of intense social struggle” (Harvey, 1990, p. 239).
Lefebvre and other neo-Marxist writers on the politics of space pay particular
attention to how the representations of space dominant under capitalism are enabled
by processes of abstraction, including the quantification of space (alienation) and
the elimination of differences (homogenization) (See, for example, Lefebvre, 1977,
1991; Harvey, 1978, 2001; Soja, 1989, 1996). Given the power to organize, regulate,
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delimit and delineate space according to functional priorities, these representations of
space (conceived space) help create capitalist and neo-capitalist spaces that are quan-
tified and increasingly homogenous and which facilitate production, consumption,
reproduction and circulation in ways organized and structured to meet the require-
ments of capital. All the elements of such commodified space are exchangeable and
thus interchangeable; it is also a policed space where no resistance or obstacles are
tolerated by the state. “Economic space and political space,” Lefebvre (2009) argues,
“converge toward the elimination of all differences” (p. 192).
While theories of the production of space enable geographers and social scientists
to analyze ideas and values inmodernity, a range of other authors are calling for more
rigorous recognition of how Lefebvre’s spatial theory and analyses can be adapted,
i.e., put to use, for more humane and just approaches to the planning and design
of urban and rural environments (See, for example, Coleman, 2015; Fraser, 2011;
Stanek, 2011; Zieleniec, 2018). Planners and designers, with their analytical preoc-
cupation with abstract space, should actively respond to and engage with Lefebvre’s
critical analyses of the processes of alienation and homogenization, particularly the
spatial dimensions of his lifelong multifaceted critique of “the devastating conquest
of the lived by the conceived, by abstraction” (Lefebvre, 2006, p. 10 as quoted in
Wilson, 2013, p. 366).
Following intensified scholarly interest in the geographies of state space since the
late 1990s, social scientists and political geographers, such as Agnew (1994, 2005),
Sassen (1996, 2006), Brenner (1997, 2004) and Elden (2004, 2009), have further
developed the territorial dimensions of Lefebvre’s thinking on state space. Although
Lefebvre did not systematically conceptualize territory, his reflexive attention to
the relationship between territory and modern state power supports territory as an
essential feature of modern state space (Brenner & Elden, 2009). Brenner and Elden
(2009) highlight three key dimensions of Lefebvre’s approach to “state space as terri-
tory,” namely the production of territory, state territorial strategies, and the “territory
effect;” the latter refers to the state’s tendency to normalize its transformative effects
on socio-spatial relations by means of its territorial form.
As socially constructed spaces, territories are recognizable as “discrete, distinc-
tive, bounded, measurable, communicable spaces that are deliberately created in an
effort to achieve certain social goals” (Murphy, 2012, p. 164). Territory is both a
relation and an outcome of territoriality, a process defined by Robert Sack (1986)
as the “attempt by an individual or group to affect, influence, or control people,
phenomena, and relationships by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic
area” (p. 19). According to Sack, territoriality involves the dual processes of classi-
fication and communication (pp. 21–22). Classification refers to theoretically elim-
inating or altering the need to regulate specific resources or individuals within a
territorial zone, and communication refers to visually or textually conveying both
the territorial boundaries and the restrictions on activitieswithin the territory. Specific
territorial projects where territorial strategies (territoriality) are deployed by various
actors to produce bounded and controlled spaces (territory) to achieve certain effects
is defined as territorialization, a common goal of which is to govern people and
resources located within and around the territory (Scott, 1998).
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In their influential analysis on the ways state power is territorialized within the
borders of a politically defined space, political ecologist Vandergeest and sociologist
Peluso (1995) identify territory as a practical facet of state control and the state’s
territorial strategies as tools to control people and their access to land-based resources.
When analyzing forms of classification and communication, they argue that the
territoriality of the modern state is based on abstract space, which “can be cut up
into discrete units… and measured” (p. 388). Echoing Lefebvre’s critical analysis of
alienation and homogenization, Vandergeest and Peluso point out that abstract space
is homogeneous in that, firstly, “any unit can be compared and rendered equivalent
to another unit by spatial categories” and, secondly, imposing seemingly equivalent
and comparable grids onto space “permits the location or nesting of an area in a
larger abstract space” (p. 388). Maps and land codes (land laws) are highlighted
by Vandergeest and Peluso as tools to classify and communicate abstract space.
Maps do not simply represent reality, they “are instruments by which state agencies
draw boundaries, create territories, and make claims enforced by their courts of
law” (p. 389). Being “textually mediated” (p. 388), land codes insulate the state’s
territorialization from earlier regimes of rule and production.
Echoing Lefebvre’s critique of the conquest of the lived by the conceived through
abstraction, Vandergeest and Peluso (1995) assert that, firstly, the creation of an
abstract space implies the annihilation of lived space and, secondly, the incompat-
ibility between lived space and abstract space is at the root of the instability of
modern states’ territorial strategies. They describe territorial land-use planning as “a
utopian fiction unachievable in practice,” given that it often overlooks and contra-
dicts “peoples’ lived social relationships and the histories of their interactions with
the land” (p. 389). The mismatch between lived space and abstract space makes the
enforcement of the state’s territorial claims a necessity, one attained through “their
recognition by a relevant audience, by social pressure, and by the threat and use
of violence” (p. 389). In their analysis of enforcement institutions, Vandergeest and
Peluso note that where there are overlapping and conflicting claims by different legit-
imating authorities, “the one that is the most enforceable in practice (de facto) will
have a greater influence on behavior and resource use that de jure controls” (p. 389).
They also point out that more often than not, more powerful states and international
non-state groups offer economic and military assistance to poorer or strategically
important states facilitating such territorial control.
It is important to understand the motivations behind territorialization. Contrary to
many theorists, Vandergeest and Peluso argue that global forces typically reinforce
state-based claims over space instead of disrupting them; the authors foreground
the importance and sophistication of territorialization as a strategy of state control
of resources. In the modern world-system, which primarily legitimates territorial
claims, states must make claims on territory to secure access to people and income
from taxation and exploitation of natural resources.Moreover, in the context of global
competition, territorialization is increasingly dependent on commercialization. Terri-
torialization facilitates the state’s ability to collect taxes, thereby providing a regular
source of financial support for government investments to sustain local production.
In addition to the need to make territorial claims, protect resources, and collect taxes,
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Vandergeest and Peluso (1995) also surmise that given their large mobile popula-
tions of highland peasants, Southeast Asian states use territorial administration to
“organize surveillance, gather information about the population, force them to settle
down… and organize close control over people’s everyday activities” (p. 390).
Land-use planningmust be understood through the politics of space and the state’s
territorial strategies. Many development scholars link the practice of land-use plan-
ning to the realities of social organization (See, for example, Whatmore & Boucher,
1993; Whatmore, 1994; Hillier, 1999; Perry, 2003). Perry (2003) identifies land-
use planning as part of the production and reproduction of social relationships with
power, given that “the plans produced serve the dominant political economy as much
as they challenge and reshape existing social configurations” and “planning is always
remaking itself as it is embedded in and responds to a world that itself is always in
the process of being remade” (p. 151). Geographers Whatmore and Boucher (1993)
see land-use planning as a key regulator of environmental boundaries and transitions,
representing “an institutional terrain which is deeply implicated in policing the onto-
logical divide between society and nature” (p. 176). In other words, by representing
nature as a series of discrete parcels and elements instead of as an integrative system
of relationships, land-use planning “formalizes the separation between nature and
abstract space” (p. 169) and the spatial narratives of land-use planning “can be seen
to constitute strategic representations of natural and social relations, both in the sense
that they are unavoidably partial, and that they are frequently a focus of deliberate
political action” (p. 168).
Building on these critical analyses of land-use planning and focusing specifically
onLaos, Lestrelin et al. (2012) identify three concurrent territorialization projects that
have driven diverse land-use planning exercises across the country. With the goal of
national integration, immediately following the Lao People’s Democratic Republic
(PDR) establishment in 1975, Laos’s first territorialization project was characterized
by an extensive internal resettlement programand nationwide agro-ecological assess-
ments conducted with the assistance of development “partners” such as the World
Bank, theUnitedNations and various bilateral aid agencies. In the context of growing
environmental concerns, the increasing involvement and power of foreign experts and
the rapid expansion of what was termed “sustainable development” globally, Laos’s
land-use planning efforts intensified in the 1990s under a the second territorialization
project effected by scientific expertise. This project was characterized by land cover
classification, land-use zoning and land allocation programs that, developed with
the assistance of major multilateral and bilateral development agencies, attempted
to rationalize land-uses and limit environmental degradation. The increasing influ-
ence of neoliberal ideas introduced by international donors further transformed the
land-use planning arena leading to a third territorialization project ushered in by the
National Land Titling Programme in 1997. With market forces as the key land-use
planning instrument, this territorialization project was (and remains today) charac-
terized by new concession-based land policies and large-scale land-use plans for the
purpose of facilitating the development of private land and large capital-intensive
development.
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In his 2001 article on the remaking of Laos as an environmental state, sociologist
MichaelGoldmanopenedwith a description of a hand-drawnmapof theLaoPeople’s
Democratic Republic prepared byUS-based environmental NGOWildlife Conserva-
tion Society for the World Bank. “This map does not demarcate the nation’s capital,
its towns or villages; the only cartographic markings are round, oblong, and kidney
shapes, each labeled with initials such as WB, SIDA, WCS, and IUCN” (p. 499).
According to Goldman, the map illustrates an important political story about “new
efforts to classify, colonize, and transnationalize territory in the name of environmen-
tally sustainable development” (p. 499). Amorphous bubbles depict the zoning of
nearly one-fifth of Laos’s land area for conservation with abbreviations standing for
theWorld Bank, Swedish International Development Agency,Wildlife Conservation
Society, and the IUCN-World Conservation Union. Situated within a broader inves-
tigation of the role of the World Bank in development and the role of development
in the world system, Goldman’s article argues that the introduction of standardized
models of environmental governance imposes a hegemonic and neoliberal “eco-
governmentality” on developing countries. Our reading of Goldman’s thesis focuses
on two aspects, firstly Green-Neoliberal Development and secondly Environmental
States in the Global South.
Contemporary development literature, however diverse, can generally be pooled
into two broad camps, namely pro-development scholarship rooted in modernization
theory and post-development scholarship characterized by critiques of moderniza-
tion, including critical social theory. Both approaches, however, largely assume few
if any alternatives to Western-style capitalist development, whether for or critical of
it (See, for example, Hoselitz, 1960; Rostow, 1971; Dasgupta, 1998; Dollar, 2002).
The supposition that development must always unfold naturally in accordance with
the laws of capital has left development scholars increasingly obsessedwith the ques-
tion, “Why does development fail?” or “What is the best model of development?”
and then pursue solutions andmodifications deemed required to “improve” the devel-
opment process. These quests for improvement, however, as Goldman (2005) points
out, only serve to legitimize and promote development projects, “justifying it as a
necessary if flawed uniform project of modernity and progress for the South” (p. 13).
The emergence of green neoliberalism, themost recent development regime of the
World Bank, is reflected in how dominant rationales of “no alternative to develop-
ment” and a “better model of development” drive the World Bank’s reform process,
giving rise to a capital-driven green hegemony since the 1980s. Stemming from
growing transnational social movements critical of its capital-intensive development
practices, Goldman describes a “reform or die” situation whereby the World Bank
began to “green” itself. In the decade leading up to this reform, the Keynesian
economic worldview emphasizing government economic intervention diminished
in the 1970s in favor of a neoliberalism advocating deregulation of flows of inter-
national finance capital. Tapping into this surfeit of capital, World Bank president
Robert McNamara (1968–1981) rapidly expanded the Bank’s project lending across
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the world. After this decade of the “McNamara revolution,” however, the World
Bank’s large-scale developments in theGlobal South had resulted in significant defor-
estation, river contamination and the displacement and subjection of forest-dwelling
indigenous peoples resulting from Bank-financed infrastructure development and
neocolonial timber, mining, and agricultural schemes.
Worldwide strikes, rallies andmass demonstrations protesting againstWorldBank
and IMF policies and projects ensued, exposing the World Bank to a crisis of legit-
imacy and forcing it to either “green” its global development policies or cease
its dominant role in global development. Reductive arguments would claim this
greening as largely a public relations strategy; however, Goldman (2005) describes
it as “the Bank’s latest and most profound discursive framework, producing a power-
knowledge regime of green neoliberalism” (p. 5). This green neoliberalism,Goldman
(2001) argues, not only enables the World Bank to “aggressively incorporate lessons
from its worst critics” (p. 191) but also to “expand into more places and insinuate
its worldview into more life-worlds than ever before” (Goldman, 2005, p. 6). The
World Bank simultaneously does improvement, improves its development practices,
and sets the terms by which its interventions are rationalized. It actively builds on
“new global problems as well as on its own global expertise, new mechanisms for
intervention aswell as new reasons for countries to borrow, newdevelopment subjects
and subjectivities as well as new forms of its own legitimation” (p. 34).
AsGoldman (2005) pointed out, the “failures” of development generate newactors
and networks (p. 37). The production and distribution of information and power in the
field of green neoliberalism are not limited to the World Bank’s ambit; these extend
as “a series of events and practices centered on professionals working in government,
firms, NGOs, and the scientific community” (p. 33). In the 1990s, the World Bank
embarked on a quest to re-establish its legitimacy by conducting scientific assess-
ments of environmental and social repercussions, developing additional projects or
project components in order to mitigate adverse impacts; these became known as
environmental impact assessments (EIAs). Through this process, the World Bank
turned previously combative relationships with NGOs into development-oriented
alliances for generating “green project assessments, projects and regulatory reforms”
(Goldman, 2001, p. 193). New NGOs were cultivated. Instead of occupying a “civil
society” middle ground between the “state” and the “market,” the positions and roles
of NGOs have become increasingly disparate in the world of development where
“individuals often wear multiple hats and move across agencies and structural loca-
tions” (Goldman, 2005, p. 37). NGOs engaged by the World Bank and other inter-
national development institutions as consultants to conduct project-related research
and help implement and improve development have become increasingly invested in
expanding the business of development (Nelson, 1995).
Goldman’s (2005) scrutiny of the World Bank’s production of information and
power, its green neoliberalism deployed to buoy its faltering global legitimacy, led
him to assert that “the realms of knowledge production and political economics are
mutually constitutive and codependent” (p. 33). The greening and neoliberaliza-
tion of the Bank’s development agenda allow it to accommodate both “the critics’
demand for democratization and the investors’ call for privatization” (Goldman,
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2001, p. 191) while simultaneously reinventing itself as a global “knowledge bank”
(p. 208). Goldman (2001) uses the term “authoritative green knowledge,” defined
as “the particular set of facts that are produced to differentiate, classify and cate-
gorize populations and their natural environments,” to describe the World Bank’s
flavor of environmentalism and approach to environmentally sustainable develop-
ment (p. 194). The science of environmental and social needs assessment becomes
crucial to justifying the intervention, generating green knowledge that enables the
World Bank to “reinvent itself, tame its critics, and intervene in an ever-growing
number of institutions, terrains, and social bodies” (Goldman, 2005, p. 5). Green
neoliberal development logic serves the needs of transnational capital and perme-
ates throughout transnational professional-class networks such that, today, it is
near impossible to practice development outside the parameters of environmentally
sustainable development and green neoliberalism (p. 7).
As just detailed in the preceding section, the significance of the World Bank’s
“remaking” and co-option of environmentalism since the 1990s is not limited to
legitimating the organization itself; it has far-reaching repercussions for borrowing
states’ institutions and their resource-dependent populations. By introducing stan-
dardized models of environmental governance to its borrowing countries, the World
Bank generates newnational and international administrative structures, i.e., environ-
mental states for the Global South. Goldman (2005) challenges the dominant narra-
tive that the emergence of environmental authorities in Southern countries is moti-
vated by the inexorable Western rational of environmental sustainability by arguing
that these authorities primarily serve “the specific needs of transnational capital”
(p. 183). Deploying Foucault’s “art of government,” which questions framing the
state as the nexus of modern societal power, Goldman establishes a concept of “eco-
governmentality,” central to political ecology discourse for the past two decades, that
describes the political rational “compelling states and citizens to improve their care
of nature and their care of each other for the greater good of the economy” (p. 184).
Green neoliberalism is the dominant force pushing sweeping reform and config-
uring eco-rationalities in the Global South. These reforms purport to improve the “art
of government” not for the sake of nurturing and strengthening states themselves but
to privilege the demands of the economy. According to the World Bank’s brand
of environmentalism, it is through the nourishment of markets and economy that
we provide “sustenance, development, human rights and justice, and environmental
sustainability” (Goldman, 2005, p. 184). Based on consultation with Western envi-
ronmental organizations, academics, in 1992 reports, the World Bank argued that
economic valuation of the environment was requisite for “sustainable development”
(Goldman, 2005, p. 10 citing World Bank, 1992, 2003). Through aid, incentives
and its dominant lexicon, the World Bank coerces social institutions that other-
wise regulate the environment according to non-capitalist principles to follow their
economic-environmental rationale.
By declaring Southern countries’ common-pool resources such as river basins,
forests, wetlands, and aquifers as undervalued, theWorld Bank frames these reforms
as a precondition for conserving and efficiently using natural resources; these reforms
are “the catalyst to integrate countries into the global economy and to move out of
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debt” (Goldman, 2005, p. 39). There is no alternative to development, and “the
only question is how to make it more sustainable” (p. 7). Both World Bank experts
and academic elites focused on sustainable development blame “underdeveloped”
Southern administrations and their populations for destroying local environments
and impairing global interests and “globally shared prosperity” (p. 10). This justifies
green prerequisites for the approval of loans, with borrowers required “to restructure
state agencies, to write national legislation that creates new commercial land and
resource markets, and to adopt new scientific protocols that result in the shaping of
knowledge and expertise on the causes and solutions of ecological destruction and
halted development” (p. 11). Given that many Southern countries, particularly the
most indebted, depend on external development grants and loans for their operating
budgets, the threat of loandenial compels these states to surrender to the preconditions
of sustainable development.
To achieve theWorldBank’s versionof sustainable development, states are obliged
to restructure, resulting in what Goldman (2005) describes as “unevenly transnation-
alized” environmental states (p. 183). By following the Bank’s doctrine of economi-
cally valuing the environment, borrowing states’ restructuringprocesses considerably
narrow the ideological and practical separation between financial and environmental
ministries. In the effort to support large capital projects, some state functions are
empowered while others are neglected. For example, ministries of environment,
forests, agriculture, mining, land management, and water in the Southern states are
increasingly involved in the receipt and management of foreign capital inflows and
their staff integrated into the transnational professional class of experts. As Goldman
(2005) points out,many Southern countries experience increasing “disparity between
public expenditures on health, education, and public services and expenditures on
the increasingly transnational energy, forestry, construction, and transport sectors”
(p. 207). Such uneven transnationalization results in the deprivation of social sectors
in favor of newly capitalized sectors and the prioritization of large-scale investment
projects that resource-related agencies are now obliged to finance, implement and
regulate.
Environmental states are effectively restructured to “make sites and popula-
tions more compatible with these large-scale capital investments” (Goldman, 2005,
p. 200). Goldman emphasizes the material impacts of newly imported environmental
concepts (e.g., conservation, biodiversity, sustainable development and watershed
management) when actualized as new regulatory regimes, reformed state agencies,
and large-scale capital investments (e.g., dams, tree plantations, and biodiversity
and conservation parks). These imported concepts supersede or subjugate traditional
ways of valuing nature and accessing land and natural resources, replacing themwith
transnationally managed eco-territories. A hegemonic discourse rooted in neoliberal
market ideology has emerged which reinterprets the ecological qualities of different
parts of state territory, “defining some ‘qualities of territory’ as degraded and others
as appropriate for commodification, and hence for improvement” (p. 184). This new
classification system constitutes a knowledge regime for land relations and a mech-
anism for political-economic calculation, which declares “socially diverse, semi-
nomadic, shifting, kinship-based, interdependent relations of production are ‘out’ in
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the new framework, while biodiversity conservation, sustainable timber production,
and watershed management are ‘in’” (p. 203). This categorization and reduction
of ecological differences facilitates and legitimizes these normalizing practices that
transnationalize resource access in the Global South in the service of neoliberal
goals of “improving” the conditions of environments and populations for the benefit
of international markets.
Goldman’s insights on green-neoliberal development and environmental states in
the Global South reveal sustainable development as a global technology of gover-
nance expanding over the past three decades. In the name of sustainable develop-
ment, new types of knowledge and institutional norms are created by “neoliberal
discourse and its rights-based orientation, on the one hand, and new disciplinary
mechanisms of globalized environmentalism, on the other” (Goldman, 2001, p. 193).
AlthoughGoldman’s reading of sustainable development and eco-governance echoes
Foucault’s concept of the “art of government,” Goldman focusses on nature, qual-
ities of territory, and the political-epistemic rationales that were undifferentiated
by Foucault and his adherents. Environmentally sustainable development as a “tech-
nology of government” can be understood as a system of “mundane forms of violence
perpetuated in the name of development” (Goldman, 2005, p. 12). Mundane violence
differs from the gross violence of development projects well-documented by others
and refers to “the everyday forms of building up hegemony that influence and pres-
sure people to participate in the formation and stabilization of the World Bank’s
green-neoliberal agenda” (p. 12).
Based on his critical reading of how sustainable development has reshaped Laos,
Goldman (2005) reveals how theWorld Bank’s simultaneous offer of “better”models
of development and suppression of any possibility for alternatives through its domi-
nant discourse actively legitimized a new Lao environmental state, resulting in the
subsequent reclassification of the country’s territory into various eco-zones since the
early 1990s. Given that the Lao government was fiscally poor to prioritize protecting
its environment, the World Bank and its partners argued that only large-scale capital
projects could finance protection of the country’s precious ecosystems (p. 194).
Restructuring and policy reorientation of state “software” became a precondition in
order to qualify for the Bank’s loan for developmental “hardware” (p. 200). In the
1990s, with the help of foreign fiscal advisors, natural resource planners and lawyers,
the Lao primeminister’s office passed a number of important decrees relating to prop-
erty rights and natural resource use, especially forests, water, and land (p. 201). This
process paralleled new data collection on ecological resources, especially in terms of
these resources’ degradation and recovery rates, with the expanding market demands
for natural goods and services (e.g., hardwoods, hydropower, eco-tourists, biodiver-
sity aesthetics). These decrees and laws facilitate the redrawing of administrative and
cultural boundaries into new eco-zones delineated based on “scientifically” valued
natural resources and projected demands of different groups of resource users.
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4 Frontier Resourcification
In a 2009 article, geographer Keith Barney recounted the exploration process of
Australian multinational Oxiana Ltd.’s gold and copper mines in the uplands of
Laos’s Savannakhet province, where the company spent nearly a decade roaming
the jungle tracks of the Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos. On finding a USD $4.29 billion
gold and copper deposit, the first such discovery in Laos by an overseas mining
company, the team’s geologist remarked, “We were leading the push into new fron-
tiers” (Bloomberg, 2004 as quoted in Barney, 2009, p. 149). According to Barney
(2009), this quote captures the shift in perception of Laos as a frontier, from the
colonial conception of “Laos as an underpopulated frontier zone” (p. 149) to today’s
capitalist conception of “Laos as a ‘last frontier’… an available site for transnational
resource sector investment” (p. 156). In his analysis of the contemporary geographies
of enclosure in Laos, Barney deploys a relational perspective on nature, economy and
livelihood to foreground the historical and relational complexity of frontier “resour-
cification,” a process whereby “Laos, and territories within Laos, are being actively
‘peripheralized’ in a globalized economy” (p. 156). In this section, we contextualize
Barney’s thesis within discourse on “the production of frontiers” and “patchworked
frontier.”
Frontier theory, as originally advanced by American historian Frederick Jackson
Turner (1894, 1920), follows a spatiotemporally linear, colonist- and colonizer-
centered approach. Extending and often challenging Turner’s theories, the metaphor
of “frontier” is frequently used by geography and political economics fields to refer
to the absorption of peripheral regions into capitalism and is closely related to the
concept of resource commodification, such as in “resource frontiers” (Barney, 2009;
Fujita Lagerqvist, 2013), “commodity frontiers” (Kelly & Peluso, 2015; Moore,
2000), “extraction frontiers” (de Jong et al., 2017; Temper et al., 2015), “capi-
talist frontiers” (Tsing, 2003, 2005) and “neoliberal frontiers” (Brannstrom, 2009;
Carmody&Owusu, 2016; Sims, 2015). In contrast to the Turnerian perception of the
frontier as an empty, unoccupiedwilderness, these positions acknowledge the frontier
as “a zone of destruction of property systems, political structures, social relations,
and life-worlds to make way for new ways of resource extraction” (Rasmussen &
Lund, 2018, p. 389).
A frontier does not exist naturally; rather, it is a discursive and physical construct.
Following his analyses of various forms of capitalist enclosure, political economist
Massimo de Angelis suggests the production of frontiers can be understood through
the geographical extension of capitalist means of production. De Angelis (2004)
argues, “it is capital that identifies a frontier, and the identification of this frontier
implies the creation of a space of enclosures, a horizon within which policies and
practices promoting further separation between people and means of production in
new spheres of life” (p. 73). In this case, a frontier, rather than being space itself,
“happens in and to space” (Rasmussen & Lund, 2018, p. 388). The production of
frontiers begins as moments where capital recognizes a frontier, which “implies the
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identification of a space of social life that is still relatively uncolonized by capi-
talist relations of production and modes of activity” (de Angelis, 2004, p. 73). These
moments are succeeded by new property regimes and forms of authority that legit-
imize their power through defining proper uses and users, setting enclosure inmotion.
As De Angelis argues, “the identification of a space of enclosure implies the attempt
to overcome necessary resistance by what capital regards as ‘enclosable’ subjects.
All classical examples of enclosures…fall in this category” (p. 73).
Over the past two decades, resource frontiers have proliferated throughout the
Global South, with dramatic increases in demand, consumption, prices and rates
of new capital investment across resource extraction sectors. Political ecologists
carrying out research on Southeast Asia have used the resource frontier metaphor
to analyze forest transitions, including logging and cash crop expansion, resource
degradation and community displacement (See, for example, Tsing, 2005;McCarthy,
2006; Walker, 2006; Barney, 2009). Keith Barney (2009) uses the term “frontier-
neoliberalism” to explain the strong connection in the twenty-first century between
global market demands, intensive resource extraction and new state or private land
enclosures in Southeast Asian countries such as Myanmar, Papua New Guinea, Laos
and Cambodia. Driven primarily by capital, the production of resource frontiers in
these countries is in part made possible by a process described by anthropologist
Holly High as “resourcification.” High (2010) pointed out that natural features that
were previously seen as physical obstacles to investment capital have been “framed
within a language of resources” in recent decades. Resourcification occurs as “natural
features are judged as useful in relation to human wants,” and the drive to turn natural
resources into capital derives from theways political actors judge or appraise resource
values and benefits (p. 156).
The metaphor of the “last frontier” is being widely deployed as the global
machinery of resource extraction and commodity production encroach on the few
remaining landscapes where natural resources have not yet been enclosed, extracted,
and processed (Barney, 2009, p. 146). Focusing on the production of frontiers in Laos,
Barney argues that state agencies and multilateral development banks such as the
Asian Development Bank (ADB) strategically deployed “last frontier” as discourse
to attract transnational investment and legitimize the conversion of upland areas into
capital-intensive resource extraction zones. The “last frontier” metaphor implies that
the Lao uplands are vacant, un-governed and uninhabited (or underpopulated), in
otherwords enclosable for large-scale logging, plantations,mines, hydropower dams,
and other resource-based industrial projects. Omitting rural peoples and their liveli-
hoods, on the one hand, serves “a useful ideological function for resource capital”
as it reproduces popular conceptions of the rural as empty, thus promising higher
rates of return on investment, and on the other hand, is part of “a crucial method
of externalizing the true costs of resource development mega-projects, and shifting
the damages and the responsibility onto local populations” (Barney, 2009, p. 151).
The deliberate denial that various groups of largely ethnic minorities, whose liveli-
hoods are intimately linked to the land, do indeed inhabit Laos’s uplands reveals the
close correlation between enclosure and exclusion (or dispossession) inherent in the
establishment of resource frontiers. This phenomenon results in “dramatic changes
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in socio-natural landscapes” and “new patterns of marginalization and livelihood
insecurity for a vulnerable rural population” (p. 146).
Critical geographers identify the close linkage between enclosure and expropria-
tion of land and resources in line with KarlMarx’s concept of primitive accumulation
(Baird, 2011; Fujita Lagerqvist et al., 2014; Lund, 2011; Neef, 2016). According
to Perelman (2007), as significant populations in the Global South have not yet
fully integrated into the wage-labor economy, primitive accumulation persists and
“involves the direct expropriationof people’s conditions of production, the purposeful
forcing of people into wage labor, and the intentional manipulation of the social divi-
sion of labor” (p. 59). For example, regarding state land concessions for plantations
in Laos, geographer Ian Baird (2011) reveals that the system of issuing large-scale
concessions not only involves the enclosure and expropriation of land and resources
but also forcibly integrates subsistence and semi-subsistence farmers into the labor
market. In Baird’s words, the national policy “to ‘turn land into capital’ is crucially
intertwined with … ‘turning people into labor’” (p. 12). He further describes how
the transition of Laos’s labor force into the market economy is a primary part of the
state’s rhetoric justifying the current land concession system. For many state offi-
cials, the dispossession of the rural population’s existing means of subsistence is “a
necessary evil … needed to propel Laos into the modern world and eventually out of
poverty,” and the violent primitive accumulation is “a necessary step in the direction
of fuller human development” (p. 12).
Many geographers investigating the broad implication of large-scale natural
resource concessions in Global South countries foreground the co-existence at
multiple scales of various actors, both state and private, whose everyday prac-
tices reshape people’s relationship with land and resources and transform the rural
landscape (See, for example, Hardin, 2002; MacLean, 2008; Barney, 2008, 2009;
Fujita Lagerqvist et al., 2014). They argue that new frontier places and landscapes
are not exclusively the outcomes of either global political-economic or elite state-
bureaucratic forces. Instead, these are landscapes where “alternate regimes of invest-
ment, extraction and accumulation” aggregate and aggravate each other (Barney,
2009, p. 152). In Laos, while political processes determine how natural resources are
valued, the party-state is not a hegemonic force determining development outcomes
and multinational capital-intensive development projects often overlap with other
resource-extraction interests often tied to military or provincial authorities (Barney,
2009; Fujita Lagerqvist et al., 2014). Acknowledging these processes as situated and
contingent further requires that local people and local landscapes feature as crucial
players in the production and reproduction of frontier spaces (Raffles, 2002; Tsing,
2005; Walker, 2006).
As agents compete for access and control over land and resources, their authority
and interests overlap and are in tension, producing “fragmented and overlapping
mosaics of resource governance and territorial control” (MacLean, 2008 as quoted
in Barney, 2009, p. 147). Resources are valued in different ways by different actors;
for example, tourism agencies place aesthetic value on the landscape, which is in
direct opposition to the material value imposed by mining, hydropower, and tree
plantations. Following MacLean, Barney (2009) deployed the phrase “patchworked
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frontiers” to describe distinct frontiers in Laos that are “associatedwith different, elite
fractions [sic] and power configurations, and different state agencies” (p. 152). Land
concessions of divergent sizes granted under various authorities at different times
create a patchwork of overlapping governance regimes, where new multinational
resource sector investments “interact with previous spatial regimes of resource gover-
nance” (p. 147), and various political-economic blocs compete against each other.
As Fujita Lagerqvist et al. (2014) demonstrate, a further lack of coordination and
effective regulation across various resource-related sectors in Laos has cumulative
as well as project-specific repercussions.
In a “striated and patchworked landscape” (Barney, 2009, p. 152), new resource
enclosures interact with the socio-environmental impacts of previous land reforms,
with concession-induced migrations overlaid on Laos’s long legacy of internal and
international migrations. Laos’s 1953–1975 civil war and the government’s long-
standing policy, since the establishment of the Lao PDR in 1975, to eradicate
upland swidden farming are major factors contributing to contemporary migra-
tions. At the local level, many long-established communities have witnessed several
waves of migration since the 1950s, including those caused by the creation of
large-scale resource concessions over the past two decades; these migrations have
exacerbated resource competition and subsequent resource scarcity. For example,
in Feuang District, part of the 16,000-square-kilometer Nam Ngum River basin,
Fujita Lagerqvist et al. reveal the complexities of intense resource competition. The
lower Nam Lik valley, a rural area that first received wartime refugees from north-
eastern Laos, was designated to accept a large influx of migrants displaced by the
construction of a large-scale hydropower dam in another district in the basin. The
resulting intensification of local resource competition in Feuang District led to a
surge in land prices and rising tensions between the resettled community and existing
villages (Fujita Lagerqvist et al., 2014).
While some communities such as those in Feuang District have experienced
several rounds of immigration, others underwent repeated displacements. In the
village of Ban Pak Veng in the lower Hinboun valley, Barney examines a case of
“double displacement,”whereby village livelihoodswere threatened by the combined
externalities of a major hydropower project and industrial tree plantations, projects
from two of Laos’s leading extractive sectors. Serious upstream riverbank erosion
caused by the hydropower dam altered the flooding regime of the middle and
lower Hinboun valley, rendering existing lowland wet rice cultivation impossible
and resulting in acute food insecurity. Villagers who lost their lowland rice paddies
switched to swidden cultivation in nearby upland forests, and soon afterwards, a
third of these villagers’ swidden agriculture land was designated under the Land and
Forest Allocation program as “degraded forest land” and expropriated for commer-
cial eucalyptus plantations with minimal compensation. The lack of compensation
and ineffective mitigation measures provided within the hydropower and planta-
tion projects led to villagers’ intensified, short-term exploitation of their remaining
resources and to village youth emigrating for job opportunities within and outside
Laos (Barney, 2009).
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In their analyses of the socio-environmental impacts of resource development in
Laos, both Fujita Lagerqvist et al. (2014) and Barney (2009) emphasize that farmers
are not unresponsive to the drastic changes of their rural landscapes and those land-
scapes’ degradation. Land reform programs and capital-intensive resource projects
entangle with legacies of local resource management practices, transforming the
local environment and mediating villagers’ responses. In their struggle to respond
to this degradation, villagers adopt a variety of strategies, including livelihood
diversification and reorientation toward newly accessible markets, which in Feuang
District and Hinboun valley involved villagers planting cash crops such as cassava,
rubber, and agarwood. However, these smallholder investments take place amidst
the privatization of land and common-pool resources, a process that is often highly
uneven and unequal. Well-off households, including some receiving remittance from
migrated youth, can readily diversify their livelihoods by undertaking new agricul-
tural practices and can make substantive claim to previously communal agricultural
lands. Poorer households also diversify their livelihood activities when adapting
to change. However, given their lack of basic means of production and reduced
access to capital, they are disadvantaged in the competition for local resources.
By observing how villagers respond to fast-changing circumstances and how such
responses feed further changes in land tenure and landscape dynamics, geographers
such as Fujita Lagerqvist et al. and Barney reveal both planned and unexpected
trajectories of development projects in the rural Laos.
Geographers have shown today’s resource frontiers to be a product of capitalism
and how new frontier places and landscapes have become patchworks where diverse
regimes of investment, extraction and accumulation contend for influence. In Laos,
large-scale resource concessions have been detrimental to upland communities in a
country where upland areas account for nearly 80% of the territory (Hodgdon, 2010).
The Lao uplands are imagined as an empty frontier space, by and for transnational
investment, despite being the means of subsistence for ethnic minorities who make
up over 40% of Laos’s total population (Hodgdon, 2010). These people are heavily
reliant on mixed subsistence and semi-subsistence agriculture and obtain most of
their food from family farming, fishing, hunting, and gathering non-timber forest
products (Baird, 2011; Fujita Lagerqvist et al., 2014).While thewage-labor economy
is becoming increasingly important in rural Laos, geographers highlight the degree of
spatial and demographic unevenness in which it incorporates the population. Upland
ethnic minorities are disproportionately less reliant on wage-labor than the overall
population (Baird, 2011; Rigg, 2005). Land managers should neither romanticize
nor undervalue subsistence agriculture where a large segment of the population’s
livelihoods have historically been and remain intimately tied to the land (Baird,
2011).
In his analysis of the complex reworking of Laos’s upland frontier, Barney (2009)
emphasizes that decades of development and land policies continue to have “a
deep transformative effect upon the Lao landscape” (p. 148) and that “there is no
singular political-economic rationality or intentionality at work in the Lao uplands”
(p. 153). He conceptualizes frontier resourcification in Laoswithin a longer history of
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resource development in two interrelated phases. Referring to “programmes associ-
atedwithFrench colonial,war-era and subsequent decentralised political structures in
Laos,” a “first frontier” was created when Vietnamese, Thai and Chinese businesses,
particularly in the logging sector, engaged the Lao military, provincial governors
and central Party officials (p. 152). More recent projects associated with “capital-
intensive, neoliberal inspired resource investment, including new land reform poli-
cies” contributed to the formation of a “second frontier” that “overlaps with the
processes and outcomes of the first frontier” (p. 152). Barney (2009) highlights
how, in this second frontier phase, historical and contemporary land reform poli-
cies, including Laos’s Land and Forest Allocation (LFA) and Participatory Land Use
Planning and Land Allocation (LUPLA), upland resettlement and “focal site” rural
development have deployed a reductive area-based approach to development that
facilitated “the freeing up of land and forest resources for capitalization” (p. 153).
In many cases, customary lands did not receive full legal recognition during the
implementation of new upland tenure policies, and policies such as LFA became the
very mechanisms by which villagers would lose customary lands and resources to
plantation firms (Barney, 2008, 2009). The severe livelihood insecurity induced by
these past and recent policies has prompted alternative approaches to land develop-
ment, reallocation and regularization, including an overhaul of LFA and LUPLA and
collective land titling. However, a more effective system that recognizes customary
and common property rights for upland communities is still needed.
5 The Promise of Infrastructure
In his 2020 article on the politics of infrastructure development in northwest
Laos, geographer Michael Dwyer cited Chinese Academy of Sciences academics
describing the BRI as “a model in which the hand of the state accompanies the hand
of the market … to deliver not simply net gains as in the neoliberal case but win–win
outcomes” (Liu & Dunford, 2016, p. 325 as quoted in Dwyer, 2020, p. 1). Dwyer
challenges this claim and the discrepancies between the “BRI-as-idea” and “BRI-in-
practice” through revealing the tensions between BRI investments and earlier devel-
opment plans and projects. He provides a detailed examination of Laos’s Northern
Economic Corridor (NEC), a highway-centered regional trade corridor launched in
Laos’s rubber boom years of the mid-2000s that was later retroactively labelled part
of the BRI. Dwyer (2020) argues that since the BRI-in-practice is largely an assem-
blage of existing projects “firmly planted, at least in part, in the world of neoliberal
development,” the real debate must shift from BRI versus neoliberalism to consid-
ering that “the same questions of regulatory protection that have plagued neoliberal
development projects continue to confront the BRI” (p. 10).Wider scholarship firstly
on the discourse of “infrastructure” and secondly on the discourse of “planning and
assessment” will help theorize Dwyer’s contention.
According to economist Batt (1984), the earliest documented use of the term
“infrastructure” in English was in 1927 when it appeared in the Oxford English
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Dictionary under an entry for a French rail line, noting “the tunnels, bridges, culverts
and ‘infrastructure’ work generally … have been completed” (p. 2). Despite the
term being credited to civil engineers during the nineteenth century boom in railway
construction, the discourse surrounding infrastructure today only emerged from its
use in military and economic jargon of the mid-twentieth century.
During the Cold War, the term was used by defense experts to describe the “fixed
installations which are necessary for the effective deployment and operations of
modern armed forces” (Ismay, 1954, p. 10 as quoted in Batt, 1984, p. 2). The term
also entered postwar economic development and national-building efforts, particu-
larly those targeting low-income countries (Batt, 1984, p. 2). In contrast to nineteenth-
century railway development largely supported by private capital and deliberately
non-public, the appropriation of the term by military and postwar development
planners in the mid-twentieth century led to its close association with state policy,
investment and public spending (Batt, 1984). Immense capital investment became
a precondition both for modern war mobilization under the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) and other alliances and for lifting underdeveloped nations
out of poverty. The phrase “infrastructure development” was increasingly used to
describe these capital investments seen as prerequisite for efficient development of
heavy industry, trade, and nation-building, all efforts readily understood as neces-
sarily state-led (Batt, 1984, p. 2). Given the high initial costs and long payoff periods
of these investments, new planning processes were deployed by military and devel-
opment planners, replacing nineteenth-century patronage systems and facilitating
more “responsible” public spending (p. 2).
During the 1970s, infrastructure discourse further expanded, and its focus shifted
away from military defense towards economic development with the mainstreaming
of neoliberal ideas advocating deregulation of international financing and the
rebranding of development as international aid (Dwyer, 2020, p. 3). Development
lending broadened from focusing on material elements such as roads, airports, and
water supply systems, which are often the subjects of market-rate loans, to social
services such as health care, education, and social organization financed by grants or
soft loans (Rankin, 2009, p. 69). Accordingly, “infrastructure” became both modern
society’s industrial capital base and the human capital, the training and education,
that support it (Batt, 1984, pp. 2–3). Acknowledging this, in 1984, Batt defined the
term as “that element of capital overhead which is supportive of all other economic
investment in a society, necessary to its further development” (p. 1).
The anticipation of this further development, the promise of a “future perfect,”
along with its accompanying risks, led in the 1980s and 1990s to theWorld Bank and
other multilaterals’ institutionalization of formal safeguards in infrastructure plan-
ning practices, most notably the introduction of environmental and social impact
assessment (ESIA) and mitigation planning. As explained earlier in this chapter’s
section on the sustainable development paradigm, significant socio-environmental
impacts, the consequence of a decade of rapid development lending in large infras-
tructure projects byMcNamara’sWorld Bank, led, during the 1980s and 1990s, to the
creation of formal safeguards. Often resultant from conflicts between development
banks and civil society (See, for example, Rich, 2013; Wade, 1997, 2016; Dwyer,
5 The Promise of Infrastructure 75
2020), these safeguards’ main objective was the mitigation of development risk,
effectively institutionalizing assessment and planning methods that would “more
adequately anticipate the impact zones and their associated effects before projects
were actually approved” (Dwyer, 2020, p. 3). Acknowledging that safeguards are
intrinsically political and spatial, with each infrastructure sector having unique
impacts, geographer Dwyer argues that formal safeguards turbocharge the “poli-
tics of valuation at multiple scales” (p. 3). Assessment questions such as “whether,
how, where and when various types of impacts should be counted” are politically
entwined with questions such as “which projects would be funded, how they would
be designed and supervised, who would receive and not receive various types of
project-financed mitigation” (p. 3).
Over the past three decades, while the meaning of “infrastructure” expanded, new
ideas for its financing were limited due to neoliberalization. Geographer Furlong
(2020), in her analysis of economies of infrastructure, draws fromBrine and Poovey’s
(2013) work on the history of capital where they recognize capital not as “stock”
but instead as “expectation.” Here, Furlong emphasizes the importance of the “time
element” in infrastructure financialization, “whereby the capital ‘stock’ must yield a
‘flow’ of income ‘in the form of the incremental payments of interest it would return
over time’” (Furlong, 2020, p. 576). Like Furlong,many have pointed out that, regard-
less of whether development is underwritten by debt or more recently by financial-
ization, it often takes the form of wealth extraction. Analyzing the recent origins of
infrastructure in development economics, post-development theorist Escobar (1995)
highlights that built infrastructures are expected to generate sufficient returns to repay
any associated debt, interest and fees. In her investigation of the “infrastructures of
austerity” including outdated technologies and degraded infrastructure, anthropol-
ogist Laura Bear (2015) argues that sovereign debt provides the political rationale
for austerity, which “leads to an intensified extraction of value from public infras-
tructures” (p. 4). In this way, infrastructure investment has increasingly become a
spillway for over-accumulated capital in the global economy. Where Furlong and
Escobar assert the expectation, or promise, of infrastructure giving it momentum,
Bear describes the simultaneous glut of financing producing infrastructures that too
often result in massive maintenance, refurbishment and adaptation shortfalls and
mistrust between communities, local governments and investors (See, for example,
Pieterse & Hyman, 2014; Harvey, 2017; Furlong, 2020).
Economic geographers Flyvbjerg et al. (2009), in their analysis of the condi-
tions whereby “across the globe, large infrastructure projects almost invariably
arrive late, over-budget, and fail to perform up to expectations,” argue that the
sheer number of unsuccessful projects is too significant to be explained by chance
alone (p. 172).While project executives frequently attribute the discrepancy between
project expectations and performance to unforeseen circumstances, Flyvbjerg et al.
argue that proponents often succumb to “delusion and deception” and that psycho-
logical and governance issues are the underlying reasons for such discrepancy. Delu-
sions, including honest mistakes, result from psychological biases influenced by
“planning fallacy,”whereby executivesmake decisions based on delusional optimism
rather than a rational weighing of gains, losses, and probabilities (p. 172). In contrast,
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deceptions, including the strategic manipulation of information or processes, result
from poor governance influenced by “principal-agent problems,”whereby executives
deliberately overestimate benefits and underestimate costs such that their projects
have a better chance in the competition to gain approval and funding (p. 173).
Flyvbjerg et al. (2014) argue that delusion and deception, rather than being alter-
native explanations for why large infrastructure projects fail, are complementary and
difficult to disentangle in practice.
Dwyer (2020) builds on Flyvbjerg et al.’s insightful analysis of development
planning’s “delusion and deception,” which undermine estimates of the anticipated
benefits and costs of large infrastructure projects, by examining how developers (and
their consultants) use a complex lexicon on impact prediction to discursively make a
given infrastructure project appear financeable, often by externalizing its true costs.
As mentioned above, the institutionalization of environmental and social impact
assessment (ESIA) and mitigation planning during the 1980s and 1990s was born
out of conflicts between development banks and civil society actors. While initially
oppositional, much of today’s civil society has succumbed to the hegemony of the
World Bank’s development discourse on mitigation (Goldman, 2005). In particular,
the development banks’ lexicon of project-related impacts, such as “direct,” “indi-
rect,” “induced,” “regional” and “in-combination” impacts, enabled development
experts and planners to counter critics and discredit claims of these experts’ “plan-
ning fallacy” or irrational optimism by making the outcomes of large-scale interven-
tions seemingly foreseeable and quantifiable. According to Dwyer (2020), however,
these impact assessment and mitigation planning frameworks frequently exaggerate
pre-project estimates of both benefits and profitability. Dwyer argues that the lexicon
of direct and indirect impacts “allows for the nuanced specification of complexity,
such as the cascading effects that infrastructure projects regularly induce beyond the
immediate physical (‘direct’) impacts of, say, losing one’s land to a new road” (p. 4).
Here, financers and planners have latitude to define impacts in order to mitigate
complexity and, at the same time, discretion in how thoroughly these impacts are to
be investigated and addressed.
Dwyer uses the case of Laos’s Northern Economic Corridor (NEC), a road-
upgrading project connecting China with Thailand via Laos and co-financed by the
Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the governments of China and Thailand, to
exemplify how developers mold the project’s discursive and financial terrain via its
“project area of influence” (PAI). Defined by the World Bank as “[t]he area likely
to be affected by the project, including all its ancillary aspects” (World Bank, 1999,
p. 2), a PAI enables planners, in Dwyer’s words, to “cast the net of impact assessment
widely, while also allowing for flexibility in whether an anticipated effect is formally
labeled an ‘impact’” (Dwyer, 2020, p. 4). For the NEC, a two-fold compromise
enabled by the PAI kept certain anticipated effects outside the zone of mitigation,
thereby creating a leaner loan package while boosting the estimated profitability.
The first part of the compromise was to finance the georeferenced documentation
of any permanent agriculture or other improved land uses within the immediate
50 m from the highway’s centerline; this allowed planners to explicitly define a
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zone of mitigation (Dwyer, 2020). The second part of the compromise was effec-
tive in transferring the developer’s responsibility of the larger NEC, their societal
obligation for managing the acute tenure insecurity that existed beyond that zone
of mitigation, into a separate poverty-reduction project, thus enabling the ADB and
three governments to proceed with construction (Dwyer, 2020). This displacement
of responsibility further suppressed mitigation costs to a level entirely insufficient to
address the major socio-environmental issues identified during the ESIA process.
Frameworks for community participation developed and deployed by multilateral
development banks (MDB) are also theorized within Flyvbjerg et al.’s “delusion and
deception” (See, for example, Guttal & Shoemaker, 2004; Lawrence, 2009; Hatcher,
2006, 2015). In the 1990s, mechanisms for local community participation became
central to a new set of approaches devised by MDBs such as the World Bank and
ADB for managing expectations around the societal benefits of development and
for managing, or rather containing, opposition to large capital projects. In their 2005
report onExtractive Industries and SustainableDevelopment, theWorldBank (2005)
had acknowledged that large capital projects may “aggravate or cause serious envi-
ronmental, health, and social problems, including conflict and war” (p. 1); however,
they insisted that negative impacts are not inevitable if propermitigationmeasures are
taken. The World Bank soon replaced its recommended policy framework with one
adopting a strong social-economic development narrative that advocated the involve-
ment of local communities in risk mitigation (Hatcher, 2015). While theWorld Bank
describes its social-development model (SDM) as centered on poverty reduction and
environmental sustainability, Pascale Hatcher (2015), a political economist writing
on Laos’s transnational mining sector, argues that these new development models
such as SDM are effectively management tools offering “a depoliticized path to vent
… local opposition,” thereby limiting the socio-political risks faced by capital and
multilateral institutions (p. 340).
Hatcher reveals the extreme disparities between the SDM’s narrative and experi-
ences on the ground by closely examining Laos’s Sepon gold and copper mine and
Nam Theun II hydropower dam, two of the World Bank’s largest resource extraction
projects in Laos. Hatcher challenges the Bank’s self-proclaimed “neutral position”
(World Bank, 2010) by juxtaposing the World Bank Group’s highly political and
duplicitous roles in Laos, from direct credit provider to leading the country’s struc-
tural reform or “liberalization” process, including promoting SDM as the dominant
strategy for developing Laos’s large capital projects (Hatcher, 2015, p. 325). SDM’s
participatory mechanisms are defined by Hatcher (2015) as “neoliberal modes of
participation,” strategies employed by pro-market interests with “a clear attempt to
mitigate political risk in order to facilitate capital accumulation” (p. 323). Despite
the World Bank’s awareness of Laos’s challenging political landscape characterized
by “a one-party regime,…clear conflicts of interest in regulatory bodies, and institu-
tional capacity deficits” (p. 340),Hatcher argues that there is a certain hypocrisy in the
Bank’s simultaneous promotion of socio-environmental standards, on the one hand,
and rapid liberalization and opening of the natural resource sectors to foreign invest-
ment on the other. Just as Dwyer observed in the NEC case, Hatcher (2015) notes
that ESIA and mitigation planning have often been superficial, “alluding to further
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studies and further elaboration of details later,” and that participatory processes have
been limited to an information dissemination process, “which mainly consisted of
providing information and not having discussions” (p. 333).
The discourse of infrastructure has been closely associated with state policy and
investment since the mid-twentieth century. Critical geographers, critical anthro-
pologists and political scientists argue that it is the conceptual plasticity and mate-
riality of infrastructure that made this once (French) engineering term dominant
in postwar military and economic knowledge-power systems (Carse, 2017; Dwyer,
2020). This plurality of “infrastructure” persists, as evidenced in the growing body
of scholarship and recent “infrastructural turn” in anthropology, the social sciences
and broader humanities fields, where social relations, political forms and environ-
mental concerns are increasingly analyzed through the lens of infrastructure. Crit-
ical academics approach infrastructure as a set of “dense social, material, aesthetics,
and political formations” (Anand et al., 2018, p. 3) often oscillating between “the
modernist move to standardize and the anthropological move to pluralize” in their
infrastructure studies (Carse, 2017, p. 36). They focus their ethnographic and histor-
ical scrutiny on sites of tension and discrepancy, revealing infrastructure as a discur-
sive assemblage that can act “both as a foundation for economic development and
social inclusion and as an instrument of wealth extraction, enhanced inequality and
potential crisis” (Furlong, 2020, p. 572; Harvey & Knox, 2012; Howe et al., 2016).
In northwest Laos, geographer Michael Dwyer (2020) describes China’s Belt and
Road Initiative (BRI) as embedding these contradictions in its projects “as-ideas”
and “in-practice.” BRI-as-idea offers “the promise and possibility of more inclusive
development via the presence of a stronger regulatory state” (p. 10). BRI-in-practice,
however, will still need to contend with the complex development legacies of Laos’s
Northern Economic Corridor (NEC). Development of the NEC has been a widely
uneven process where “state power has come down largely on the side of enclosure
and extraction rather than of social protection of poor and vulnerable sub-populations
in the corridor’s impact zone” (p. 2). Similarly, while neoliberalism-as-idea is often
framed as “the elimination of state ‘barriers’ to ‘the market’,” neoliberalism-in-
practice is actually “predicated on active (if often disguised or downplayed) state
interventions” (p. 10). Dwyer concludes that to achieve genuine social inclusivity
and equity in infrastructure development, it is the process of development thatmatters
and not the financing, vision or states’ involvement. He offers three suggestions to
facilitate more inclusive development: First, he calls for reassessment of how respon-
sibility is allocated, particularly in the ways development banks’ existing practices
mandatemitigating “direct” impactswhile leaving responsibility formitigating “indi-
rect” impacts to borrowers. Second, he suggests rethinking the ways that geographies
of influence and impact are mapped, critically, to shift focus onto issues of equity and
blunt planners’ formal spatial practices, projects, and preoccupations with making
infrastructure. Lastly, he recognizes that inclusive development will require devoting
far higher levels of financing and institutional resources toward regulatory protec-




In this chapter, we reviewed: (1) the politics of land-use planning in Laos, covering
the politics of space and the state’s territorial strategies; (2) the sustainable devel-
opment paradigm, green-neoliberal development approaches and the emergence of
a Lao environmental governance; (3) frontier resourcification, enabled by capital’s
construction of frontiers as patchworks, assemblages or mosaics of development
plans, projects, programs and policies; and (4) the discursive origins of “infrastruc-
ture” and the analytical arms race of the environmental impact assessment process
since the 1990s. Importantly, this is not a literature survey or review so much as a
purpose-built, efficient and rigorous assembling of theory and field studies meant to
simultaneously untrain planners and engender ways of actioning critical landscape
planning.
Land-use planning is a social process that reproduces dominant power relations
and formalizes the divide between society and nature. While presented episodically,
Laos’s territorialization projects over the past four decades, including national agro-
ecological assessments, land reallocation and resettlement programs, and concession-
based land policies for capital-intensive development, have followed the similar
global currents producing environmental governance states across Southeast Asia.
Recurrent themes on the importance of land use and land cover classification are
echoed throughout upwards of three-quarters of this chapter, in the sections on the
Politics of land-use planning, the Sustainable development paradigm, and Frontier
resourcification. Together with the anthropological reflections on standards in the
final section, the Promise of infrastructure, we have a very clear portrayal of Li’s
“rendering technical” of social and ecological issues and the immense challenges of
holding principled cultural-technological positions in Laos and similar contexts.
The cache of literature by political scientists and critical geographers reviewed
in this chapter, while not offering a comprehensive survey of relevant planning and
development literature given its predominant focus on Laos, it does demonstrate that
such literature can be surveyed in a relatively short time for the education of landscape
planners and its deployment conceptually in their strategic proposals. The literature
assembled in this chapter is indeed the literature by which we engage our landscape
architecture students as they learn “development.” This engagement occurs through
seminar-style discussion and through students’ visualization of critical theory in
space, over time, and via representing the landscape through drawing. This provides
for these landscape architects’ socialization in very foreign disciplines and critical
social theory while building an awareness of local, situated discourse on Laos’s
development.
Each of the four chapters in Part Two, which together contain a series of nine
strategic planning proposals for Laos, make explicit references to the discourses
and histories outlined in this chapter—i.e., they put them to use. The wide range
of development project types and sectors reviewed, including resettlement projects,
dam-building and watershed management, social development models in large-scale
resource extraction, and regional road-building schemes, are tackled simultaneously
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by individual students in the same university course. Most of these featured strategic
planning proposals presented in Part Two assume highly imperfect development
contexts where most development impacts will not be addressed by any of the formal
planning or implementation processes discussed in this chapter. In that sense, they are
critical and reactionary. These proposals assumemany of infrastructure’s “promises”
will be broken. To do critical landscape planning requires longer-term studies, the
construction of new rigorous and authoritative histories, and the forecasting and
backcasting of models where past and future events and impacts are uncertain or
unknown. They require a deeper understanding of development and discourse.
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This chapter presents two strategic planning proposals dealing with “direct” impacts
of the construction of the China-Laos Railway. It draws from discourse on “frontier
resourcification” and the “promise of infrastructure” introduced in Chap. 4.
We earlier citedGupta and Ferguson’s (1992) conception of connectivity, whereby
“cultural and social change becomes not a matter of cultural contact and articula-
tion but one of rethinking difference through connection” (p. 8). Anthropologists
Harvey and Knox in their 2015 book Roads: An Anthropology of infrastructure and
expertise, in addition to similarly querying “previous histories of connectivity,” are
also critical of the promise of integration and remind us to always question “who or
what is being integrated” (p. 52). Practices of “sustainable” development, in those
practices’ approaches, however genuine, to physically and economically connect
communities to newmarkets and generate new economies, disrupt preexistingmodes
of connectivity, whether socioeconomic, cultural or ecological.
The two strategic planning proposals included in this chapter are: Curating rural
connectivity: Strategic maintenance of temporary access roads of the China-Laos
Railway; and Before the bulldozer: Strategic agricultural cooperation for an uncer-
tain rail alignment. Importantly, in neither of the two proposals are we discussing
the connectivity directly brought by the China-Laos Railway itself—its primary
economic justification. Instead, the focus is on recognizing preexisting and tenuous
forms of connectivity. For instance, in “Curating rural connectivity,”which dealswith
the temporary access roads built tens of kilometers into rural landscapes to construct
the railway (Figs. 1 and 2), existing peoples, places and economic nodes, such as local
markets, become bypassed and marginalized. In “Before the bulldozer,” agricultural
irrigation networks are disrupted and farmlands fragmented by the construction of
the railway. While these disruptions may under certain economic terms be deemed
necessary, the years of uncertainty in planning transparency and mechanisms of
compensation amplify and distort the process. As we described in Chap. 2, plans,
even if unconstructed, have impacts years before groundbreaking, as people and
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economies reorganize in speculation and anticipation. Although neoliberal processes
often create smooth connections and do bring economic growth potential (Figs. 3
and 4), the impacts of supporting infrastructures create new, sometimes ephemeral
and often uneven connections. Geographers writing on Laos cited earlier help us
understand impact as relational and to strive for more critical articulations of what
“cumulative” impact is in the development process (Barney, 2009; Dwyer, 2020).
Dwyer asserts that projects in the Belt and Road Initiative (and most global develop-
ment campaigns for thatmatter), whether newor drawn into that framework post-hoc,
are assemblages of existing projects and relations.
In Chap. 4, we also reference Dwyer’s (2020) contention that meaningful debates
and reflections on the Belt and Road Initiative should not center on its similarities
and differences with neoliberalism but instead on the recurring faults of regula-
tory protections, especially the environmental and social impact assessment (EIA or
ESIA) processes promoted worldwide since the early 1990s. We also introduced
the World Bank’s and environmental governance state’s “lexicon of impact” as
described by Goldman (2005) and Dwyer (2020) in their respective writings on
Laos. This discourse or lexicon of direct and indirect impacts (as well as induced,
in-combination, or cumulative impacts) facilitates planners’ agency to deploy a
“nuanced specification of complexity” that, because of these planners’ compromised
positions in a project’s power structure, ultimately tends toward reductions in overall
economic risk and the concomitant externalization of the true costs of development,
displacing responsibility for socioenvironmentalmitigation and adaptation onto local
populations (Dwyer, 2020, p. 4). The planning proposals in this chapter redirect such
nuanced specifications of complexity, primarily in social and ecological terms, to
purposefully accentuate difference and heterogeneity and encourage structures that
reproduce such qualities.
One example of this purposeful, indeed critical, nuance is in the recognition of
plural publics and plural perceptions of environmental impacts. Fujita Lagerqvist
et al. (2014) reason that villagers have complex responses to degradation (including
both real degradation and the environmental governance state’s construction of
the concept of degradation), whereby they often pursue livelihood diversification
or resiliency and reorient their production and practices towards newly accessible
markets. Strategic planning proposals in this chapter (as well as in Chap. 6) offer
politically and ecologically tuned guidance to aid villagers’ responses to degradation,
especially under uncertain development conditions and pathways. These strategic
proposals capitalize on the shared uncertainties impacted communities face. Yet,
where these strategic proposals suggest state-, NGO-, or developer-led interventions,
such as the social responsibility schemes considered in “Before the bulldozer,” they
do not assume ormake their strategies contingent on such intervention. At most, such
suggestions are included to help principled actors argue for such programs, supported
by the contextually rich details and awareness-raising components of these bottom-up
strategies.
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Fig. 1 Temporary access roads built for constructing remote segments and 109 tunnel portals of
the China-Laos Railway. Consisting of both new construction and upgrades of existing tracks, these
roads potentially increase connectivity among remote villages, but their maintenance beyond the
opening date of the railway remains uncertain. Photo by Xiaoxuan Lu (March, 2019)
Fig. 2 A tunnel portal of the China-Laos Railway under construction above the Nam Khan River
south of Luang Prabang. Photo by Ashley Scott Kelly (March, 2018)
90 5 Infrastructural Connectivity and Difference
Fig. 3 At Nanla New Town Planning Exhibition Center in southern Yunnan province, an hour
drive from the China-Laos border gate, one of the galleries is dedicated to “The Belt and Road”
and features a simplified timeline of the vast trade network connecting Eurasia and North Africa
via land and sea starting from the second century BCE and continuing into the future. This gallery
also highlights Nanla’s strategic importance in Yunnan and globally, summarized in hyped-up titles
such as “Opening up the Border Area to Build an Attractive Yunnan” and “Reviving the Historic
Silk Road to Build a Better-Connected World.” Photo by Ashley Scott Kelly (March, 2019)
Fig. 4 Located near the China-Laos border in Southern Yunnan, Mengla city is undergoing rapid
transformation given its strategic location along the southern corridor of the BRI. The city’s expan-
sion on the east bank of the Nanla River is branded as Nanla New Town. This photograph shows
the newly completed “Water Splashing Square” designed to host 6,000 people in the foreground,
and a two-story Nanla New Town Planning Exhibition Center with its pitched roof was a replica of
the traditional Dai-style architecture, only ten times the scale. Photo by Ashley Scott Kelly (March,
2019)
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2 Curating Rural Connectivity: Strategic Maintenance
of Temporary Access Roads of the China-Laos Railway
By early 2018, nearly all the China-Laos Railway’s 110 tunnel portals had started
construction.1 One-third of these are sited between Luang Prabang and Muang Xay
along the most inaccessible portions of the China-Laos Railway corridor. Due to
its remoteness and mountainous terrain, this 86 km segment required construc-
tion of new access roads, some extending up to 44 km in length to reach northern
Laos’s primary north–south vehicular corridor, Route 13 (Fig. 5). Since beginning
construction in 2016, these access roads have served not only building the railway but
also communities along those access roads. Regardless of whether being composed
of new construction or upgrading of existing tracks, when the China-Laos railway
becomes operational in 2021, these “temporary” roads face future uncertainty when
the construction companies that maintain them vacate. This is compounded by risk
hazards, including floods, drought, and landslides prevalent across the study region
(Fig. 6; Hearn, 2011; Hearn et al., 2008).
Given the insufficient government resources allocated to district and rural road
development, this project reveals potentials of these access roads to aid social and
economic development of remote rural communities. Laos’s road sector has been
long plagued by underfunding, irregular targeting of priorities, and poor communi-
cation and collaboration between government departments (Fig. 7; Barma & Oksen,
2014). Established in 2001, theRoadMaintenance Fund (RMF) is the primary agency
charged with road maintenance nationally. 74% of the agency’s funding currently
targets the maintenance of national roads, such as Route 13, and 18% goes to district
and rural roads at a 1 to 1.5 ratio (Figs. 8 and 9; ADB, 2015). While funding has
generally increased year-on-year, it does not meet current maintenance needs and
generally deteriorating road conditions across the country (ADB, 2015). The govern-
ment’s future upgrade plans are primarily surface improvements, including engi-
neered natural surfaces and increased lanes (Fig. 10). Further, road safety audits in
Laos focus within the right-of-way only; roadside conditions are not considered yet
are key to road performance and longevity.
Using the Laos’s 2015 census (Lao Statistics Bureau, 2016), a comparison
between communities along highly accessible Route 13 and those extremely remote
along the rail corridor shows that average literacy rates, unemployment rates, elec-
tricity access, poverty incidence, and length of the “longest route to school” are
similar (Fig. 11). This suggests that physical accessibility may not be the dominant
factor affecting living standards and thus the need to focus on service provision.
This project develops scenarios and designs for six prototypical locations
(Figs. 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17), including their five nearest settlements so that
livelihood opportunities and impacts can in part shape the proposed mitigation
methods. Site and material preparation, implementation, and maintenance strategies
1 China-Laos Railway construction status determined by authors by comparing planning drawings
marking the railway’s route and tunnels against 10-m resolution European Space Agency Sentinel-2
satellite imagery from March 2018.
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are suggested for each scenario. Key criteria for each approach include: Local mate-
rial sourcing, technical knowledge and on-the-ground capacity, short-term economic
and ecological incentives (including roadside ecology enhancement), short- and
long-term labor costs, and phase durations of each strategy. Roadside conditions
were sampled and categorized into farmland, rubber plantation, degraded slopes,
bare ground, and close proximity to perennial and non-perennial streams. Staged
implementation (Fig. 18) first prioritizes those road segments (1) with the highest
geotechnical risk and (2) most critical for the school-market networks. Stage three
focuses on remaining routes necessary to secure livelihood and education. Stage four
focuses on remaining villages that rely primarily on river transport.
This project further focuses on the potential ofmaintaining access roads, long after
the railway’s construction is complete, to increase education access and efficacy in
rural areas. According to the UN Special Rapporteur’s assessment of Laos in March
2019, education is key to poverty alleviation and future development in Laos. A key
suggestion from those recommendations is the need for primary school education
to be conducted in pupils’ native languages, not just in Lao language as currently
mandated by the national government (Fig. 19). Based on ethnolinguistic groups and
possibilities resulting from the new access roads’ increased connectivity, a modified
network of schools is proposed to cater to the Lao, Palaungic, and Tai-Thai speaking
communities in the study region (Figs. 20, 21 and 22). This proposal redistributes 352
schools, assuming an anticipated future primary school-going population of 47,000,
which was derived from statistic in the census.
As a byproduct of the China-Laos Railway, temporary access roads could create
new potential for resilient livelihoods, improved market and school networks and
service provision. Villages previously isolated, or at least disconnected due to poor
road conditions during the monsoon, have new viability of commercial agriculture,
inter-village trade, processing, and contract farming, if the access roads could be
maintained strategically as this project demonstrates.
Landscape planning for development, especially development such as roads that
are driven ideologically, economically and physically engineered by and for connec-
tivity, must be done assuming preexisting connections. Likewise, one must also
assume that development happens upon preexisting development, including past
implemented projects, past planned projects, supporting infrastructures, and current
planned projects.
The design proposal “Curating rural connectivity: Strategic maintenance of
temporary access roads of the China-Laos Railway” and accompanying illustrations
were developed by Heather Lam Hoilok during the course Studio Laos: Strategic
Landscape Planning for the Greater Mekong.
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Fig. 5 Between Luang Prabang and Muany Xay in northern Laos, this 86 km segment of the
China-Laos Railway route contains seven planned stations and 38 tunnels totaling 59 km
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Fig. 6 Preliminary geotechnical risk assessment showing spatial distribution of flood, drought,
and landscape risk to roads, including temporary access roads built for the construction of the
China-Laos Railway, in the study region
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Fig. 7 Institutional structure for road maintenance showing proportion of government road
budget allocated to national versus district and local roads
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Fig. 8 Timeline of key events in road, railway, and school development in the study region
Fig. 9 Road maintenance costs and budget for district and rural roads
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Fig. 10 Rural road typologies include Class III, local, paved, and engineered natural surface roads
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Fig. 11 Demographics of communities between Luang Prabang and Muang Xay comparing (1)
communities along northern Laos’s primary highway Route 13 and (2) remote communities along
the China-Laos Railway route
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Fig. 12 Strategy 1: For temporary access roads near Ban Pounglian village, brush layering on
degraded fill slopes and slopes with gradients less than 1:1.5 is proposed
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Fig. 13 Strategy 2: For temporary access roads near Ban Vanggnan village, retention ponds and
live check dams on degraded slopes near settlements are proposed
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Fig. 14 Strategy 3: For temporary access roads near Ban Houaymok village, grassed waterways
and contour strip farming on 2° to 10° slopes are proposed. Crops and grass species are suggested
that complement existing farming practices and promote a more diverse crop mixture
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Fig. 15 Strategy 4: For temporary access roads near Ban Tongtounoy and Houaylan villages,
revegetation for livestock on slopes with at least 30% soil content is proposed. Because these two
villages have a relatively larger livestock sector, suitable forage grass species are suggested
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Fig. 16 Strategy 5: For temporary access roads near Ban Hongthougnai village, stabilization of
rubber plantation monocultures is proposed. Suitable fruit tree species are suggested to complement
the villages existing plantations practices and to complement the lifespan of the existing rubber
plantations
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Fig. 17 Strategy 6: Bio-embankment is proposed for slopes of temporary access roads adjacent to
rivers but far from villages. Suitable tree, shrub and grass species are suggested
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Fig. 18 Proposed road improvement and maintenance phasing strategy that prioritizes access,
education, and trade on networks enabled by access roads constructed for building the China-Laos
Railway
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Fig. 19 Ethnolinguistic groups in the study region. Primary school children learn best when taught
in their native language
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Fig. 20 Existing and proposed networks of markets enabled by new temporary access roads
constructed for the China-Laos Railway
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Fig. 21 Existing and proposed networks of schools, combining new temporary access roads
constructed for the China-Laos Railway with existing ethnolinguistic clusters
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Fig. 22 Service areas for education and trade, with existing and proposed markets, schools, and
road connections
3 Before the Bulldozer: Strategic Agricultural Cooperation
for an Uncertain Rail Alignment
Laos and China signed a memorandum of understanding for construction of the
China-Laos Railway in April 2010 (AFP, 2010). By July 2017, Lao provincial task
force committees reported estimates that 4,411 families must be relocated along
the 420 km China-Laos Railway route (Radio Free Asia, 2017, July 12). However,
no official alignment plan at a scale or with sufficient resolution had ever been
released that would allow local communities, or any level of civil society for that
matter, to know if they would be directly displaced or impacted in other ways by the
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project. Uncertain development timelines, i.e., when land clearance and construction
would begin, are common, and targets are often missed even when dates for project
components and stages are formally set. The China-Laos Railway is, at least in terms
of construction, an exception in this regard, and although the project has greatly
lacked transparency in its design, impact assessment, and construction processes, it
has generally kept at or ahead of its construction schedule (after a few false starts)
since its ground-breaking in 2016.
Also in 2016, the Lao government introduced Decree 84 on “Compensation
and Resettlement Management in Development Projects,” which replaced the 2005
Decree 192 and removed the previously existing legal requirement for land-for-
land compensation. Although not without significant planning and implementation
issues, a predominantly monetary form of compensation introduces a host of addi-
tional issues for people highly dependent on the land. Compensation calculations in
Laos, especiallywhen comparedwithWorldBank standards, often neglect significant
intangible costs, such as valuing agricultural investments, transportation, administra-
tive costs, and market access. For the China-Laos Railway, delays, including those of
more than two years from when households are displaced for the railway’s construc-
tion until they receive compensation, were persistently reported in media such as the
U.S. government-backed outlet Radio Free Asia (2019, July 16). Besides direct loss
of land, railway construction has fragmented the irrigation patterns of agricultural
land, and such indirect or other diffuse socio-economic impacts of the railway have
not been formally accounted for.
The following proposal offers strategies that vulnerable groups could use to help
plan for and direct their household’s and communities’ futures, given the significant
uncertainty and often impossibility of knowing when or where the rail alignment
and right-of-way are to be developed. A site for brainstorming various scenarios
was selected near the planned Ban Phonsavang Station on the China-Laos Railway
route in the northernmost part of Vientiane Prefecture (Figs. 23 and 24). In March
2018, University of Hong Kong researchers georeferenced a national-scale map and
elevation profile of the China-Laos Railway of entire the 400 km route from Boten
to Vientiane and documented segments under construction (Fig. 25). The red line
representing the railway, while no more than a few millimeters on the original map,
spans a width of nearly a kilometer in real space (Fig. 26). The selected site of
study and scenario-building is an approximately 10 km-wide stretch of land between
the Nam Souang Reservoir and Nam Ngum River, where both the rail corridor and
northern Laos’s major north–south highway Route 13 run parallel. Based on a coarse
analysis of satellite imagery,2 approximately two-thirds of agricultural land in the
study area is assumed to be wet rice production, and there is wide variation in the
land areas of farmed parcels.
A constellation of stakeholder- and context-specific development pathways is
sketched out that can increase both stakeholders’ awareness of risks and their capacity
to cope with change (Fig. 27). Such pathways are structured to increase resilience
2 Remotely sensed imagery included recent scenes hosted by Google Earth and recent monthly
scenes from the European Space Agency’s 10-m resolution Sentinel 2 satellite.
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against the uncertain rail alignment, undefined compensation timetables, and poten-
tial direct and indirect impacts on land and water supply by balancing an increase
in targeted redundancy with intensified agricultural production and returns. Several
variables are considered, some based on secondary research and others necessary
assumptions in order to construct sufficiently detailed scenarios that will foreground
a range of livelihood and other strategic challenges.
Potentially impacted farmers were classified into six categories based on agri-
cultural seasonal calendars, parcel size and livelihood sources. For instance, large
holders’ generally have both larger labor resources and greater access to diverse
forms of capital, including land and water access, financial, and technological, while
smallholders and those with subsistence livelihoods have a weaker capacity to adapt
to change or to diversify their modes of production (Fig. 28).
This strategy counts forward hypothetically from 2012 after the first public release
of low-resolution maps of the railway’s general alignment. In an alternative past,
over the next several years, agricultural cooperatives capable of capitalizing on the
community’s shared uncertainties are established (Figs. 29 and 30). New field prepa-
ration works carried out (Figs. 31, 32, 33 and 34) and agricultural intensification
strategies are suggested that generally raise the value of land while targeting a range
of potential compensation outcomes, including those that purposefully raise aware-
ness of international standards and Laos’s legacy of compensation lapses (Fig. 35)
(See, for example, Stuart-Fox, 2009). For small holders, less labor-intensive crops
allow time for vocational training. When official land surveys are finally carried out
and villagers are informed of the precise location of the 50-m railway right-of-way,
agricultural cooperatives must go through a reorganization process, prompted by the
new information about whether their lands are to the east, west, fragmented by and/or
directly within the requisition area. When required to leave, residual lands can be
sold, if arable but not necessarily productive in isolation, into management by the
cooperative.
While this strategic plan turns uncertainty into valuable time for preparation,
it is necessary to gauge community solidarity and social choice when tested by
rapidly changing development circumstances. The eventual distribution of compen-
sation, as well as its imminent or always-present promise, will map unevenly against
this agricultural cooperation. Engendering community building, management and
local leadership is necessary for assessing risks and distributing knowledge of those
risks, for incentivizing change, and for implementing improvement works. These
cooperative structures may yield unexpected benefits, such as potentially facilitating
communities’ direct input into the any social responsibility schemes the developer
may consider implementing. For large-scale developments such as the China-Laos
railway, it is necessary to understand transparency as a process—to consider what
is known, what will be known, and what can be known—as strategic considerations
that can lead to more resilient futures.
The design proposal “Before the bulldozer: Strategic agricultural cooperation for
an uncertain rail alignment” and accompanying illustrations were developed byMay
Zou Wenyao during the course Studio Laos: Strategic Landscape Planning for the
Greater Mekong.
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Fig. 23 The selected study site is located at the northern boundary of Vientiane Prefecture near the
planned Ban Phonsavang station of the China-Laos Railway
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Fig. 24 This proposal’s approximately 10 km-wide study site (black dotted line) includes agricul-
tural fields fed by irrigation systems interrupted by the construction of the China-Laos Railway (red
double line)
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Fig. 25 A national-scale map and elevation profile of the China-Laos Railway planned route was
released in 2016. While accurate, the low resolution of the route means that its precise location on
the ground is only knowable within an approximately one-kilometer-wide span (blue shaded area)
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Fig. 26 Within the study area, significant amounts of both large- and smallholder agricultural land
is at risk from either (1) direct land loss due to railway construction or (2) disruption of irrigation
water supply
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Fig. 27 Stakeholder- and context-specific development pathways and cooperation strategies are
suggested that take into account landowner resources, agricultural practices and risk resiliency
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Fig. 28 Landowner cooperation strategies consider the level of development uncertainty (i.e., how
much is known about the railway’s direct impact on land and irrigation systems) and could be
supplemented by social responsibility schemes and vocational training programs
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Fig. 29 Aerial perspective sampling a range of circumstances within the study site and suggested
agricultural cooperation strategies to mitigate impacts of railway development
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Fig. 30 Various agricultural intensification strategies, including relay intercropping and integrated
agriculture, are considered for different community economic groups and impacts of future land
loss due to railway construction
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Fig. 31 Sampling of existing agricultural land uses (background) and suggested agricultural
intensification strategies in-situ (circles in foreground)
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Fig. 32 Agricultural cooperative subgroups within the study area and their reorganization between
2012 to 2016 depending on level of uncertainty of the railway’s potential, planned, and constructed
impacts
122 5 Infrastructural Connectivity and Difference
Fig. 33 Agricultural cooperation and intensification strategies for subgroup A within the study
area
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Fig. 34 Agricultural cooperation and intensification strategies for subgroup Bwithin the study area
124 5 Infrastructural Connectivity and Difference
Fig. 35 Agricultural cooperation and intensification strategies for subgroup Cwithin the study area
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Drawing from discourse on the “sustainable development paradigm” and “frontier
resourcification” examined in Chap. 4, this chapter presents two strategic planning
proposals that are generated from frictions between rural development as construed
by western aid agencies and forms of Chinese aid and development, especially
regarding the speed of development and their cache of neoliberal ideologies. This
is not about Chinese versus Western but recognizing the legacy and patchwork of
development assistance, forces dominating northern Laos in the 1990s and 2000s, in
these landscapes to guide intervention today.
The UNGeneral Assembly (1998) defined alternative development as the preven-
tion and elimination of narcotics through rural development “in the context of
sustained national growth and sustainable development … recognizing the partic-
ular sociocultural characteristics of the target communities and groups.” Alterna-
tive development project components frequently include sustainable natural resource
management, livelihood diversification (with a focus on food security and expanding
market access), road and water infrastructure provision, health and education facili-
ties and programs. These projects also hold some emancipatory ideals of the sustain-
able development paradigm, including capacity-building for village governance,
explicitly targeting (and defining) vulnerable subpopulations, and recognizing opium
cultivation as a symptom of poverty (rather than a cause) stemming from a reduction
in land available for shifting cultivation (Cohen, 2009).
In Muang Sing, alternative development projects from the mid-1990s through
2010 were largely adapted from the German Technical Cooperation Agency (GTZ)
and Norwegian Church Aid’s (NCA) successful highland development programs in
northern Thailand from the 1980s and 1990s. However, when paired with the higher
speeds of implementation deemed necessary for opium eradication and substan-
tially less advanced infrastructure in Laos, these programs were far less successful.
Although GTZ had highlighted the necessity of a “cautious promotion” of para
rubber, promoting rubber agroforestry to reduce soil erosion and preserve some
© The Author(s) 2021
A. S. Kelly and X. Lu, Critical Landscape Planning during the Belt
and Road Initiative, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-4067-4_6
127
128 6 Western Alternative Development and Chinese Development
biodiversity, they also recommended monitoring by local government and master
contracts to protect villages interests from foreign investors, on top of clear demar-
cation of village boundaries, land titling, and agricultural diversification (Cohen,
2009, p. 428). This long list of regulatory and land tenure-related issues underscores
the substantial economic forces and weakness of Laos’s development context. Today
these landscapes are dominated not only be rubber but cash crop expansion (Figs. 1
and 2), which has led to a cumulative reduction in available ground and surface
water resources necessitating the construction of new irrigation and water supply
infrastructure (Figs. 3 and 4).
The two strategic planning proposals included in this chapter are: Low-labor
landscapes: An Agricultural response to short-term construction employment on
the China-Laos Railway; and Water risk and responsibility: A Political-chemical
land genealogy for the Muang Sing Valley, Laos. While these two proposals are
not dealing with alternative development by its definition, the proposal “Water Risk
and Sustainability” assembles the legacies of alternative development programs in
the Muang Sing valley to help guide a strategy for basin-scale agricultural pollution
remediation and increasedwater security. “Low-labor landscapes” traces the legacies
of opium’s replacement, primarily via Chinese investment, with rubber in northern
Laos and the how the resultant patchwork of rubber, subsistence and cash crops, and
ethnic diversity might deal with increasing rural–urban migration and significant
associated strain on the rural agricultural labor force. As geographer Barney (2009)
surmised in his writing on northern Laos, which we reviewed in Chap. 4, such
legacies and mosaics create a “patchwork” (p. 147) landscape or frontier of resource
enclosures—“fragmented and overlappingmosaics” that result inmigrations and new
economies (p. 152). These two proposals proactively reconstruct this patchwork or
mosaic as both narrative and site of strategy development and preliminary testing,
i.e., scenario-building.
Cohen contrasts Western-style “alternative development” with Chinese “opium
replacement” programs in northwestern Laos’s Muang Sing valley. These Chinese
programs were effectively foreign investment, largely in rubber (Figs. 5 and 6),
carrying different moral forces of “scientific rationality, technical competence and
entrepreneurial spirit” characteristic of 1950sWesternmodernization theory (Cohen,
2009, p. 429) that were later rejected in the Alternative Technology Movement and
post-development theory. Rubber had been promoted by provincial authorities to
households in Yunnan since the mid-1980s. Large-scale rubber cultivation spread
in northern Laos with the emergence of China as the world’s largest rubber market,
declining domestic rubber yields, and China’s own restrictions on rubber cultivation
across the border in Xishuangbanna due to environmental degradation from rubber
monocultures, which resulted in reduced biodiversity, reduced food security, and
large-scale hydrological and erosion impacts (Shi, 2008).
Farmers in northern Laos aspired for “Chinese modernity,” while the Akha ethnic
group used familial and patronage connections with clans in Yunnan for capital, tech-
nical assistance, saplings and market access (Diana, 2007 as cited in Cohen, 2009).
The proposal “Low labor landscapes” recognizes these cross-border clan connec-
tions, in addition to the specific spiritual and seasonal calendars of different ethnic
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groups in the study region. Cohen further describes how socioeconomic inequali-
ties were aggravated and reproduced in household investment startups and access
to productive land, in addition to Laos’s limited credit, weak regulation and poor
enforcement mechanisms. Both strategic planning proposals in this chapter not only
recognize diverse publics but actively construct them. In “Water risk and sustain-
ability,” this construction is not only demographic but land-based, constructing a
land genealogy from satellite imagery, with speculation on a diversity landholder
socio-economic conditions and potentials of localized pollution accumulation in the
landscape from herbicides, pesticides and fertilizers.
In his review of the World Bank and the emergence of the environmental state,
Goldman emphasizes the creation of a hegemonic discourse of “authoritative green
knowledge” rooted in neoliberal market ideologies—a knowledge regime of land
valuation and classification that replaces cultural relations and ecological complexity
with biodiversity conservation, sustainable forestry and watershed management
development programs (Goldman, 2001, p. 194, 2005). The two proposals featured
next exhibit the difficult balancing act between participating in the language and valu-
ation metrics of development but with design concepts and approaches that actively
resist easy constitution or reduction. The emphasis of alternative development on
livelihood security, environmental sustainability and social development may be
commendable, but the building of social capital takes time. Critical, landscape-
oriented planning is necessary, especially as road and dam-building, resettlement
programs, and large-scale agroindustry continue apace (Figs. 7 and 8).
Fig. 1 The boom in cash crops is increasing social disparities and environmental degradation in
northern Laos. This photograph was taken at an experimental banana plantation, leased to a Chinese
operator from a Lao landowner, testing new commercial species after a virus invaded banana crops
in the Muang Sing Valley 2 years earlier. Photo by Brian Cheang (March, 2019)
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Fig. 2 Amid controversy over chemicals reported to be causing deaths and illnesses among planta-
tion workers, the government of Laos enforced a ban on the granting of new concessions for banana
plantations in 2016. This photograph shows an experimental banana plantation and its surrounding
rice fields in the Muang Sing Valley in the Golden Triangle. Photo by Xiaoxuan Lu (March, 2019)
Fig. 3 Aworker constructs a Vietnamese-funded irrigation damwithin NamHaNational Protected
Area. Photo by Brian Cheang (March, 2019)
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Fig. 4 Cash crop farms producing watermelon, bananas, and other export produce in the Muang
SingValleywill leasewater to pay off the dam’s investment.While the dam is a top-down investment
in water security for the valley, water equity remains missing for many small-to-medium land
holders focused on rice cultivate in the valley, as water-hungry crops deplete the water table. Photo
by Xiaoxuan Lu (March, 2019)
Fig. 5 The rubber boom in northern Laos is the co-production of increased demand for latex in
China and the Laos government’s land-use policy related to the stabilization and ultimate eradication
of shifting cultivation. Acting as “water pumps,” rubber plantations are frequently placed on lands
that are important for biodiversity conservation and ecological functions, inducing adverse effects
on the regional landscape. This photograph shows rubber tapping at Nam Deang Tay Village along
Route 3. Photo by Ashley Scott Kelly (March, 2019)
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Fig. 6 Nam Deang Tay Village, located within a half-hour drive of Boten Special Economic Zone
along a planned “super-highway” to Thailand, contains severalminority groups resettled here during
the Laos government’s land reallocation campaigns over the last three decades. Photo by Xiaoxuan
Lu (March, 2019)
Fig. 7 Nam Tha River, a major tributary of the Mekong River, approximately two months before
completion of a Chinese-funded hydropower dam 55 km downstream. This photograph shows:
(1) an existing village (left) that will be inundated; (2) a newly constructed resettlement village
(top-right) atop a ridge; and (3) a road (center) newly cut into the hillside, constructed above the
soon-to-be reservoir draw-down zone. Photo by Jane Li Aijing (March, 2018)
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Fig. 8 Nam Tha River hydropower dam, 97% complete, which will export the majority of its
generated electricity to Thailand. Photo by Ashley Scott Kelly (March, 2018)
2 Low-Labor Landscapes: An Agricultural Response
to Short-Term Construction Employment
on the China-Laos Railway
Landscapes surrounding the Boten Special Economic Zone (SEZ) on the Laos-China
border are undergoing transformation. Immediately south of Boten SEZ, a “smart”
logistics hub is proposed by Thailand-headquartered Amata corporation. Amata
signed concessions in 2018 for lands totaling 7,000 hectares near Nateuy village
(Radio Free Asia, 2019b) at the intersection of Route 13, Laos’s primary north–south
highway, and Route 3, which is planned for upgrading into a four-lane highway to
Thailand (Dwyer, 2020).While these developments have not removed large numbers
of people from their lands, agricultural systems already unseated by two decades
of large-scale rubber plantations and cash crops via Chinese contract farming need
increased resiliency (Fig. 9). Dependency on the rubber market, which has weakened
considerably in recent years, has led to shrinking subsistence rice production and food
security problems (Baird, 2011). Construction jobs for the China-Laos railway, as
well as illicit industries tied to Boten’s development, are changing agricultural labor
availability.1 While these new developments create short-term job opportunities for
the surrounding local population, further labor diversification away from the agricul-
tural sector will likely lead to permanent loss of cultivated land and the indigenous
knowledge embedded in it (Fig. 10). This project speculates how labor diversification
and an ensuing agricultural labor shortage, especially one with variable annual and
seasonal labor availability, may affect communities along the China-Laos Railway.
1 Authors’ discussion with village leaders in Luang Namtha in March 2019.
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Timelines are constructed showing how the four dominant major agricultural
practices are affected by construction of the railway and future related industrial
developments (Fig. 11). These agricultural systems, including paddy rice, upland
rice, rubber plantations, and non-timber forest products (NTFP), react differently,
both ecologically and temporally, to labor shortages, which are themselves annu-
ally and seasonally variable. For instance, while fallow periods in upload rice are a
normal part of the agricultural cycle, recently neglected fallow paddy rice can lead
to uncontrolled weed invasion. Unmanaged rubber plantations still produce yield,
although a slightly diminished one. These limited impacts can be mitigated if lasting
only a short duration. However, owing to industrial developments in and around the
plannedNateuy logistics hub, a sustained labor deficit would require substantial labor
to reestablishment agricultural production, likely beyond what villages can provide
or sustain. Additionally, households would need to contend with Laos’s fallow land
law, which stipulates that land can be resumed by the state if left fallow for more
than 3 years (Lund, 2011).
This project develops scenarios and strategies for labor shortages, depopula-
tion, decreasing subsistence, and cash crop market fluctuations together with demo-
graphics and traditional agricultural knowledge in villages surrounding Nateuy.
Strategies are proposed to increase agricultural and livelihood resilience under
changes in village labor availability, including suggesting crops that require less labor
compared to existing produce and crops requiring preparation and harvesting butwith
minimal management (Figs. 12, 13 and 14). When expecting an agricultural labor
deficit, high-return cardamom should be established in upland areas, as it requires
one-third the labor of upland rice, takes 3 years to mature, and can be harvested
will relatively low manpower. Excess labor can then focus on alternative low-labor
crops such as maize. Maize fields can return to paddy rice as village labor becomes
available and stabilizes. For those villages with high market-dependence from their
rubber plantations but insufficient subsistence production, theymay temporarily plant
cash crops such as sugarcane in their paddy fields or leave these fields fallow with
the intent to practice clean or organic farming in the future. For villages with high
market-dependence and sufficient food production, they may adapt to a labor deficit
by converting rice fields into alternative diversified cash crops such as orchards
requiring three-years intensive preparation, followedby lowmaintenancewith lasting
yields for 20 years or longer and lower risk to market fluctuations than rubber.
These strategies are then modified based on cultural practices. The surrounding
population consists predominantly of Hmong, Khmuic, and Mien ethnic groups
(Fig. 15) (Epprecht et al., 2018). The Hmong maintain a strong clan system that
enables high economic security and resource and knowledge access. This may facil-
itate greater market access and resilience in testing of new species or agricultural
techniques. The Khmuic have strong traditional rituals tied to the agricultural calen-
dars and ecological cycles of upland rice farming. The Mien tend a wide range
of species in their home gardens, which range from food production to indigenous
cultural andmedicinal usage (Fig. 16). Recognizing that changes in agricultural prac-
tices at any scale are difficult to encourage, these agricultural strategies should be
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read as an approach to development; on-the-ground research is necessary to assess
actual viability.
The design proposal “Low-labor landscapes: An Agricultural response to short-
term construction employment on the China-Laos Railway” and accompanying illus-
trations were developed by Brian Cheang during the course Studio Laos: Strategic
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Fig. 9 Dominant village agricultural land uses, paddy and upland rice and rubber plantations, super-
imposed with recent speculative industrial development and potential labor flows from surrounding
villages
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TOTAL FOOD ACCESSIBLE in kg/ppl
subsistence rice production + rice from pofits in rubber plantation
assume import price of rice = export price of rice = 700 kip/kg
SUBSISTENCE FOOD PRODUCTION in kg/ppl
paddy rice production + upland rice production
assume both paddy rice and upland rice harvest once per year
Fig. 10 Food security, as an outcome of production and available arable lands, and market
dependency trajectories for villages in the study region
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Fig. 11 Ecological consequences of labor deficits of various durations for the study region’s domi-
nant agricultural systems, including paddy and upland rice, rubber plantations, and non-timber
forest products
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Fig. 12 Path dependencies for choosing alternative crops as a response to agricultural labor deficits




























































































































































































Fig. 13 Three general scenarios and strategies for resiliency against labor shortages, depopulation,
decreasing subsistence, and cash crop market fluctuations
From rubber dependence to diversified products




Alternative value besides labor
Culture as an alternative value to labor
Food security as foundation
Concentration of labor on food production due to compromise by labor shortage
Fig. 14 Parallel trajectories of development at three sites highlighting key principles of diversifi-
cation, food security, and alternative value systems
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Fig. 15 Unique opportunities in Hmong, Mien, and Khmuic ethnic groups’ agricultural practices
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Fig. 16 Typological distribution of land uses and communities as a function of food security,market
dependence, ethnic identity and practices, and potential alternative development strategies
142 6 Western Alternative Development and Chinese Development
3 Water Risk and Responsibility: A Political-Chemical
Land Genealogy for the Muang Sing Valley, Laos
An irrigation damwas recently constructed in northwestern Laos’s NamHaNational
Protected Area along Route 17, which connects Luang Namtha’s provincial capital
withMuang Sing in the Golden Triangle region. During our field visit inMarch 2019,
local civil society groups speculated that the dam was funded by a Vietnamese loan,
which would be paid back through selling its water to cash crop producers in the
Muang Sing valley that, given the proliferation of rubber and other cash crops since
the early 2000s (Liu et al., 2016), has experienced a significant decrease in surface
water flow and groundwater levels (Fig. 17). Due to its sedimentary composition,
groundwater storage in the Muang Sing valley may be relatively low at 1,200 mm
(Viossanges et al., 2018). Decades of cash crop expansion required more water,
adding additional stress especially in the dry season. Many cash crop plantations are
joint-ventures or operate under various forms of foreign-invested contract farming,
predominantly with Chinese companies. Once paid off, this new supply of irrigation
water has the prospect of becoming a public good to support small- andmedium-scale
rice farmers in the region, many ofwhomwere resettled from the uploads during bans
on shifting cultivation and opium eradication in the 1990s and 2000s (Fig. 18). Since
resettlement, communities have experienced intensified water use, increased compe-
tition for land and resources, increase economic division, and decreased trust among
landholders. Regardless of how much veracity that narrative holds, we consider it
a useful trigger to think about environmental sustainability, water equity, and food
security in the Muang Sing valley.
In January 2017, 2 years before our visit, a national ban on new banana planta-
tions was issued in Laos due the pervasive ongoing chemical use and subsequent
health impacts on workers and nearby communities (Radio Free Asia, 2019a). Years
of using these chemicals, some illegal even under Laos’s relatively nascent environ-
mental regulations, have left them accumulated in the soil and spread throughout the
hydrological system. Heavy metals from fertilizers resist degradation and are persis-
tent in the soil. Panama disease can survive up to 30 years in the soil (Stover, 1990).
Production of the commercially viable Cavendish banana, accounting for around
half of the global market, often requires high inputs of fertilizers, herbicides and
pesticides (Goh & Marshall, 2017).
Soon after the ban was implemented, the fungal epidemic Panama disease began
spreading in February 2017 through Cavendish banana plantations in Luang Namtha
Province (Chittarath et al., 2018). Our visit to an experimental banana plantation,
owned by a Lao landholder but contracted out to a Chinese company testing the
viability of commercially alternative species, sets the context for this strategic
proposal—Water risk and responsibility: A political-chemical land genealogy for the
MuangSingValley, Laos—that organizes a series of remediation strategies to improve
water quality and quantity, mainly due to high inputs of herbicides, pesticides and
fertilizers, and promote water equity in access, distribution and management.
3 Water Risk and Responsibility: A Political-Chemical … 143
Without detailed surveys of the valley’s hydrological regime, we speculated on
the local hydrology using free globally available elevation models and satellite
imagery to model natural rivers, streams, and non-perennial washes and artificial
irrigation canals (Fig. 19) and the proximate effects of a series of typical planta-
tions within the valley as sources of nonpoint-source pollution (Figs. 20 and 21).
Similarly, without a household or landowner survey, we assumed a range of possible
ownership configurations (e.g., large- and smallholders, independent vs. contract
farming) and land genealogies (i.e., crop history and pollution accumulation) based
on land patterns deduced from remotely sensed imagery (Fig. 22). These yielded
an array of potential producer-production typologies that were further categorized
considering biophysical aspects, stakeholders’ capabilities and their capacity for risk
tolerance and management. The Asian Development Bank’s (ADB, 2019) projects
for establishing community watershed management in north-central Laos were used
as reference. Water users’ risks are described in 13 categories across economic,
political, natural, agricultural and social considerations drawn from ADB’s irriga-
tion subsector guidance notes and criteria from the Lao Ministry of Agriculture and
Forestry guidelines (Fig. 23; ADB, 2017; UNDP Lao PDR, 2012).
Four common producer-production typologies were selected to develop our
strategic planning proposal, taking into account stakeholder risks and capabilities and
considering their spatial proximity to other plantations, costs, capacities, and social
choice (Figs. 24, 25 and 26). Proposed remediation techniques included physical,
chemical and biological applications to be deployed in-situ to ensure land remains
at least partly productive during implementation. These four typologies are:
Typology A:Where the plantation is foreign investment in rubber, the emphasis is
on preventing chemical run-off andmitigating high water consumption. Such foreign
investors generally have higher risk tolerance, more financial resources, and a larger
capacity for change. They require the least technical assistance yet likely greater regu-
lation and incentive. We propose that an independently monitored management plan
should be required for agricultural pollution mitigation and remediation. Technolog-
ically, this could involve installing permeable reactive subsurface barriers between
plantations and water courses to stop contaminant plumes (Typology A components
of Figs. 27, 28, 29 and 30).
Typology B: Smallholders who independently grow bananas have the lowest risk
tolerance and least capability for change, requiring the most technical assistance in
both financial terms and technology transfer. Crop diversification, including fast-
growing beans and cassava, is promoted to make livelihoods more resilient to uncer-
tainties. These households may provide labor in return for communal irrigation water
access rights. Technologically, soil chemical immobilization is recommended to limit
contamination in the short term (Typology B components of Figs. 27, 28, 29 and 30).
Typology C: Smallholders alternating wet rice cultivation with contract farming
have both low risk tolerance and low resilience to change. Poor irrigation water
quality, nutrient loss from their paddy production systems, and contamination from
contract farming have resulted in lower rice yields year-on-year. We recommend
that foreign investment provide access to technologies, such as fertilizers, while
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smallholders provide the manpower for operation and maintenance of the remedia-
tion strategy. Between harvesting and planting cycles, chelate- and microbe-assisted
phytoremediation,which translocatemetals from the roots to the foliage, are effective
for efficient remediation of low- to moderately contaminated soils. Wide adoption of
these strategies across the valley can lead to overall increased soil productivity and
reduce nonpoint source pollution (Typology C components of Figs. 27, 28, 29 and
30).
Typology D: Large-holder banana plantations implemented through contract
farming have high risk tolerance and larger capabilities. High concentrations of
pollutants in these contaminated soils require longer, more intensive remediation.
Chemical oxidation offers efficiency although this makes the first stage of implemen-
tation costly. Such remediation should be mandated, otherwise incentives are needed
to encourage alterative cash crops and diversification, with domestic market access
prioritized. Technologically, these large-holders should install permeable reactive
subsurface barriers between plantations and water courses to stop contaminant
plumes (Typology D components of Figs. 27, 28, 29 and 30).
Remediation is both a costly and complex process to optimize across the Muang
Singvalley.While this proposalmakes several assumptions about the agro-economics
of land and water use, it does so to draw attention to the great diversity of economic
situations and site-specific risks to agricultural pollution and disease. Landholder
and investor participation will likely require incentives. While foreign investors are
likely least willing to participate, more independent smallholders would likely need
both subsidies and technical knowledge transfer by local experts. Those engaged in
contract farming may be less inclined to act given the slow but steady accumulation
of contaminants in the soil. This proposal offers a detailed framework for coordi-
nating and mitigating these complexities and for the establish sustainable long-term
cooperation of diverse interests.
The design proposal “Water risk and responsibility: A political-chemical land
genealogy for the Muang Sing Valley, Laos” and accompanying illustrations were
developed by Vanessa Wong Nok Yiu and Sally Song Ziqi during the course Studio
Laos: Strategic Landscape Planning for the Greater Mekong.
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Paddy field in 2000
Plantations expansion in 2010
Fig. 17 Various land reallocation policies in Muang Sing in the 1990s and 2000s, many part of
foreign aid-supported opium substitution programs, resettled large numbers of villages from upland
areas, where they had practiced shifting agriculture, to the valley with paddy rice production. Since
the early 2000s, largely Chinese foreign investment has proliferated cash crops and tree plantations
throughout the valley, stressing water resources necessitating the construction of a large irrigation
dam in the adjacent Nam Ha National Protected Area
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spread, a new and deadly 
Tropical Race 4 (TR4) 
strain of Fusarium wilt 
disease
Lao government orders 
began closing down the 
environmentally destructive 
farms when their contracts 
expire and forbidding new 
contracts from being signed.
Banana workers got 
sick by chemicals 
used in farms
Banana production reached 
250,000 tonnes in Northern Laos
Cavendish bananas have 
been cultivated at a large 
commercial scale.
Increasing cash crop 
production in the lowland 
areas and the emergence 
of economic opportunities.







4600 people in total 









from 115 to 97 
Dam catchment area
Plantations expansion in 2010
noitcudorp muipo etacidarEsetis lacoF Stop shifting cultivation
Irrigation system development
Banana disease
















Fig. 18 Timeline comparing key events in village resettlement programs, expansion of plantations,
and agricultural water supply

















Fig. 19 Key agricultural irrigation infrastructure components and irrigated crop species within the
Muang Sing Valley
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TR4 Fungal Disease
Existence in the soil: more than 30 years 
Herbicides: Fe, Mn, Zn
Existence in the soil: more than 5 years 
Fertilizers: Pb
Existence in the soil: more than 150 years 
Pesticides: Cd
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Low         High
Fig. 20 Agricultural land use change, accumulation of contaminants from agricultural production,
large- and smallholder land patterns, and identified producer-production typologies
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Water quality under intensive 
banana production is reduced due 
to chemical run-off.
Bananas require an average of 4 to 
6 inches of water each month, or 
about 1 to 1 1/2 inches per week.
Much of waterconsumption is 
recycled and put to other uses, 
impact mainly on soil nutrients.
Paddy rice consumes more 









Water quality under intensive 
banana production is reduced due 
to chemical run-off.
Bananas require an average of 4 to 
6 inches of water each month, or 
about 1 to 1 1/2 inches per week.
Water quality is affected by 
fertilizer applications from 
uphill to doownstream.











































4 (TR4) is an 
infection of the 
banana plant 








vulnerable to a 
fungal disease 




TR4 can stay in 




Large inputs of 
herbicides, fertilizers, 
and fungicides High consumption
Rubber trees requires large ammount 
of water, mainly for cleaning, drawn 
from underground aquifers
Growing cycle
The complete cycle of 
rubber trees is 7 years, 













Issues of poor water quality for 
irrigation to paddy systems and 
nutrient losses from paddy 




crops highly rely 





plant tissue, serves 









Fungal diseases are easily 
spread by contact, such 







4 (TR4) is an 
infection of the 
banana plant 








vulnerable to a 
fungal disease 









Spread of TR4 Transmission of pollutants
Water seizure Nutrient seizure
Nutrient seizure Spread of Sclerotia
Transmission of pollutantsSpread of TR4
AB
CD
Fig. 21 Main sources, types and relative significance of high water consumption and agricultural
pollution transmission and accumulation between banana plantations, rubber plantations, and paddy
rice









Newly-planted: everyday for 2 weeks.
Heavy loamy soil: 20 mm of water every 3 
days in summer and every 8 days in winter.
Average groundwater storage in sedmimentary (Pz): 1200mm
Average farmland size per household: 29,200m2
Catchment water storage: 63,855,000m3 
Secondary and tertiary can
als 













Irrigated cash crops export to worldwide 
market with Vietnamese assistance
Arable land leased from local 
better-off landowner to Vietnamese sector
providing market access to inland 


























Total surface area: 25,510m2
Annual water consumption: 39,500m3
Total surface area: 5,900m2
Annual water consumption: 3,500m3
Total surface area: 380,000m2
Annual water consumption: 1,250,000m3
Total estimated population: 228
Annual water consumption: 159,600m3
Total surface area: 
445,000m2
Annual water consumption: 
573,427m3
Total surface area: 
225,600m2
Annual water consumption: 





















































Fig. 22 Agricultural water provision and consumption across key producer-production types
Assessment of stakeholders’
capabilities towards emergency
 (Composite data sourced online)
General risks of water resources access 
towards plantation expansion and livelihoods 
under the private sector lead model
Resource capacity in emergency repairs
Crops' features: Crops’ resistance
Crops' features: Market Values
Crops' features:  Crops' Return On Investment (ROI)
Access to resources
Dependence of new irrigation sources
Processed assets
 (Composite data sourced online)
 (ADB, 2017; MAF, 2010)
 (Bushe, 2003; ADB, 2017; FAO, 2008)
1. Policy Objectives
2. Watershed Management
3. Fluctuate water price
13. Water access priority
5. Weather variability
6. Natural disasters
7. Sustainability of O&M
8. Cultivation cost
















Banana as assumption ground








































































Fig. 23 Large- and smallholder water users’ capabilities across the dominant cash crops grown
in the Muang Sing Valley and their associated risks, as described by 13 categories of political,
economic, natural, cultivation and social risks
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Contribute to material
and labour cost















Sales of agricultural produce:
temporary stone or
wood-and-earth weir
Main occupation on holdings, with 
additional work off holdings
40%
Sales of agricultural produce:
Water resources grabbed by external parties
Detriment of societal good
Poor transparency of financial transactions




Water priorities go to large landowners’ cultivation





Land leased in Muang Sing


























































Major Policies & Projects (2000s):
National Socio-Economic 
Development Plan
Community Managed Irrigation Sector 
Project
Decentralised Irrigation Development 
and Management Sector Project
Northern Community Managed 
Irrigation Sector Project
Establishment of Water Users’ 
Association (WUA)
Establishment of Water Users’ 
Groups (WUG)
Livelihood Improvement Project  (SRI)  
Major Policies & Projects (2010s):
Northern Rural Infrastructure Sector 
Development Project
Greater Mekong Subregion Flood and 
Drought Risk Management and 
Mitigation Project
Laos Xesalalong Irrigation Project
SRI Project Steering Committee
Master plan for integrated agricultural 
development 
Namsan agriculture irrigation project 
Lao PDR Agriculture Competitiveness 
Project 
Variation of harvest duration among 
species affect the cost of cultivation
Significant drop of investment on 
watermelon as banana and rubber 
emerged as replacement
Vulnerability of crops varies regards to 
its resistance towards droughts or 
unexpected weather conditions
DOI provides subsidy if households are 
incapable of handing in ISF
WUA dominated by better-off villagers
Cooperation with foreign 
sectors provide a stronger 
financial base and more 
welcoming by plicy direction Current policy targets at flavouring collaboration between foreign and local ventures
Parntership in contract farming allows households 
a stronger fund base
With the private sector led irrigation 
infrastructure reform, the relationship with 
foreign aids is crucial to water access cost
WUA dominated by 
better-off villagers
Infrastrusture constructed and 
price determined by foreign sector
Irrigation infrastructure fund relies on 
better-off and foriegn sectors
Resources of contract 
farmers obained higher 
adopability
All water consumers 
required to submit ISF, 
regardless of its social 
status
Water priority goes to farms 
obtain partnership with 
foreign constructors
Contract farmer relies more 
on irrigation infrastructure by 
foreign sectors
Foreign venture built 
infrastructure often is 
incapable of collecting 
ISF directly from villagers
Cultivation cost alleviated w/ 
foreign partners assistance
Foreign investors with more concrete financial 
foundation, but the cost required is higher
Essentiality of crops affects the 
return of cultivation 
Contract farming provides 
a wider market access for 
stable revenue
Water-abosorting ability 
superior to alternate 
crops led to unbalanced 
water distributionLocal stakeholders 
access to natural 
resources has been 
better established than 
foreign sectors
Land acquisition policy inflavouravble to 
foreign independent investors
Diverse means of land 
acquisition and success 
rate
























Large landowner arable land





Sales of agricultural produce
No produce sold
Subsistence with some sale
Main purpose sale (local)
Main purpose sale (export)
Fig. 24 Major agro-economic policies and projects and the different land genealogies of key
producer-production types


























































Cycle 1  Jan-Mar Cycle 1  May-Jun Cycle 1  Aug-Sep Cycle 2  Feb-Mar Cycle 3  May-Jun
Cycle 1  Mar Cycle 1  Jun Cycle 2  Mar Cycle 2  Apr-Jun Cycle 7  Mar
Banana plantation | Small Households | Independent farming
Rubber cultivation | Foreign Sectors | Independent farming
First set of remediation project by 
Chemical Oxidation on 50% land (A) 
will be carried out while a cycle of 
beans and cassava is completed.
Contamination on site is relatively 
mild, hence natural recovery is 
adopted at the early stage before 
further assessment and correspond 
remediation is conducted.
Cash crops diversification is 
introduced to make up to the loss of 
halting banana plantation. Beans and 
cassava are selected on 50% land (B) 
due to its rapid growing quailty.
Cash crops diversification continues 
while second set of remediation is 
implemented by applying immobilizing 
amendment, and forming stable and 
immobile complexes via adsorption.
As remediation carried out in two 
rounds, banana plantation resumes. 
Meanwhile, 20% land (C) continues 
beans cultivation as a pilot scheme in 
future agriculture practice balancing 
chemical usage throughout plantation.
At this beginning stage, owner is 
expected to commence with fallow 
period on 30% land (A), and 30% land 
(C), while remaining 40% land (B) 
continue with rubber cultivation.
Owner is suggested to begin 
sugarcane plantation on land (A) as 
cash crops diversification to share the 
financial risk borne when rubber 
cultivation is on hold during the 
upcoming waterway management 
practice.
Before the further assessment and 
correspond remediation is conducted, 
natural recovery by estabilishing 
one-year fallow period is adopted on 
land (C).
Permeable Reactive Barrier Systems 
(Biological) will be adopted on land 
(C), while the remaining part of site is 
undergoing cash crops cultivation.
While contamination on site is 
relatively low, one remediation 
duration requires one year. On 
another rubber plantation cycle, land 






Fig. 25 Cash crop planting cycles, comparing relative investment cost, effectiveness, immediacy,
and compensability for: (A) Foreign-operated rubber plantations; and (B) Smallholder banana
plantations

























































Cycle 1  Mar Cycle 2  Oct-Dec Cycle 3  Jan-Feb Cycle 3  Nov-Dec Cycle 4  Jan
Cycle 1  Mar Cycle 1  Oct-Dec Cycle 2  Jan-Mar Cycle 3  Jan-Mar Cycle 3  Oct-Dec
Banana plantation | Large landowner | Contract farming
Rice cultivation | Small households | Contract farming
Alongside with the remediation 
introduced, the owner is 
recommended to continue with 
tradition fallow practices for soil and 
groundwater recovery on land (B) 
while land (A) is undergoing stage one 
remediation.
At this beginning stage, owner is 
expected to conduct cash crops 
diversification. Identifying 80% land 
(A) for fallow period, while the other 
20% land (B) carry on with sugarcane 
cultivation.
As the sugarcane cultivation is 
stabilizing, the owner is more capable 
of sparing effort on conducting 
waterway management practices, in 
this case, chemical oxidation for stage 
one remediation.
As contamination level is relatively 
high in this site, stage two of 
remediation will be carried out as a 
long-term solution by installing 
biological in-situ techniques and 
permeable reactive barrier systems.
While remediation construction is 
being completed consecutively, the 
site requires a period to fallow and 
ready to begin another cycle for 
banana plantation.
At this beginning stage, owner is 
expected to continue with original 
cultivation of paddy rice production on 
60% land (B) while the remaining 40% 
land (A) will carry on with traditional 
fallow period.
After natural recovery, cash crops 
diversification of maize on land (A) will 
being before the implementation of 
waterway management practices by 
phytoextraction technology.
Stage one of remediation project will 
be conducted on land (B) with 
chelate-assisted phytoextraction, 
which is effective for 
low-to-moderately contaminated soils 
and groundwater contamination risk.
While land (A) is adopting cash crops 
diversification to balance financial 
burden, land (B) is to carry out stage 
two of the project through 
microbial-assisted phytoextraction as 
a prevention for future contamination.
As the remediation construction 
stabilizes, land (A) is to begin the 
resumption of rice cultivation and land 





Fig. 26 Cash crop planting cycles, comparing relative investment cost, effectiveness, immediacy,
and compensability for: (C) Smallholder paddy rice alternating with cash crop contract farming;
and (D) Large landowner cultivating bananas via contract farming
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Active position in the listing of water 
price, with more barginning power
Artificial watercourses:
With no prior cultivation experience, 
the independent foreign sector has 
to build their own irrigation system
Traditional watercourses:
Natural watercourses occupied by 
villagers. At some point, 
independent foreign sector could 
come to agreement with locals to 
collaborate

















Secondary pipes / 5m
Irrigation for 2 rubber 
trees
Indirectly benefited by the 




Lower adaptability towards 
modern chemicals
Cost of rubber cultivation 
(including labour) relatively 
low, but with a long cultivation 
period for reaping
O&M responsibility mainly hold 
by scheme costructors
Rubber cultivation | Foreign Sectors | Independent farming
Banana plantation | Small Households | Independent farming
Main pipe
Ban on banana cultivation due to 
severe contamination, livelihood of 
independent households are to seek 
alternatives crops
Dependance on chemical to 
eliminate disease while individual 
farming households are lack of 
resources
Cost of banana cultivation (including labour)
O&M responsibility only shared if individual 
households are to require water access from 
private-sector led irrigation scheme
Note: Often to provide manpower in O&M 








Passive position in negotiation of water price
Note: in most case where individual household 
incapable of 
submitting water usage fee, DOI must engage
Artificial watercourses:
Least priority to private sector led irrigation 
scheme
Traditional watercourses:
Insufficient for increasing water demand of 
cash crop cultivation
Note: WUA dominated by better-off villagers, 
distribution incline to particular benefits
Secondary pipes / 5m




Walkway  / 5m
Banana sucker removal 
and harvesting use
Banana tree / 2.5m x 2.5m




10. Vulnerability of crops varies regards to its 
resistance towards a variety of circumstances
1. Current policy has imposed 
resistanaces to certain species 
of cash crops for sustainable 
and a more prosperous 
exporting agriculture
5. / 6. / 9. / 10. Cash crops quailities due 
to the natural and external factors
2./ 3./ 13. Water priority 
determined by spatial 
hierachy and social custom
7./ 8., Cost of cultivation varies, 
according to the water prices 
and O&M cost etc
Legend




Diversion line of crops/ land owner











Fig. 27 Spatial synthesis of key factors inwater usage and agricultural productivity for: (A)Foreign-
operated rubber plantations; and (B) Smallholder banana plantations








Overuse of chemical led to 
contamination
Secondary pipes / 5m





Walkway  / 5m







Lower adaptability towards 
modern chemicals
Artificial watercourses
Of least priority with their 
low input towards 
construction
Traditional watercourses
WUA dominated by 
better-off villagers, 









Indirectly benefited by the 











Infective fungal spores 
>30 years
Rice yield / 0.25m x 0.3m





Obtain partnership with foreign constructors
Traditional watercourses:
Insufficient for large scale cash crop cultivation
Inclining to cash crops collaboration 
with foreign companies in general
Notes: Ban on banana cultivation 
due to severe contaminationCost of banana cultivation 
(including labour)
Water price (pay to Vietnamnese 
constructor of Muang Sing 
Irrigation Dam)
Notes: Joint-venture collaboration 
gives price off to irrigation water 
consumption, in return landowner 
provide cash crops 
O&M responsibility shared by large 
landowners
Cost of rice cultivation
(including labour)
Water price
Notes:  Contribution to O&M is 
required before accessing 
constructed watercourses
O&M responsibility titled to be 
shared among users
Notes: DOI provides subsidy if 
households are incapable of 
handing in ISF
Rice cultivation | Small households | Contract farming
Banana plantation | Large landowner | Contract farming
Chelate-assisted
Phytoextraction
3. / 7. / 8, Cost of cultivation 
varies, according to the water 
prices and O&M cost etc
Water priority goes to farms obtain 
partnership with foreign constructors
5. / 6. / 9. / 10. Cash crops 
quailities due to the natural 
and external factors





1. Current policy targets at flavouring 
collaboration between foreign and 
local ventures to bring in fund for 
infrastrusture construction
Vulnerability of crops varies 
regards to its resistance towards 
a variety of circumstances
Legend




Diversion line of crops/ land owner











Fig. 28 Spatial synthesis of key factors in water usage and agricultural productivity for: (C) Small-
holder paddy rice alternating with cash crop contract farming; and (D) Large landowner cultivating
bananas via contract farming








Removal of heavy metals from soil by extractants (organic














Injecting wells are drilled deep enough to 
reach groundwater, an air compressor then 
pumps air into the groundwater table, 
within the well-casing to accelerate the 
volatilization process of chemicals
Vapor-phase undergoes further treatment
with carbon or thermal applications,












Capturing a plume of  contaminants and breaks down 
the contaminants, releasing uncontaminated water
Immobilization
Reduction in metal mobility and bioavailability by applying immobilizing 
amendment, and forming stable and immobile complexes via absorption
Chemical Oxidation
Injecting a common oxidant such as  hydrogen peroxide underground to react to
contaminants using existing wells, or new injection points via direct-push drilling
Injecting a common oxidant
Immobilizing agents
Including cement, clay,  zeolites, phosphates, 
minerals, microbes and organic amendments
Groundwater aquifer
Viola tricolor Cd, Pb
Solanum nigrum Cd
Absorbing metalsPlant species
Ni (Pb, Zn, Cd, Cu)Phyllanthus amarus
Ni (Pb, Zn, Cd, Cu)Murraya koenigii
Mn (Ni, Zn, Fe)Helianthus tuberosus
Phytoextraction
Use of hyperaccumulator plants to uptake,
translocate, and concentrate heavy metals from
soil to the aboveground harvestable plant parts
Microbial-assisted phytoextraction
Use of microorganisms to enhance 
phytoextraction capacity of plants
Phytostabilization
Injecting wells are drilled deep enough to reach
groundwater, an air compressor then pumps air
into the groundwater table, within the well-casing




































30% land (A): Fallow period; Sugarcane cultivation.
40% land (B): Continue with rubber planting.
30% land (C): Fallow period; Sugarcane cultivation.
2
Year 2
30% land (A): Fallow period.
40% land (B): Continue with rubber planting.
30% land (C): Natural recovery before the further 
assessment and correspond remediation– clean up 
the last season's crops and leave them on the land 
(C) for fertility recovery; Permeable Reactive 
Barrier Systems (Biological) will start.
3
Year 7
30% land (A): Natural recovery before the further 
assessment and correspond remediation– clean 
up the last season's crops and leave them on the 
land (A) for fertility recovery; Permeable Reactive 
Barrier Systems (Biological) will start.
40% land (B): Continue with rubber planting.
30% land (C): Sugarcane cultivation.
4
Year 32
30% land (A): Sugarcane cultivation.
40% land (B): Natural recovery before the further 
assessment and correspond remediation– clean up 
the last season's crops and leave them on the land 
(B) for fertility recovery; Permeable Reactive Barrier 
Systems (Biological) will start.
30% land (C): Sugarcane cultivation.
 
1
All Land: Natural recovery; Clean up the 
last season's crops and leave them on 
the land (A & B) for fertility recovery.
50% land (A): Beans and cassava 
cultivation; Chemical oxidation.
50% land (B): Beans and cassava 
cultivation.
2
All Land: Natural recovery; Clean up the 
last season's crops and leave them on the 
land (A & B) for fertility recovery.
50% land (A): Beans and cassava 
cultivation; Immobilization.
50% land (B): Beans and cassava 
cultivation. 
3
20% land (C): Beans and cassava cultivation.
80% land (C): Banana cultivation.
A   Remediation strategy phasing
A   Remediation techniques
B   Remediation strategy phasing
B & D   Remediation techniques
Fig. 29 Land remediation techniques and phasing strategy for: (A) Foreign-operated rubber
plantations; and (B) Smallholder banana plantations












Use of hyperaccumulator plants to uptake,
translocate, and concentrate heavy metals
from soil to the aboveground harvestable 
plant parts
Viola tricolor Cd, Pb
Solanum nigrum Cd
Absorbing metalsPlant species
Ni (Pb, Zn, Cd, Cu)Phyllanthus amarus
Ni (Pb, Zn, Cd, Cu)Murraya koenigii





Use of organic and inorganic ligands to enhance 
phytoextraction capacity of plants
Microbial assisted
phytoextraction
Use of microorganisms 
to enhance plant phyto-
extraction capacity
Phytostabilization
Injecting wells are drilled deep
enough to reach groundwater,
an air compressor then pumps
air into the groundwater table, 









































40% land (A): Fallow period; 
Cash crops diversification– 
maize cultivation; Waterway 
management practices– 
phytoextraction technology.
60% land (B): Continue with 




40% land (A): Cash crops 
diversification– maize 
cultivation.






40% land (A): Cash crops 
diversification: Maize cultivation; Rice 
cultivation.
60% land (B): Waterway 
management practices: 
Microbial-assisted phytoextraction; 
Fallow period; Rice cultivation.
1
Clean up the last season's crops and leave them on the 
land (A & B) for fertility recovery.
70% land (A): Fallow period; Construct permeable 
barrier as aquifer remediation; Cease further 
contamination of banana cultivation towards 
surrounding arable land.
30% land (B): Sugarcane cultivation (life span: one 
year).
2
70% land (A): Fallow period Construct permeable 
barrier as aquifer remediation; Cease further 
contamination of banana cultivation towards 
surrounding arable land.
30% land (B): Sugarcane cultivation (life span: 
one year).
3
35% land (A): Fallow period.
30% land (B): Sugarcane cultivation.
35% land (C): Sugarcane cultivation; Waterway 
Management Practices.
35% land (A): Waterway Management Practices; 
Sugarcane cultivation.
30% land (B): Sugarcane cultivation; Clean up the 
last season's crops and leave them on certain 
portion (75%) of the land for fertility recovery; Fallow 
period.
35% land (C): Sugarcane cultivation; Clean up the 
last season's crops and leave them on certain 
portion (75%) of the land (C) for fertility recovery; 
Banana cultivation.
4
35% land (A): Sugarcane cultivation; Clean up the 
last season's crops and leave them on certain 
portion (75%) of the land (A) for fertility recovery; 
Banana cultivation.
70% land (B, C): Banana cultivation. 
5
100% land (A, B, C): Banana cultivation.
6
70% land (A): Fallow period Construct permeable 
barrier as aquifer remediation; Cease further 
contamination of banana cultivation towards 
surrounding arable land.
30% land (B): Sugarcane cultivation (life span: one 
year; Clean up the last season's crops and leave 
them on certain portion (75%) of the land (B) for 
fertility recovery.
C   Remediation strategy phasing
C   Remediation techniques
D   Remediation strategy phasing
Fig. 30 Land remediation techniques and phasing strategy for: (C) Smallholder paddy rice alter-
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Chapter 7
Chinese Mass Nature Tourism
and Ecotourism
1 Introduction
Building on the discourses of the “politics of land-use planning” and “frontier resour-
cification” examined inChap. 4, this chapter features two strategic planning proposals
that engage the ideological and practical frictions between Chinese mass nature
tourism and ecotourism.
Mass nature tourism is a model employed by China’s southwestern frontier
provinces such as Yunnan since the early 2000s (Zinda, 2014). Conceived and imple-
mented as part of the Chinese central government’s long-term Great Western Devel-
opment Strategy launched in 2000 that aims to raise economic standards in western
China,mass nature tourism is a development tool for some of themost remote frontier
regions characterized by “adverse” natural conditions, “underdeveloped” infrastruc-
ture and a largely “impoverished” population (State Council of the People’s Republic
of China, 2000). Mass nature tourism is driven by an economic ideology that appro-
priates an “impoverished” region and its population as resources for development
in the name of poverty alleviation, with tourism zoning carried out based on the
suitability of land for natural and cultural commodification.
In recent years, the Chinese model of mass nature tourism has been introduced,
in parallel with other types of economic development, into northern Laos, notably
within the country’s newly established Special Economic Zones (SEZ) (Figs. 1, 2, 3
and 4). For example, Chinese and Lao mainstream media are promoting Boten and
Luang Prabang, two of Laos’s major tourist attractions and key stations on the China-
Laos Railway, as examples of the “international modern new town with outstanding
natural and cultural landscape” (Investvine, 2019; Lao National Television, 2016;
Ta Kung Pao, 2019). A ten-fold increase in tourist numbers is projected on comple-
tion of the China-Laos Railway.1 The new town or SEZ plans of Boten and Luang
Prabang both set out a spatial order maximizing the commodification of nature and
1 Authors’ conversation in March 2018 with members of Luang Prabang’s network of hospitality
management.
© The Author(s) 2021
A. S. Kelly and X. Lu, Critical Landscape Planning during the Belt
and Road Initiative, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-4067-4_7
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culture, where tourism and resort zones include existing natural rivers and local
ethnic villages as well as newly constructed artificial lakes and cultural demonstra-
tion villages (Architectural Design & Research Institute of SCUT, 2016; Planning
& Design Center of Haicheng Group, 2018).
These large-scale tourism programs being rapidly implemented in Laos may
arguably prove economically viable but unavoidably raise ethical, cultural and envi-
ronmental questions that call for urgent attention (See, for example, Hall & Ringer,
2000;Travers, 2008;Kyophilavong et al., 2018). The two strategic planningproposals
included in this chapter are:Negotiating with ethno-ecology: Landscape management
strategies for northern Laos’s ecotourism boom; and Living heritage: Redefining
protections for urban expansion in Luang Prabang. Focusing on Boten and Luang
Prabang respectively, these two proposals challenge an economic-driven and object-
based mass nature tourism model and investigate the possibility of a site-, culture-,
and landscape-sensitive ecotourism approach. Both proposals begin with an analysis
of the spatial and temporal patterns of key landscape systems such as the watershed,
food-shed, waste-shed and viewshed that are crucial for enabling the establishment of
tourism programs and for sustaining the local livelihoods and cultural practices that
are indispensable assets of authentic cultural landscape experiences. Based on these
analyses, both projects identify site-specific tourism development capacities, guiding
the scale and speed of development to minimize conflict between local communities
and tourism, while maximizing tourism-related ecological and social benefits.
Fig. 1 The deserted Golden Boten City (GBC), a former casino boomtown on the China-Laos
border, has experienced rapid transformation since 2016. This photograph was taken from the older
quarter of the GBC, once home to several restaurants serving exotic and endangeredwildlife, toward
the Boten Special Economic Zone’s “twin-towers” in the newly established central business district.
Photo by Xiaoxuan Lu (March, 2019)
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Fig. 2 Speed of construction within the Boten Special Economic Zone has accelerated since the
inauguration of the Lao section of the Yunnan-Singapore railway, commonly called the China-
Laos Railway. This photograph captured the ongoing construction and large-scale leveling of the
landscape throughout the zone. Photo by Xiaoxuan Lu (March, 2019)
Fig. 3 Hot-air ballooning is increasingly popular in Vang Vieng, a small town on the Nam Song
river surrounded by some of Laos’s most iconic karst limestone mountains, located approximately
halfway between Vientiane and Luang Prabang. Anticipating the opening of the railway, the current
Lao tourism boom not only generates revenue and employment but unprecedented pressure on both
urban and natural environments and local livelihoods. Photo by Xiaoxuan Lu (March, 2018)
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Fig. 4 According to its main developer, Haicheng Group, the Boten Special Economic Zone will
become a China-ASEAN tourist hub with sufficient capacity to cater to an expected 25 million
people once the China-Laos Railway is completed in 2021. This photograph shows the 1:1,000
panorama model on display at the Boten Exhibition Center, marked with the locations of the newly
planned “Ancient Lao City,” “Boten Lake,” and “Boten Central Buddhist temple.” Photo by Brian
Cheang (March, 2019)
2 Negotiating with Ethno-Ecology: Landscape
Management Strategies for Northern Laos’s Ecotourism
Boom
Considering the rapid growth of ecotourism in northern Laos and the often-negative
impacts of tourism development on indigenous communities, this project deploys
ethno-ecology as a tool to negotiate with tourism developers for the protection and
territorial integrity of cultural landscapes. Without critical awareness, the tourism
planning process often reduces indigenous peoples to primitive caricatures and
replaces local culture with homogenized cultural representations (Salazar, 2009).
In response to mainstream practices in the region, this project advocates for an
understanding of local knowledge via ethno-ecology, advancing alternative metrics
of cultural and ecological value and mechanisms for landscape management.
Ethno-ecology is defined as the organizational and cognitive relationships that
each local culture has with its non-human environment (Prado & Murrieta, 2015).
While ethno-ecology suggests a value system to be protected, it is also an adaptive
system capable of determining the capacity of the landscape to accommodate new
people and new programs, even including the substantial pressures for mass tourism
development in southwestern China and northern Laos. Nuanced and bespoke calcu-
lations of local “livelihood-sheds,” such as viewshed and foodshed, are used in this
project to understand, illustrate, and advocate for the spatiotemporal patterns of
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humans in their environment. Two villages in southwestern China and two villages
in northern Laos are deployed as testing grounds for exemplifying the diversity of the
ethno-ecology in the China-Laos border region and the impacts induced by tourism
development (Figs. 5, 6 and 7).
In southwestern China, Mandan village of the Dai people and Qingkou village of
the Hani people have confronted tourism development over the past several decades
and reveal the processes of exclusion and fragmentation embedded in mainstream
tourism planning (See, for example, iSkytree Tourism Planning, 2013; Sina, 2015;
Guipu, 2016; Liu & Ye, 2019). Despite focusing on different aspects of ethno-
ecology, both cases exhibit the intertwining of local spiritual and agricultural prac-
tices in generating the cultural landscape. Tourism planning here has greatly over-
simplified each village’s cultural realms and excluded large swaths of their cultural
territories because of object-oriented and profit-driven rationales (Figs. 8, 9, 10, 11,
12 and 13).
Insights drawn from these two ecotourism villages in southwestern China are then
translated to Boten and Nalan villages in northern Laos, both under tourism devel-
opment pressures from Chinese and Thai capital.2 Such translation helps predict
potential damages to the integrity of cultural landscapes and helps devise landscape-
oriented and culture-driven means of negotiation with investors and tourism plan-
ners. In the case of Boten village, now within the rapidly developing Boten Special
Economic Zone, its historical salt production system is a renowned local tradition
and highlight in the current tourism plan (Planning & Design Center of Haicheng
Group, 2018). This village is strategically selected for its potential in calculating and
visualizing Boten’s cultural territory and ideal tourism capacity (Figs. 14, 15, 16, 17,
18 and 19). In the case of Nalan village, its system of rice and rice wine production is
a cultural practice strategically chosen here for the quantification and visualization of
a cultural territory closely tied to the practice of shifting cultivation. Nalan partially
falls within the Nam Ha National Protected Area, and shifting cultivation is one of
the most misunderstood and controversial forms of land use (Figs. 20, 21, 22, 23 and
24) (Ducourtieux et al., 2005).
Indigenous practices and tourism development are not necessarily exclusive to
one another. An adaptive landscape that caters to traditional practices and tourism
programs can allow visitors to experience authenticity while securing the dignity and
strengthening local people to shape and maintain their cultural landscapes.
The design proposal “Negotiating with ethno-ecology: Landscape management
strategies for northern Laos’s ecotourism boom” and accompanying illustrations
were developed by Yani ZhangMengting andWilliamWei Gongqi during the course
Studio Laos: Strategic Landscape Planning for the Greater Mekong.
2 Author’s conversation in March 2019 with manager of Boten Special Economic Zone Planning
Exhibition Center.
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Fig. 5 Two villages in
southwestern China and two
villages in northern Laos are
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Fig. 6 Mandan village and Boten village are both situated within development enclaves in the
China-Laos borderlands, namely Mengla-Mohan Key Development and Opening Up Experimental
Zones in China and Boten Beautiful Land Special Economic Zone in Laos
Fig. 7 Mengla and Boten are branded as the “Golden Crossroads of Five-Country Collaboration,”
and this map represents an imagined geography of the China-Laos-Myanmar-Thailand-Vietnam
economic regional affiliation promoted by the BRI
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Fig. 8 Focusing on fengshuiwoodlands, this detailed calculation of local “livelihood-sheds” reveals
that the cultural territory of Dai people at Mandan village is significantly larger than the area that
falls within the boundary delineated by the tourism planner
Fig. 9 The exclusion and fragmentation of cultural territory of Dai people at Mandan village offers
a glimpse of the rapidly transforming regional landscape within Nanla New Town established on
the east bank of the Nanla River
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Fig. 10 The intertwining of local spiritual and agricultural practices in generating the cultural
landscape at Mandan village of the Dai people
Fig. 11 Focusing on spiritual and agricultural use of water, this detailed calculation of local
“livelihood-sheds” reveals that the cultural territory ofHani people atQingkouvillage is significantly
larger than the area that falls within the boundary delineated by the tourism planner
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Fig. 12 Mainstream tourism planning has greatly oversimplified Qingkou village’s cultural realm
and excluded large swaths of the cultural territory or Hani people because of object-oriented and
profit-driven rationales
Fig. 13 The intertwining of local spiritual and agricultural practices in generating the cultural
landscape at Qingkou village of the Hani people
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Fig. 14 Insights drawn from two ecotourism villages in southwestern China are translated to Boten
village within the rapidly developing Boten SEZ in Laos to predict mainstream tourism planning’s
potential damages to the integrity of cultural landscapes and to devise landscape-oriented and
culture-driven means of negotiation with investors and tourism planners
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Fig. 15 Calculation of tourism capacity and inevitable landscape consumption in culture tourism
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Fig. 16 Given that salt production is a renowned local tradition and is highlighted in the current
tourismplan, it is strategically chosen here for the quantification and visualization ofBoten’s cultural
territory and ideal tourism capacity
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Fig. 17 Through quantification and visualization, two schemes are developed for Boten village to
negotiate with tourism developers for the protection and territorial integrity of cultural landscapes
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Fig. 18 Experiencing a highly dynamic cultural landscape characterized by complex human-nature
relationships
Fig. 19 Experiencing a landscape-oriented and culture-driven salt production system at Boten
village
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Fig. 20 Insights drawn from two ecotourism villages in southwestern China are translated to Nalan
village, which partially falls within the Nam Ha National Protected Area, to predict mainstream
tourism planning’s potential damages to the integrity of cultural landscapes and to devise landscape-
oriented and culture-driven means of negotiation with investors and tourism planners
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Annual Tourism Demand of Unmilled Rice
Requirement of Rice Field Expansion for Tourism Demand 
(4380 * 0.5 / 70%) = 3129 kg
3129 / 1400 = 2.24 ha
Requirement of rice 
field expansion for 
tourism demand
Basic demand of 
rice field 
expansion
Total Expansion of Shifting Cultivation Practice
Autonomous Demand of the Villagers for Tourism Expansion
5.51 + 2.24 = 7.75 ha
Basic demand of rice field expansion in 
forested area for sustainable internal consumption
 5396 / 70% / 1400 = 5.51
ha
181 * 206 = 37286
kg/year





Average daily consumption of rice by 
Laotian in Luang Namtha
206
kg/year
Surplus of annual rice production 37286 + 4370 - 36260 = - 5396
kg
Rice milling ratio 70%
73egallivehtnisdleifecirfoaeralatoT
ha
37 * 1400 * 70% = 36260
kg
Lowest annual milled rice production
4370
kg
Annual milled rice consumption by rice wine
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Fig. 21 Given that rice and rice wine production are important cultural practices for Khmu people
and are highlighted in existing ecotourism programs, they are strategically chosen here for the
quantification and visualization of Nalan’s cultural territory and ideal tourism capacity











Annual Tourism Demand of Unmilled Rice
(23500 * 0.5 / 70%) = 16,786 kg
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16786 / 1400 = 12.00 ha
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 • Daily lodging space expansion
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Annual Tourism Demand of Unmilled Rice
Requirement of Rice Field Expansion for Tourism Demand 
(14300 * 0.5 / 70%) = 10,215 kg
10215 / 1400 = 7.30 ha
Requirement of rice field 
expansion for tourism demand
Basic demand of 
rice field expansion
Total Expansion of Shifting Cultivation Practice
Autonomous Demand of the Villagers for Tourism Expansion
Community waste disposal capacity 9300
kg/year
Daily waste generation by tourist 0.65
kg/person
Annual tourist arrival when the community waste 




(versus 181 ppl. in Ban Nalan)
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 • Policy Compromise for Allowing Shifting 
Cultivation Expansion outside the Namha NPA 
Exclusively for the Upland Khmu Village
Negotiation for Resources from the Government
 • Daily lodging space expansion
 • Waste disposal point requirement
5.51 + 7.30 = 12.81 ha
Scenario 2: 
Annual Tourism Capacity Reaching 14300 
Limited by Community Waste Disposal System
5.51 + 12.00 = 17.51 ha
Scenario 3: 
Annual Tourism Capacity Reaching 23500 
Limited by Maximal Labor Force
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Fig. 22 Through quantification and visualization, three scenarios are developed for Nalan village
to negotiate with tourism developers for the protection and territorial integrity of cultural landscapes
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Jan Feb
A jar (40liter) of rice wine will 
be opened to notify the 
house-spirit with the plan of 
field selection
A jar of rice wine will be 
opened to close the seed hole
A jar of rice wine will be 
opened to celebrate the 
completion of planting season
Rice wine should be prepared 
for inviting other families to 
participate in rice harvesting
A jar of rice wine will be 
opened for the ritual
of the “start of eating new 
rice”
Two jars of rice wine, and 
two chickens, will be prepared 
for the ritual of eating new 
leaves
Mar Apr May June July Aug Sep Oct Nov DecDec
0.23 
kg/liter
Rice consumption of lao hai production 
500 
liter/household/year
Demand of lao hai for traditional rituals
Village demand of lao hai 19000
liter/year
Village rice consumption for lao hai 4370
kg/year
Two jars of rice wine, a pig, 
and two chickens, will be 
prepared for the ritual of 
celebrating harvest completion
At least A jar of rice wine will 
be opened for the ritual of  
“greh” revering the khmu’s 
ancestor Cheuang as the 
source of all knowledge
Distillation of Lao Lao (Rice Wine)
Recover Shifting Cultivation as the 
Buttress of Khmu’s Ethnic Culture
Forest for NTFP Collection 
Firewood Collection from the Fallow Land 
outside Nam Ha NPA for Lao Lao Production
Fig. 23 Experiencing the dynamics of a shifting cultivation landscape, one of the most misunder-
stood and controversial forms of land use
500m
1km 3km
Jan Feb Mar April May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov DecDec
Slash and Burn Planting Mid-Season Harvesting
Trekking in the Fallow Land
Experience the Landscape of Harvestiug
Learn about the Slash and Burn Ecology
Living in the Hut in the Field
Fig. 24 Experiencing a landscape-oriented and culture-driven rice and rice wine production system
at Nalan village in Laos
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3 Living Heritage: Redefining Protections for Urban
Expansion in Luang Prabang
Anticipating the boom in urbanization in Luang Prabang that follows the opening
of the China-Laos Railway, this strategic proposal foregrounds the insufficiency of
a predominantly architecture-focused cultural heritage protection mechanism insti-
tuted by UNESCO and explores the potential for a landscape-oriented framework
that defines and protects essential cultural landscapes in the region.
Situated in a valley at the confluence of theMekong and NamKhan rivers in north
central Laos, Luang Prabang was an ancient royal capital and the current cultural
center of the country (Reeves & Long, 2011). As Luang Prabang town experienced
increasing social and environmental pressures from the growing influx of tourists
since its designation as a UNESCO World Heritage site in 1995, the town and
its expansive landscape are currently undergoing unprecedented changes induced
by simultaneous rural–urban transformation and regional infrastructure expansion
(Figs. 25 and 26). In addition to the expected ten-fold increase in the number of
tourists visiting Luang Prabang once the China-Laos Railway begins operation at
the end of 2021,3 the pace of urbanization and deforestation is accelerating, espe-
cially along the railway. Considering the cultural significance of Luang Prabang, the
importance of forest resources to local communities and the rapid urbanization of
the region, immediate intervention is needed to protect the region’s heritage, secure
local livelihoods and curtail or redirect speculative development toward sustainable
ends.
This proposal redefines regional landscape values and reflects on the spatial impli-
cations of this valuing system. UNESCO appraises Luang Prabang as a heritage
site that “reflects the exceptional fusion of Lao traditional architecture and nine-
teenth and twentieth century European colonial style buildings” (UNESCO, 1995),
and its protection measures are spatially reflected in two boundaries defining the
core and buffer zone of the inscribed heritage property (Figs. 27 and 28). An exer-
cise combining land use and viewshed analyses in the buffer zone and along the
railway helps identify possible extents of vernacular landscapes with cultural and
ecological value. These analyses reveal contradictions embedded in the UNESCO-
delineated buffer zone. The current defined zone can abruptly exclude new capital-
driven construction along with village use of forest resources that have cultural and
livelihood significance. Consequently, this zone is not capable, either spatially or in
land use management, of regulating land conversion and speculative development of
Luang Prabang (Figs. 29 and 30) (UNESCO, 2013). Given that substantial land spec-
ulation is occurring and will expand further along the China-Laos Railway, which
passes through a dozen local villages heavily dependent on agriculture, this project
overlays predicted unregulated areas of urban expansion and viewsheds along the
railway to identify strategic spaces for intervention.
3 Authors’ conversation in March 2018 with members of Luang Prabang’s network of hospitality
management.
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The location of new railway stations, existing highways and terrain are key factors
in predicting urban expansion areas (Fig. 31). Taking advantage of the mainstream
narrative of offering visitors an “authentic experience” of Luang Prabang’s cultural
landscape, this proposal identifies areas of urban expansionwithin the viewshed along
the railway that may degrade such experiences, which are regarded as crucial assets
in the tourism industry (Figs. 32, 33, 34 and 35). Guided by this spatial framework,
four multiscalar landscape strategies, namely reforestation, buffer planting, devel-
opment regulation and alternative buffer zone demarcation, are proposed to mediate
the socioenvironmental impacts of previous development projects, minimize poten-
tial spatial conflicts between the local and nonlocal use of resources, and mitigate
foreseeable land speculation (Fig. 36). In addition, three landscape typologies are
proposed to guide the spacing of new plantings and selection of plant species with
cultural and livelihood significance (Figs. 37, 38 and 39).
While UNESCO’s significant contributions to the protection of cultural heritage
across the globe are undeniable, in the context of unprecedented socioenvironmental
challenges faced by cultural heritage, such as that of Luang Prabang, a landscape
framework characterized by a three-dimensional systematic analysis of a cultural
territory is necessary, especially one shaped by cultural practices and with a critical
definition of cultural landscape heritage that is alive and dynamic.
The design proposal “Living heritage: Redefining protections for urban expan-
sion in Luang Prabang” and accompanying illustrations were developed by Haylie
ShumHiu Lam during the course Studio Laos: Strategic Landscape Planning for the
Greater Mekong.
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Fig. 25 Landscapes have always been a vital part of Lao culture. Two-fifths of Laos is forested,
and the country’s forests have provided a vast variety of landscape uses, including food, agriculture,
medicinal, building and spiritual uses
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Fig. 26 Luang Prabang has experienced a growing influx of tourists since its designation as an
UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1995. The town and its extensive landscape are currently under-
going unprecedented changes induced by simultaneous rural–urban transformation and regional
infrastructure expansion
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Fig. 27 Historical timeline of Luang Prabang and the current regulations managing the World
Heritage Site’s buffer zone
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Fig. 28 Context map of Luang Prabang showing the boundaries of the core and buffer zones and
major challenges currently faced by the town and its landscape
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Fig. 29 Land use and viewshed analyses for areas along the China-Laos Railway
Fig. 30 Land use and viewshed analyses for areas within the buffer zone
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Fig. 31 Map showing the three phases of urban expansion, which are predicted based on proximity
to railway stations, proximity to existing highways and slope gradient









Urban expansion - 2021
Urban expansion - 2026
Urban expansion - 2031
Visible extent
Invisible extent
Fig. 32 The predicted area of urban expansion indicates a 25% increase in urban area within the
viewshed along the railway by 2031
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Fig. 33 Statistics of villages affected by the predicted urban expansion. Ten villages are currently
situated along the railway within the study are, encompassing 5,000 people and 638 hectares of
agricultural land
Fig. 34 Landscape section cut, illustrative view, and statistics of Ban Daensavang village
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Fig. 35 Landscape section cut, illustrative view, and statistics of Ban Kokngiou village
Fig. 36 Four multiscale landscape strategies are proposed to mediate the socioenvironmental
impacts of previous development projects, minimize potential conflicts between local and nonlocal
use of resources and mitigate foreseeable land speculation
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Fig. 37 Three landscape typologies are proposed to guide the spacing of newplantings and selection
of plant species with cultural and livelihood significance
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Fig. 38 Activities allowed and prohibited within the predicted area of urban expansion
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Fig. 39 Experiencing Luang Prabang’s cultural landscape along the China-Laos Railway
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Drawing from discourses of the “politics of land-use planning” and “sustainable
development paradigm” examined in Chap. 4, this chapter features three strategic
planning proposals focused on the ideological and practical frictions between
Northern scientific knowledge and indigenous knowledge.
Northern scientific knowledge has enabled and legitimized various territorializa-
tion projects since the establishment of the Lao PDR through the environmentally
deterministic classification and representation of diverse peoples and their landscapes
(Goldman, 2001). These territorialization projects fall into three main paradigms
of land governance in Laos. Firstly, nationwide agro-ecological assessments were
carried out in the 1970s to identify “land development potential.” Secondly, land
zoning, land-use classification and land reallocation programs since the early 1990s
facilitated a “rationalization” of land use in the name of “sustainable development.”
Thirdly, a National Land Titling Program was initiated in the late 1990s to identify
“unutilized” or “underutilized” land suitable for large-scale concessions driven by
the national strategy dubbed “Turning Land into Capital” (Lestrelin et al., 2012).
Over the past decade, the application of Northern scientific knowledge has diver-
sified and expanded alongwith Laos’s increasing integration into the socio-economic
geography of the China-Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor (Figs. 1, 2, 3 and
4).1 In addition to the construction of large-scale infrastructure projects intended
to improve physical connectivity across national borders, novel scientific programs
and knowledge exchange networks are being established or strengthened to facilitate
transnational research initiatives. Laos, as one of the most ecologically diverse yet
least explored centers of biodiversity in Indochina, is becoming a scientific frontier
1 The China-Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor is an imagined socio-economic geography
that links China with the Indochina Peninsula. It is expected to boost China’s cooperation with the
ASEAN countries.
© The Author(s) 2021
A. S. Kelly and X. Lu, Critical Landscape Planning during the Belt
and Road Initiative, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-4067-4_8
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for research into biodiversity and ecosystem services. Unlike World Bank-funded
green-neoliberal development that dominated Laos in the 1990s and 2000s, some
China-funded projects are furthering the green neoliberal valuation of ecosystems,
and their “services” to humans, in monetary terms and these ecosystems’ conserva-
tion by means of market dynamics (See, for example, d’Amato et al., 2016; Jiang,
2017; He, 2020).
These ecosystem territories inevitably overlap with the country’s indigenous terri-
tories and their natural resource-dependent communities. The population of Laos is
overwhelmingly rural, with its “ethnic minorities,” as the Laos government does not
use the term indigenous, constituting about 40% of the total population and heavily
reliant onmixed subsistence and semi-subsistence agriculture (Hodgdon, 2010).With
this in mind, this chapter features three strategic planning proposals: Scientific stew-
ardship: Indigenous and ecosystem territories across the China-Indochina Peninsula
Economic Corridor; Empowering a labor transition during enclosure and securiti-
zation of Luang Prabang’s natural heritage; and Clean versus organic: Strategic
agricultural enterprises for Vientiane under rural–urban migration. These three
proposals foreground Laos’s remarkable human diversity and local communities’
valuable traditional ecological knowledge and practices. These planning proposals
are situated in a diverse range of socio-ecological contexts, namely: northwestern
Laos’s NamHaNational Protected Area; a protected forest outside of Luang Prabang
city; and agricultural land within the capital Vientiane. Collectively, they focus on
agrarian populations influenced by old or new forms of land enclosure, investigating
possible scenarios that may lead to more equal power relationships between the
scientific and indigenous knowledge regimes. These projects acknowledge indige-
nous communities’ synthesized knowledge systems, intimate knowledge of seasonal
cycles and ecological processes, and management of bio-cultural diversity as crit-
ical national assets supporting social and ecological resilience and advocate for their
recognition and safeguarding.
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Fig. 1 Sun bears rescued from the bear trade in Laos at the newly opened Luang Prabang Wildlife
Sanctuary. The facility, which is not open to the public and includes awildlife hospital, complements
a largely tourism-funded sister project near Luang Prabang’s most popular waterfall. Photo by Brian
Cheang (March, 2019)
Fig. 2 Laos’s first wildlife sanctuary opened in 2019 in Luang Prabang on the site of a former
coffee plantation. The 24+ ha facility rehabilitates animals captured from the illegal wildlife trade,
including the largest ever seizure of red pandas from Boten Special Economic Zone on the China-
Laos border. Photo by Xiaoxuan Lu (March, 2019)
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Fig. 3 In Vientiane, Panyanivej Organic Farm’s director walks towards a new highway that bisects
the property, formerly promoting integrated rice-based farming systems before the site’s hydrology
was disrupted. Photo by Angel Wong Wing Yin (March, 2019)
Fig. 4 A highway, crossing largely disused farmland, under construction in Vientiane linking the
capital’s airport to a planned station on the China-Laos Railway. Panyanivej Organic Farm, a social
enterprise formerly part of the ParticipatoryDevelopment TrainingCentre (PADETC), Laos’s oldest
but politically accosted civil society organization focused on sustainable development, is bisected
by the highway yet continues operation. Photo by Xiaoxuan Lu (March, 2019)
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2 Scientific Stewardship: Indigenous and Ecosystem
Territories Across the China-Indochina Peninsula
Economic Corridor
Given the increasing transnational flow of knowledge and expertise along the China-
Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor (CICPEC), an imagined socio-economic
geography initiated in 2010 and subsequently incorporated into the Belt and Road
Initiative, this project focuses specifically on the interaction between scientific and
traditional ecological knowledge and posits possible scenarios that could secure local
communities’ customary land rights while enabling their equal participation in the
ongoing re-territorialization along CICPEC, particularly in Laos.
The current socio-ecological landscape of theLaoPDRhas been shapedbyvarious
forms of territorialization projects since the establishment of the country in 1975.
Through land-use planning, specific socioenvironmental perspectives and values are
and have been projected onto the territory, consequently legitimizing the inclusion of
certain forms of activities and the exclusion of others within these plans’ demarcated
boundaries (Lestrelin et al., 2012). In addition to earlier forms of territorial enclosure,
such as protected areas and economic concessions that have effectively excluded local
communities from their customary land, the establishment of experimental plots for
scientific research emerged recently, fueled by global research trends in studying
ecosystem dynamics and services. Focusing on the Chinese Academy of Science
(CAS) and Chinese Academy of Forestry (CAF), two “scientific giants” in the field
of ecology rapidly expanding their projects across CICPEC, this proposal reveals the
conflicts embedded in their existing projects and provides alternative visions on the
creation, operation and management of future scientific projects (Fig. 5).
This proposal first critically analyzes two existing projects, one byCAS inYunnan
and the other by CAF in northern Laos, with particular emphasis on these projects’
participatory components. Although preexisting local uses of forest land (e.g., for
hunting and mushroom foraging) are strictly forbidden within CAS’s experimental
plot at the Bubeng Field Station in Mengla, Yunnan, local villagers are periodically
hired by CAS as consultants given their incomparable ecological knowledge about
the site, where subsistence practices had long been carried out, for locating and
installing scientific devices such as camera traps (Fig. 6).2 For a community forest
project at NamKaeNoy Village in Luang Namtha, the zoning plan and planting plan
created by CAF, in collaboration with the provincial planning institute, helped attract
and secure funding for the project. However, as will all community forest programs,
the project’s implementation and effectiveness for conservation are contingent on
the participation of the local communities who are expected to perform the majority
2 Authors’ conversation in March 2019 with researchers at the Bubeng Field Station.
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of the planting and maintenance work, in this case on northern Laos’s challenging
terrain (Fig. 7).3
Based on insights drawn from these two case studies, this strategic planning
proposal constructs a set of alternative scenarios characterized by more inclusive and
equal forms of community participation on sites where indigenous and ecosystem
territories overlap.AlthoughCASandCAFhavenot yet implementedprojects collab-
oratively in Laos, this work speculates on the establishment of joint experimental
plots by CAS and CAF, given their common interest in ecosystem services as well as
their similar regional geographic interests as revealed in their plans for research site
expansion along CICPEC (Fig. 8) (See, for example, APFNet, 2012; Xishuangbanna
Tropical Botanical Garden, 2018). Two types of scientific research, one focusing on
leaf litter decomposition and the other on medicinal plant species and which involve
community forest programs as their key components, are hypothesized in scenarios
on sites within the Nam Ha National Protected Area in northern Laos bordering
Yunnan (Figs. 9, 10 and 11). In both scenarios, formal land tenure protections may
be granted to villagers to increase their incentive for participating in community
forest programs. Moreover, the site selection criteria are not only limited to those
that help maximize scientific research outputs but also include factors that contribute
to the capacity building of villages within or adjacent to the project areas. Further-
more, the viable operation andmanagement of the experimental plots depend equally
on the protection and mobilization of indigenous knowledge of local flora and fauna
and the introduction and utilization of scientific knowledge that turn collected data
into research output to draw the funding that sustains the project (Figs. 12, 13, 14,
15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22).
The unprecedented scale and speed of transnationalization and re-territorialization
along CICPEC initiated by science institutions makes necessary the meaningful
inclusion of the knowledge of indigenous populations who have long practiced
ecological stewardship of the region. This proposal envisions the emergence of amore
complementary scientific stewardship that facilitates a bidirectional dependency and
benefit-sharing capable of sustaining local practices, increasing local community
sovereignty, facilitating access to education, healthcare and diversified economies,
and enforcing or requiring layers of cultural meaning in natural science projects.
The design proposal “Scientific stewardship: Indigenous and ecosystem territo-
ries across the China-Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor” and accompanying
illustrations were developed by Michelle Chan Syl Yeng and Sammi Wong Wae
Ki during the course Studio Laos: Strategic Landscape Planning for the Greater
Mekong.
3 Authors’ conversation in March 2019 with the village head and manager of the NamKaeNoy
community forest project.
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Fig. 5 Timeline showing the formation of relations between Laos and two Chinese “scientific
giants,” namely the Chinese Academy of Science and Chinese Academy of Forestry, within the
context of land-use planning and policies in Laos
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Fig. 6 At the Bubeng Field Station experimental forest research plot of Chinese Academy of
Science in Mengla, Yunnan, local villagers are periodically hired as consultants given their incom-
parable ecological knowledge about the site for locating and installing scientific devices such as
camera traps
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Fig. 7 At the NamKaeNoy village community forest in Luang Namtha in northern Laos (an initia-
tive of Chinese Academy of Forestry in collaboration with the Provincial Planning Institute), the
community forest’s implementation and conservation effectives are contingent on the participation
of the village
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Fig. 8 Transnational flow of knowledge and expertise along the Indochina Peninsula. This strategic
planning proposal establishes joint experimental plots by the Chinese Academy of Science and
Chinese Academy of Forestry, given their common interest in ecosystem services and their similar
regional geographic interest as revealed in their plans for research site expansion
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Fig. 9 Discourse assembly based on a collection of critical literature on environmental governance
and forest management in Laos
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Fig. 10 Examples of existing research on ecosystems and carbon flows and ethnobotanical research
onmedicinal plants, the respective focus of two scenarios explored in this strategic planning proposal
Fig. 11 Visions and components of the proposed landscape design and planning intervention,
identified through a comparative analysis of the respective goals and visions of theChineseAcademy
of Science and Chinese Academy of Forestry
2 Scientific Stewardship: Indigenous and Ecosystem Territories Across … 205
Fig. 12 Scenario One explores the establishment of joint experimental plots by the Chinese
Academy of Science and Chinese Academy of Forestry within Laos’s Nam Ha National Protected
Area, where the scientific research on leaf litter decomposition is implemented
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Fig. 13 Roles of different agencies and individuals involved in the establishment and management
of the experimental forest plots
Fig. 14 Community forestry as a critical component of these new cultural-technological experi-
mental forest plots
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Fig. 15 Proposed phasing strategy showing the implementation of experimental forest plots over
the next 20 years
Fig. 16 Proposed community forest project conducted in Phase One of experimental forest plot
implementation
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Fig. 17 Scenario Two explores the establishment of joint experimental forest plots by Chinese
Academy of Science and Chinese Academy of Forestry within Laos’s Nam Ha National Protected
Area, where the scientific research on medicinal plant species is implemented
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Fig. 18 Phasing strategy showing the implementation of experimental forest plots over the next
10 years
Fig. 19 Negotiation at various levels and scales are required prior to proposal implementation
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Fig. 20 According to the Lao government’s classification of pharmaceutical species, the planting
scheme ofmedicinal species is developed and refined by sampling those species that are ecologically
fit for the Nam Ha National Protected Area
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3 Empowering a Labor Transition During Enclosure
and Securitization of Luang Prabang’s Natural Heritage
In response to the rapid expansion of various forms of commodification and enclosure
of natural heritage in Luang Prabang, this proposal foregrounds issues related to the
integration of local populations into thewage-labor economy and explores an alterna-
tive model of conservation and development that empowers, with emancipatory and
social-choice principles, a labor transition with socioecological benefits. The study
and proposal area encompasses villages in close proximity to the Luang Prabang
Wildlife Sanctuary (LPWLS) and situated between the planned Luang Prabang
Special Economic Zone (LPSEZ) and a 34,000-ha protected forest.
This proposal first critically reflects on the existing models of development
enclaves (e.g., special economic zones, industrial zones) and conservation forests
(e.g., protected areas, protected forests) in Laos to underscore Luang Prabang’s posi-
tion as one that not only possesses the country’s largest SEZs under planning4 but
also as one of Laos’s wildlife trade hotspots–a critical site for combatting wildlife
trafficking (Figs. 23 and 24) (Davis & Glikman, 2020). Occupying 4,850 ha of land
with a concession lease duration of 99 years and located immediately adjacent to the
buffer zone of UNESCO’s Luang Prabang World Heritage Site property, the LPSEZ
is expected to start construction after the completion of the China-Laos Railway in
2021. Despite its promises to generate job opportunities for local people, the SEZ
is following similar models of urban development and enclosure that dispossess the
local population while simultaneously integrating them with few alternatives into
wage-labor markets. In addition, the LPSEZ along with the opening of the China-
Laos Railway are expected to exacerbate pressures on local conservation practices.
For example, the operators of the LPWLS, which is located three kilometers to the
south of theLPSEZ’s “S3” zone, are concernedwith the limited capacity of their facil-
ities to handle the impacts of rapid development in the region. Established in 2017 as
Laos’s firstwildlife sanctuary andhospital, the 6.6-haLPWLShouses over 55 rescued
sun bears and moon bears as of 2019 and is considering releasing rehabilitated bears
into the wild for conservation due to the foreseeable growth of wildlife poaching and
trafficking induced by improved transnational connectivity and, correspondingly, the
increasing seizures and pressures on the sanctuary’s physical capacity.5
To tackle these challenges, this proposal identifies the nearby 34,000-ha protected
forest, which is fundamentally a “paper park” due to its lack of on-the-ground
management, as a potential site for carrying out a bear-releasing scheme. Unfor-
tunately, such a scheme will likely be hindered by an existing contested relation-
ship with adjacent communities who actively use bear parts for traditional medicine
(Fig. 25) (Sukanan & Anthony, 2019). Similar to other protected areas in Laos, the
establishment of this protected forest must contend with the exclusion of customary
4 China Economic Information Service (2018). Occupying an area of 4,850 ha, the Luang Prabang
Special Economic Zone plans to require an investment of 1.2 billion US dollars and provides a
franchised operation period of 99 years.
5 Authors’ conversation in March 2019 with chief executive officer of Free the Bears.
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land uses, such as dry-rice cultivation and forest foraging (Goldman, 2005; Lestrelin
et al., 2012). Even until today, the boundary between the control use zone and the total
protection zone of the protected forest is disputed. Acknowledging these challenges,
this proposal offers a bear-releasing scheme as an opportunity to reconfigure the rela-
tionship between the LPWLS, protected forest and local communities. This recon-
figuration has two main objectives. First, the labor demand associated with forest
protection for bear conservation offers local communities alternatives to working
for the LPSEZ, particularly under an ongoing labor transition across the region.
Second, conserving the protected forest for bear releasing challenges the existing
narrowly scoped forest protection model characterized by a top-down, overly secu-
ritized approach and advocates an alternative conservation model in Laos that is
nature-sensitive and equitable.
In this proposal, local communities from five nearby villages become key players
in the implementation of the LPWLS’s future bear-releasing scheme at the protected
forest (Figs. 26 and 27). Three strategies centered on community engagement are
proposed, namely (1) reforestation for buffer zone establishment and bear habitat
restoration, (2) patrolling and site-based conservation activities, and (3) ecotourism
and related low-impact tourism activities. Levels of community engagement are
quantified through the detailed calculation of dynamic labor demand at the LPSEZ
and protected forest in relation to seasonality in near and long terms (Figs. 28, 29,
30, 31, 32, 33 and 34). Five scenarios are outlined using these strategies, where each
scenario is characterized by different speeds and scales of strategy implementation
and consequent bear-releasing capacity (Figs. 35, 36 and37). In addition to promoting
more voluntary, equal forms of labor transition, detailed design interventions such as
planting schemes andphasing schemes tackle issues such as human-wildlife conflicts,
risks and potential for bear release, and ethical use of state-of-the-art technologies
in conservation. Stressing ethical and critical use of such technologies is important
given the increasing militarization of such technologies in conservation practices
around the world (Adams, 2019).
Ultimately, this proposal strengthens local communities’ sense of meaningful
involvement and responsibility in conservation while protecting and motivating their
rich knowledge of the local landscape. This is incredibly important given ongoing,
rapidly advancing neoliberal modes of nature commodification and securitization.
The value of Luang Prabang’s natural heritage must be planned and defined in excess
of the economy-driven SEZ or the ecology-driven protected forest.
The design proposal “Empowering a labor transition during enclosure and secu-
ritization of Luang Prabang’s natural heritage” and accompanying illustrations were
developed by Rachel Ma On Ki and Haven Lee Chi Hang during the course Studio
Laos: Strategic Landscape Planning for the Greater Mekong.
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Fig. 23 Encroachment of Luang Prabang Special Economic Zone on a 34,000-ha protected forest
outside Luang Prabang town and the limited capacity of Luang Prabang Wildlife Sanctuary to
handle new rescued wildlife from the increasing illegal trade
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Fig. 24 Regional forces and impacts on a 34,000-ha protected forest outside Luang Prabang town.
Luang Prabang possesses one of the country’s largest special economic zones, and it has become
one of Laos’s wildlife trade hotspots and a crucial site for combatting wildlife trafficking
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Fig. 26 Comparison of labor demand and financial incentives between Luang Prabang Special
Economic Zone and the proposed agroforestry and conservation management scheme for the
protected forest
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Fig. 27 Reforestation for buffer zone establishment and bear habitat restoration at a 34,000-ha
protected forest outside Luang Prabang, which has been selected as a potential site for a bear-
releasing scheme
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Fig. 28 The successful implementation of the proposed bear-releasing scheme in the protected
forest depends strongly on collaboration with local communities and their support for the initiative
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Fig. 29 Planting scheme and implementation scenarios of pilot site reforestation
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Fig. 30 Bear territory and seasonalmigration patterns. LuangPrabang’s protected forest is degraded
and needs to be reforested in order to establish a buffer zone and restore bear habitat
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Fig. 31 Procedures and challenges of rehabilitation and reintroduction of captive-reared bears
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Fig. 32 The successful implementation of the bear-releasing scheme at Luang Prabang’s protected
forest depends strongly on the participation and patrolling effort of individuals from the local
villages
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Fig. 33 Patrol route planning and strategic, ethical application of artificial intelligence technology
in conservation, which is important given the increasing militarization of such technologies in
conservation practices around the world
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Fig. 34 Three patrol schemes are outlined corresponding to the availability of labor, degree of
artificial intelligence utilization, and demand of ecotourism activities at Luang Prabang’s protected
forest
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Fig. 35 Five scenarios are outlined to empower a labor transition with socioecological bene-
fits. Each scenario is characterized by different speeds and scales of strategy implementation and
consequent bear-releasing capacity at Luang Prabang’s protected forest
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Fig. 36 In Scenario One (top), 55% of the working population will participate in the scheme, and
15,000 ha of the forest will be regenerated in 50 years. In Scenario Three (middle), only 30% of
the working population is assumed to willingly participate in the scheme, and 5,000 ha of the forest
will be regenerated in 50 years. In Scenario Five (bottom), most of the villagers may eventually
decide to work in the Luang Prabang Special Economic Zone, and none of the working population
will participate in the community involvement program for forest regeneration
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Fig. 37 In the first five to 10 years of proposal implementation, Scenario One is likely to happen
given the uncertainty of the construction and opening of the Luang Prabang Special Economic Zone
(SEZ). After the first decade of project implementation, Scenario Three is likely to happen, and
local communities are expected to participate in the planting and patrolling schemes while seeking
seasonal employment opportunities at the SEZ. Ultimately, this project introduces flexible strategies
that enhance the communities’ freedom of choice
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4 Clean Versus Organic: Strategic Agricultural Enterprises
for Vientiane Under Rural–Urban Migration
This proposal advocates the establishment of new agricultural enterprises in Vien-
tiane, Laos’s national capital, which is undergoing rapid rural–urban transformation
and situated at the receiving end of nationwide rural–urban migration of the past two
decades. Specifically, this proposal promotes sustainable agricultural practices that
are “clean” rather than “organic” within the specific socioeconomic context of Laos
(Fig. 38).
The increasingly mainstream organic agricultural practice, which emerged due
to the growth of ethical consumerism in developed countries, may not be a suit-
able model for Laos.6 Organic agriculture criticizes negative socio-environmental
impacts of industrial agriculture and advocates reciprocity and justice (Clarke, 2008).
Nevertheless, this practice is tightly associated with capitalist agriculture and often
excludes alternative agricultural practices that are otherwise socially, ethically, and
environmentally responsible but that remain outside the government certification
system, largely for political-economic reasons (Moberg, 2014; Schreer & Padman-
abhan, 2019). In Laos, institutional infrastructure supporting organic agriculture has
been established since the early 2000s, with a state certification body formed in 2005
(UNCTAD, 2012). In contrast to organic agriculture, this strategic planning proposal
promotes clean agriculture based on the following two premises. First, acknowl-
edging that farmers possess irreplaceable and incomparable knowledge about their
land and practices, clean agriculture is built on trust and peer-group assessment as
an alternative to government certification. Second, understanding that most land in
rapidly urbanizing Vientiane has been polluted to various degrees, clean agriculture
promotes the improvement of degraded land via agricultural practices rather than
mandating organically certified products grown on pollutant-free land (Figs. 39, 40
and 41).
This proposal pays tribute to and draws inspiration from the practice of the Partic-
ipatory Development Training Centre (PADETC), an indigenous, all-Lao organiza-
tion founded in 1996 to promote “education for sustainable development” (PADETC,
2012). Through detailed analysis of two of PADETC’s development learning centers
and networks in Vientiane, namely Panyanivej Eco-Rice Fish Farm and Suanmailao
Eco-Forest Learning Center, this proposal recognizes both the value of PADETC’s
participatory operational frameworks and the ever-intensifying challenges to advo-
cate for sustainable development in Laos. These challenges include the recently
constructed highway, which links the Wattay International Airport and Vientiane
station of the China-Laos Railway and that bisected Panyanivej Farm and destroyed
its primary irrigation source, and the Saysettha Special Economic Zone (SEZ), which
expropriated the Suanmailao Eco-Forest within its development zone (Figs. 42 and
43). In addition to the fact that the expansion of development projects has physically
impaired and spatially constrained the much-needed programs and facilities of these
6 Authors’ conversation in March 2019 with Shui-Meng Ng, founder of TaiBaan and wife of
disappeared sustainable development expert Sombath Somphone.
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social enterprises, Vientiane faces increasing social issues related to the influx of
young rural–urban migrants from diverse regions of the country who are in search
of better employment opportunities.7
Given all of these challenges, this proposal foregrounds the importance of securing
agricultural land for sustainable practices in rapidly urbanizing Vientiane, on the
one hand, and preserving indigenous agricultural and environmental knowledge for
rural–urbanmigrants on the other.While domestic NGOs such as PADETC and other
social enterprises try to expand their influence by establishing education centers in
various parts of the country, this proposal takes a reversed approach by motivating
young migrants in Vientiane to participate in agricultural knowledge production and
exchange programs. Specifically, this proposal takes advantage of young migrants’
transitional periods, which average between three and 12 months starting from their
arrival in the city and securing of employment, offering short-term job opportunities
and accommodation.
Agricultural land along the Houay Makhiao River connecting the former That
Luang Marsh and the Mekong River is identified as a hypothetical site to set up a
network of community-based platforms promoting knowledge exchange and “clean”
agricultural practices (Figs. 44, 45 and 46). With the That Luang Marsh, once Vien-
tiane’s largest wetland (Gerrard, 2005, p. 5), recently subsumed into That Luang
Lake SEZ, this proposal also functions as a strategy to resist further urban expansion
along the Houay Makhiao River by transforming the land into a crucial piece of
agricultural and educational infrastructure with both local and national significance.
Three categories of existing livelihood dependency (i.e., high, medium, and low) on
the Houay Makhiao River are identified and three out of the seven villages along
the river are selected as sites for scenario-building (Figs. 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53,
54 and 55). An operational matrix is suggested that pairs up particular sets of agri-
cultural practices and knowledge with these sites as characterized by levels of land
degradation, water pollution and land and water availability.
Recognition the social and ecological impacts from the unprecedented speed
and scale of rural–urban transformation in Laos, this proposal promotes a Lao-
specific sustainable model that improves food security, knowledge resilience and
socio-environmental justice.
The design proposal “Clean versus organic: Strategic agricultural enterprises
for Vientiane under rural–urban migration” and accompanying illustrations were
developed by Cynthia Chan Sze Wai, Micky Lo Sheung Miu, and Theo Sham Chi
Chung during the course Studio Laos: Strategic Landscape Planning for the Greater
Mekong.
7 Authors’ conversation in March 2018 and 2019 with the director of Panyanivej Eco-Rice Fish
Farm.
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Fig. 38 Comparison of trust-based clean agriculture and certificate-based organic agriculture
models. Given the specific socioeconomic context of Laos, this proposal promotes clean agri-
culture that acknowledges the farmers’ irreplaceable and incomparable knowledge about their land
and practices and promotes the improvement of degraded land through agricultural activities
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Fig. 39 Rural–urban migrants newly arrived at Vientiane, Laos’s national capital, carry region-
specific indigenous knowledge, including agricultural, forestry, livestock, handicraft and architec-
tural
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Fig. 40 Hydrological system of Vientiane in 1995 (top) and 2010 (bottom). Rapid urbanization
leads to changes in the quantity, type and spatial patterns of land use and radically transforms the
hydrological system of Vientiane Prefecture
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Fig. 41 Hydrological system of Vientiane in 2020. Enclosure and urbanization processes, particu-
larly the establishment of five special economic zones in Vientiane over the past decade, have signif-
icantly decreased the availability of agricultural land and the viability of smallholder agricultural
practices
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Fig. 42 Case Study One: Panyanivej Learning Centre of the Participatory Development Training
Centre (PADETC). The recently constructed highway linking the Wattay International Airport and
the Vientiane station of the China-Laos Railway has bisected Panyanivej Farm and destroyed its
primary irrigation source
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Fig. 43 CaseStudyTwo: SuanmailaoEco-Forest LearningCenter of the ParticipatoryDevelopment
Training Centre (PADETC). The Saysettha Special Economic Zone has completely expropriated
the Suanmailao Eco-Forest within its boundary
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Fig. 44 Proposed sites for the establishment of agricultural enterprises in Vientiane. With the
That Luang Marsh (Vientiane’s largest wetland) recently subsumed within the That Luang Lake
Special Economic Zone, strategic proposal sites have been selected to further counter the urban
expansion along Houay Makhiao River by transforming the land into crucial sites of agricultural
and educational infrastructure
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Fig. 47 Site plan of Ban Xamkhe village and proposed development model A: eco-agriculture
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Fig. 48 Development phases of proposed eco-agriculture introduced to Ban Xamhe village
Fig. 49 Illustrative view of eco fish-rice farm at Ban Xamhe village
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Fig. 50 Site plan of BanNano village and proposed developmentmodel B: conservation agriculture













































4 Clean Versus Organic: Strategic Agricultural Enterprises for Vientiane Under … 245
Fig. 52 Illustrative view of conservation farm at Ban Nano village
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Fig. 53 Site plan of Ban Makhiao village and proposed development model C: self-sufficient
agriculture
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Fig. 55 Illustrative view of self-sufficient farm at Ban Makhiao village
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